WILL THE NEW PATH WORK?

The Saudis will place pressure on Mr. Arafat to seize full control of the West Bank and Gaza, to tailor himself in the image of other Arab leaders. But the Israelis would have to cooperate, and so would the Americans. The Israelis would have to remove their settlements from the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza--or at least make that commitment and start the process.

Israel's love of others' land and water, and the intent of Iran and Syria to balance out Israeli power, will assure continued Arab public support for the Palestinians' effort to liberate their land one way or another. Of course, those liberators will be squeezed for a time by Arafat on the inside and the United States and its Arab allies on the outside.

In short, the Saudis will have their hands full. They have taken on the role of mediator between the United States on the one hand, and on the other the Arab public and the Palestinians. By extension, they've taken on the role of tamers of Israel's government. And they've tied their domestic legitimacy to that policy. Barring a change in Israel's government, the Saudis will be in for a nasty time. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is unlikely to cooperate. Having unleashed him, the Bush administration will be unable to control him fast. The U.S. will have to return to an old policy of supporting the Labor party, and probably indirectly finance it to help it re-take government. That's a long-term project, and the Arab and Saudi masses may not be patient.

But Saudi Arabia has other sources of Arab nationalist legitimacy: Iraq and Syria. And it could continue to be outspoken in its criticism of Israel while trying to work for some peace in Palestine. Will Abdallah end up limping the way others had been? Perhaps it's better if he doesn't place too much pressure on Arafat to encircle the liberators, and let Israel go back in, again and again, until it gets tired. In the meanwhile, he can continue on with the successful policy he has recently pursued: humanitarian aid, intervention with the Americans, protecting Iraq from invasion, and so on of Arab nationalist policies.

Too, he might want to think about opening a secret channel for talks with Israel's Labor Party and help finance it along with the Americans.

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY: A SECOND LOOK

In the short term, an Iranian-Iraqi mutual defense treaty would benefit Saudi Arabia. It would diminish the possibility that its ally, the United States, would control oil prices, by controlling Iraq. In other words, America's failure to control Iraq would benefit the Saudis, since they would remain in relative control of world oil prices. Not to mention that this treaty would lessen the possibility of an American invasion of Iraq--a nightmare for the Saudi leadership. Domestically, all bets would be off if the Saudi public sees an American invasion of a neighboring Arab country.

But these benefits are temporary. The United States or Iran could raise the tension, and Iran might decide to expand its unconventional methods into the Kingdom. Or the Israelis could delay their withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza, east Jerusalem, and the Golan, defeating Abdallah's new path of Arab nationalism. That defeat could diminish Abdallah's ability to absorb domestic dissatisfaction; with that, the way could once again be open for Iran to wage its unconventional warfare inside the Kingdom.

A MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY IS NEAR

THE U.S. IS TRYING TO DELAY IT BY LURING IRAN INTO SECRET TALKS AND PROMISES

THE U.S. SABRE RATTLING AGAINST IRAQ IS ONLY THAT AND IS MEANT TO KEEP IRAN PREOCCUPIED AWAY FROM CENTRAL ASIA

To delay an Iranian-Iraqi defense treaty the U.S. has been engaging Iranian moderates (and hardliners, some say) in secret talks. SPC can only speculate that the American party to these talks is providing Iran with assurances: that an American invasion of Iraq will respect Iranian interests in that country. That, in essence, would mean that the American-sponsored Iraqi government would include substantial Shia representation. Too, the U.S. party is probably providing assurances that the United States will not use its control of the new Iraq to lower oil prices. But the tactic of secret talks without more can only delay a mutual defense treaty, not stop it. The Iranians are awakening to the hidden purpose of the talks. In the meanwhile, Iran is mobilizing its public, as we are. (SPC suspects that the Iranians are better at it than we.) Recently, on or about May 16, the Iranian President (a moderate) described the U.S. as the most distinguished face of evil/terror.

American assurances notwithstanding, the Iranians don't believe that an American-sponsored government in Iraq will not result in American control of worldwide oil prices. Concomitantly, Iran will lose all hope of regaining its regional power status, which status already has been undermined by the U.S. military presence in the region.

What do the Iranian hardliners expect in secret talks with the United States? For one, they probably are trying to rob the Iranian moderates of their monopoly of the American relationship. For another, they are drawing the line clear to the United States as to what Iran can't put up with.

