CAN'T WE TURN THEM ALL INTO AMERICAN CLIENT STATES? -- AN IRANIAN UPDATE
Iran and not Iraq can cause headaches to U.S. foreign policy. The American Presidency gave up publicly on its effort to lure the moderates within Iran. In truth, what the U.S. Presidency gave up was its loud chatter about its flirtation with those moderates, which had hurt their cause. Now, with the U.S. keeping some distance, perhaps the moderates under President Khatami could clinch power. A doubtful proposition, since these moderates are now being outbid by yet more pro-Western forces: the students. So it's chaos, an environment where moderates fare badly; and the threat of an American invasion or strike against a nuclear facility, should weaken the moderates even further. But hope springs eternal.
Why is Iran so important to the United States? For one, Iran's Islamic populist policy, pitting it against Israel, has gained it a lot of popularity in the Muslim and Arab world. There's no Arab nation that is able or willing to defend Arab . . .honor; Iran is. Hence its popularity. And with popularity comes the dream of regional leadership--and space. Iran needs to breathe, and the region is its natural outlet.
Iran is the only country at present which has accepted the challenge posed by Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and satellites. Israel had introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East, and Iran intends on catching up, and it probably will. Policy-makers in both countries continually ridicule each other about the state of that winless race. The Arab public watches and is impressed by Iran's daring policies.
Second, Iran had taught the Shias of Lebanon and the Palestinians of Israel-Palestine about the effectiveness of unconventional warfare, including suicide-bombing. That method has rocked Israel, the American ally par excellence in the region.
Third, Iran stands in the way of an American invasion of Iraq. True, Iraq is not keen on too rapid a deepening of its relationship with Iran; but recent military maneuvers by the latter in he Sea of Oman and on its borders with Iraq are messages intended not to Iraq but to the United States. Iran could not afford to see the United States control Iraq and its oil, both for commercial self-interest (oil prices) and for the strategic value of having access to Syria and Lebanon--to the Mediterranean, North Africa and Europe. Space is important to a country which feels trapped from east (the United States in Afghanistan and the former Russian republics) and west (the United States in the Arabian peninsula: in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain.)
Fourth, Iran is Syria's only capable military ally, and the Arab public can see that. But for Iran's influence over the Shias of Lebanon, Syria would lose its most powerful weapon against Israel. Syria can use the Palestinian refugees, but these would have to go through Shia lines to get to the Lebanese-Israeli border. Syria keeps its negotiating line open with the United States, on the chance that the U.S. would convince the Israelis to fully relinquish the Golan. But Syria is no fool. It would be relatively easy for the United States to diffuse some of the tension by forcing its ally to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders. But it isn't willing to do this. Therefore, Syria will hold dear to its Iranian relationship, allowing Iran the influence it feels it deserves. (In Lebanon, Syria has kept the Palestinian camps under the control of their residents, a weapon that it would unleash at will should its hope for a return of the Golan through American pressure wane.)

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