SAUDI ARABIA'S POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ: PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO LET UP AND CONTAIN IRAN

The American campaign of psychological warfare against Iraq was dizzying.  Its purpose, SPC believes, was to divert the Arab public's attention away from Israel-Palestine. In that, it was successful.  Suddenly, Iraq became the most prominent issue, as the U.S. campaign ignited one fire after another, forcing all to pay attention.  But some fires were comical--though few saw it that way.   Note, for instance, the charade of an American-sponsored conference (who else would pay for it in the heart of London?) of former Iraqi army officers which met in London about mid-July.  It was part of the intense U.S. campaign of disinformation which implicated Jordan as an important launch pad for the American assault on Iraq--embarrassing that country, which benefits immensely from cheap Iraqi oil.  (A taxi across Amman costs between one and two dollars; across Beirut: twenty-five to thirty!)  And note the attendance at the officers' conference of the Jordanian king's uncle, Prince Hasan bin Talal.  The conference brought back a slice of Arab history in a surrealistic British setting with a bunch of exiled officers now probably on our payroll!  But it worked.  It got the Arab public and press so preoccupied with the prospect of an invasion that less space was given to the Intifadha!

The conference of former officers, while part bluff, was real nonetheless, and did fit into a pattern of preparation for some action in Iraq.  Here's SPC's explanation for Hasan bin Talal's attendance:  we know that an American assault on Iraq could result in an Iraqi civil war, Shia against Sunni.  The Shias man many of the regular armed forces; the Sunnis the Republican Guard and the Special Forces.  Iran would go in.  A Shia-ruled Iraq--even if Iran controlled only a part of it--would thus be part and parcel of Iran, a la Syria-and-Lebanon model.  A Shia powerhouse would threaten the Gulf countries.  The United States' propaganda specialists needed a way out of this perception, to ease the fears of the Iraqi Sunnis, especially within the officer corps.    So our government probably smooth-talked Prince Hasan to make an appearance at the conference, giving the Sunni doubtful some assurance.  (The very prospect of a war with Iran, to liberate the south of Iraq or to control Iran's guerrillas, is by itself a complicating factor in the hypothetical invasion of Iraq.) 

Iraq remains stubborn.  It wants a total lifting of the sanctions in return for allowing international inspectors back into the country.    What weapons of mass destruction it has--if it has any--it'll continue to conceal, as these are its only effective means of defense against its more powerful Shia neighbor: Iran. 

In the middle of America's campaign of psychological warfare,  Iraq turned to Saudi Arabia for help. Uday Saddam Hussein wrote an article which smacked of nervousness; he said that the United States planned to break-up Saudi Arabia into cantons,  similarly to Iraq, and that Iraq would defend the Kingdom.  This "analysis" can be read as part of the Iraqi government's continued rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.    For Iraq is torn strategically between allying itself to Iran, or seeking shelter in Arab (Sunni) solidarity.  For now, it has chosen Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, of course, cannot offer military assistance.  The most it can do is to persuade its ally, the United States, to ease up.  To that end, it can point out that an invasion of Iraq might very well result in the rise of Iraq's Shia majority, resulting in an Iraq that is totally allied to anti-American Iran.  It can also remind the United States that it has become the most hated country in the Arab world and the kingdom thanks to its alliance with Israel and its anti-Iraq campaign.  At an extreme, its policies may threaten the very survival of the current pro-American Saudi government.