The Iranians know that an American attack on Iraq could result in a Sunni assault on the Shia of Iraq, if Iran colludes with the United States. Cold-blooded massacres would turn the American invasion into an Iraqi Sunni-Shia civil war. A few massacres against Shia, and counter-massacres against Sunnis, should coalesce all Sunnis in support of the Saddam Hussein regime. These massacres would almost certainly result in an Iranian invasion of Iraq, from the south. The American and Iranian invasions are certain to bring about Arab Sunni outrage and assistance. The Arabs, having recently re-discovered their nationalism, thanks to Jenin, could react violently against their governments.

The news of secret meetings between Iranian and American officials are making the Iraqis nervous. After all, Iran and the United States are engaged in competition in the Caspian Sea basin. Accordingly, Iraqi officials fear that the Iranians would make a deal with the Americans: Iran would hope to obtain concessions in that basin, in exchange for sitting out an American invasion of Iraq.

But it is unlikely that any compromise would be reached about the Caspian Sea basin. The matter is far too complex for such a compromise, since the United States hasn't yet become too comfortable in that region, and Iran would hardly be able to offer anything of value. At any rate, Iran cannot afford to be so heavily engaged on two fronts: the Middle East and Central Asia. It possibly perceives the United States' sabre rattling against Iraq as a means to keep it preoccupied away from Central Asia. Why not play along, then, and patch up relations with the Iraqi regime, to buttress the Middle Eastern regional anti-American coalition? To assuage the Iraqi regime's nervousness, Iran might have to sign a mutual defense treaty with it, and offer it troops to help it defend itself against an American invasion.

Such a treaty would isolate Iran no further. It is, after all, a member of the axis of evil, and is the subject of an American weapons' embargo. Additionally, such a treaty would allow Iran and Iraq to check increasing Turkish influence in northern Iraq. Turkey, to further its interests, is said to have been organizing the ethnic Turkish minority in that region.

America's continued arms and commercial embargo against Iran is part of the dual containment policy against both Iraq an Iran. This embargo assures continued Iranian mistrust of the United States. A mutual defense treaty with Iraq would send the clearest message to Washington that it will not be allowed any more control over the supplies and price of oil. For the near future, the new alliance would not be directed at Saudi Arabia.

But the new alliance can wreck havoc to America's policy in Kurdistan. Iran can interject itself in Kurdish politics in northern Iraq, bringing Turkey closer to outright military intervention. That would disturb the most important launch-pad to the increasingly theoretical (and unlikely) invasion of Iraq. To mobilize its people and Arabs against the United States, Iran has made accusations that the U.S. is sponsoring another Israel in northern Iraq--an independent country for an exclusive ethnic-religious group, the Kurds.

Iran also can disturb the commercial and social peace of affluent Qatar, where Al Udeid is located, the air base the United States plans to use in its invasion of Iraq.

The mutual defense treaty would have another important benefit. Iran should be concerned with an American nuclear retaliation against Iraq for its use of chemical and biological weapons if the U.S. invades. Even a minimal nuclear response would threaten the health and safety of Iran's population. Regaining the confidence of the Iraqi regime would assure it that Iran would defend it, and thus avoid a desperate Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons and an American nuclear retaliation. In short, Iran would hope to avoid an ecological disaster.

Closer relations between Iran and Iraq have been evolving, slowly. For one, in late January of this year, Iran announced that it would be running regular civilian flights between Tehran and Damascus, flying over Iraqi territory. (Currently, Iran runs flights between Tehran and Baghdad.) Iran also released over 600 Iraqi prisoners of war. Iraq, in turn, released 48 Iranian POWS. The two countries had also signed a understanding for cooperation in educational, cultural, and artistic fields. Could these be the confidence-building steps on the way to a mutual defense treaty?

THE SAUDIS: WHERE DO THEY STAND?

Saudi Arabia is working to rehabilitate Iraq. But the United States stands in the way of the total rehabilitation of that regime, as it continues to dream of a successful coup. Pursuant to its new role as an activist country on behalf of Arab causes, under Abdallah, Saudi Arabia could not ignore Iraq's plight--albeit that plight is becoming softer by the day. Still, Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faysal, drew closer to Iraq, when he reminded the press in late April, 2002, that Iraq had committed itself not to ever repeat its 1990 adventure.

On May 11, an Iraqi delegation left to Saudi Arabia, headed by the Iraqi Minister of Industry and Minerals, to participate in an Arab conference. While the Saudis avoided direct comment about whether bilateral talks would be held, the Iraqi Minister was less circumspect: He expected such talks. Two days later, the Saudi deputy Foreign Minister, Prince Ahmad bin Abdel-Aziz, commented about the Iraqi visit. Iraq, he said, is a brotherly country, of which we're proud and about which we care; we feel for it. He added that cooperation between the Kingdom and Iraq was old and will continue. (SPC Note: Could it be that Abdallah has slated Prince Ahmad to be the Kingdom's official Arab patriot?)

Soon after Ahmad's statement, it was announced that Saudi exporters of goods to Iraq may use one border post, and may use the same post for "re-exporting" non-Saudi products.

But the campaign to impose Pax Americana in the Arab world will make it difficult for the Saudi government to fulfill its citizenry's wishes: that their country lead the Arab patriotic fight. Saudi Arabia will thus have to walk a tight rope, between on the one hand the policy of direct intervention by the United States, its foremost ally, and on the other, the Palestinians and those Arab countries and Iran who the U.S. President has branded as evil.

WILL IRAN SIGN A MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH IRAQ?

There was a time, prior to the Gulf wars, when Iran and Iraq had balanced each other's power. No one then would have thought they would ever become allies. Now they are. The U.S. presence in various Gulf countries has all but united the two erstwhile enemies. The United States now stands at Iran's doorstep, and the Islamic Republic knows not to combat the one supreme power in the unipolar world. If war ever is imposed on the Islamic Republic, it'll conduct it unconventionally--at least where it can. The Islamic Republic after all had seen what happened to Iraq when it fought a conventional war with the United States.

The direct American involvement in the area--in the siege of Iraq, the alliance with the Kurds, the location of military bases in the Gulf countries--has brought Iran and Iraq closer. For now, however, mistrust on both sides has prevented an outright alliance. But the United States is pushing (unwisely in SPC's view) hard to throw the two countries into each other's arms.

ABDALLAH VISITS THE UNITED STATES

The strongest move in mending Saudi-American relations came in Abdallah's visit to Texas in late April, 2002. There, the Crown Prince re-awakened the American President to the dangers to American interests lurching in the military campaign launched by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon against the West Bank. It was time, anyway, for our President to re-balance his approach. His hitherto perspective--Let Arabs and Israelis kill each other-- who cares?-- was now threatening the stability of pro-American governments. The assault on the Palestinians, for as long as it lasted, was good news for those who wanted revenge for September 11. Never mind that the Palestinians had nothing to do with that horror; that they aimed for the Israelis to stop robbing them of their land and water. SPC suspects that, to many on the right of the President, some retaliation for September 11 was in order, and it was alright to leave it to Ariel Sharon to do the dirty work.

SAUDI WOMEN OBTAIN IDENTITY CARDS

The Saudi government understood that an American non-governmental counter-assault on the Kingdom could very well take the form of prying about the rights of Saudi women. That would be a natural for those in the United States who wanted to exercise imperial control over the affairs of yet another country, as open editorial pages filled fast with articles on the status of women in Saudi Arabia.

To meet the possibility of a gender counter-attack (so to speak) on the Kingdom, Saudi authorities announced in early December 2001 that they would provide identity cards to women-applicants.

ACCOMMODATING THE AMERICAN LEFT

Another American counter-assault seemed to be brewing, a particularly dangerous one. Less than one month following bin Laden's ordered suicide attack on New York and Virginia, a former United States' President, an icon of the left, with star status, made long remarks at Georgetown University, his and this publisher's alma mater. In those remarks, given on November 7, 2001, the former president reasoned about the state of the world. At one time, he called for activism on behalf of democracy, seeing that political system as a "stabilizing force." He said, "...it's no accident that most of these terrorists come from non-democratic countries. If you live in a country where you're never required to take responsibility for yourself, where you never even have to ask whether there's something wrong you should be doing to solve your own problems, then people are kept in a kind of a permanent state of collective immaturity and it becomes quite easy for them to believe that someone else's success is the cause of their distress." He went on to note: "...in the Middle East most governments are characterized either as theocracies...or they're secular governments but they're either weak democracies or they're not real democracies. And underneath there are fundamentalist movements that essentially say the west is the source of all evil...So it's all backward looking."

Was this a call for an American penetration of the Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, a la campaigns we've used to open up other countries? Former President Clinton was soon to visit Saudi Arabia, invited by the Economic Forum Of Jeddah. Sources revealed to the Arab press that the former President was paid one million Saudi Riyals for his participation in the Forum--the equivalent of $266,000.

COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES

Saudi Arabia has accepted to cooperate closely with U.S. authorities on tracing money laundering as a source of support for bin Laden's Islamic terror network. This should offer the United States a deeper inside look into the extensive Saudi and Arab informal money movement and laundering. Time will tell how effective the new knowledge will be. For now, we can rest assured that the informal system will find ways of dodging the new monitoring, shifting perhaps to other countries and banks outside of the Gulf region.

THE KINGDOM RE-AFFIRMS ITS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES

The Saudi government was concerned about an American political counter-assault on the Kingdom in response to the September 11 attacks. It took steps to meet that assault head on, to cooperate with the U.S. government, and to neutralize potential and possibly dangerous American non-governmental initiatives.

ABDALLAH'S TASK HAS JUST BEGUN: HELP FOR IRAQ AND SYRIA

The Saudi governmental establishment has known that it could not ignore any issue of concern to the Arab public. But Usama bin Laden and September 11 have given zest to that hypothesis. After all, that governmental establishment had allowed one of its politicians to hijack pan-arab issues, under the guise of Islam. Usama Bin Laden and the Islamists he headed had read the Saudi and Arab people better than many. They understood the centrality of the Palestinian agony to their very identity. And the suffering of the Iraqi people wasn't far behind. From now on, in the midst of the heaviest American direct intervention and expansion of its presence in the Arab world, any Arab government allied to the United States could ill afford to ignore the suffering of any part of the Arab people.

Thus, in Beirut, at the Arab summit conference, Saudi Arabia and Iraq made up. That has put an end to the cold war that had been waged by the two countries, and which could be seen in the press of each.
Hearing the message from its citizenry, the Kingdom had expressed its opposition to the use by the U.S. of the Prince Sultan Air Force base as a launch pad for an invasion of Iraq. In response, the United States has been shifting its resources to an air base in Qatar: Al Udeid. (SPC notes that Qatar would not have offered its base without a Saudi wink.)

The Israeli government continues to provide the Kingdom with yet more sources for strengthening its connection to its people. It has been reported recently that the Sharon government has opened a new project for settlement on the Golan Heights. This project would make available one thousand housing units in the eighteen settlements already present in the Golan. And so, soon, the Kingdom would have the opportunity to expand its list of sources of legitimacy, by minding the issue of Israel's expansion of its colonies on Syrian land.

MORE LEGITIMACY: WE WERE AND STILL ARE GOOD MUSLIMS. THAT'S WHY THEY'VE WAGED A CAMPAIGN AGAINST US IN THE WEST

Though Palestine and Arab solidarity loomed largest in the newly-energized Saudi policy to absorb domestic dissatisfaction, the Saudi rulers still felt the need to remind their public that they were as ever devout Muslims. This obviously was a response to the Saudi opposition which literature, found on the internet, accuses the royal family of having deserted Islamic teachings. (SPC has been reviewing the opposition literature; for now, SPC hasn't found it useful to synopsize it.)

King Fahd thus assured Saudis in early November 2001 that the country will "remain fond of the Book of God and the Sunna of [His] Prophet, in word and work, law and principle, and way of life, until such time as God inherits the earth and its inhabitants." Crown Prince Abdallah did as much in late November, in a meeting with the Kingdom's leadership: You know, he told his audience, that the campaigns against the Kingdom is caused by our reference to Muhammadean Shariah.

ABSORBING DOMESTIC DISSATISFACTION:PALESTINE-IN-CRISIS IS THE SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY FOR EACH AND EVERY ARAB GOVERNMENT

It took September 11 to awaken the Saudi governmental establishment to the dissatisfaction of its people. It caught on fast. It read the public message as follows: We the Saudi people are Arab, and have brethren in Jenin who are being murdered by a state that was built on stolen Arab land, one that is financed by the same imperial power which is our royal family's closest ally. We have oil and can live without that ally who, in effect, is murdering our brethren.

Abdallah took in that message and, fortunate for him, Israel was led by Ariel Sharon, an easy target to hate and mobilize against. The Arab public holds Sharon responsible for the cold-blooded murder of 600 to 1000 Palestinian civilians, mostly women and children, at Sabra and Shatila. He was now doing it at Jenin.

Though Saudi Arabia had never ignored the Palestinians' struggle against colonization, it took Usama bin Laden, September 11, and Ariel Sharon to inject life into Saudi Arabia's Palestine policy. The entire Arab nation, including the Saudis, was so offended by Sharon's attempt at humiliating the Palestinian Arabs. The resistance of the impoverished Palestinian fighters at Jenin, against overwhelming Israeli force, revived Arab pride. Abdallah read the new political map. (SPC predicts that Jenin will become a hallmark in the revival of Arab nationalism, now that Islamic fundamentalism has proven murderous, ineffective, is been hunted down the world over.)

Saudi Arabia sent humanitarian help, both governmental and grass-roots, to the Palestinians. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to Britain, Ghazi Algosaibi, published a poem in Arabic called "The Martyrs." His words expressed the frustration of the Arab masses, Saudis included, at repeated humiliation by Israel. You died to honor God's word, said the poem. You committed suicide. In fact, we are the ones who committed suicide by living like the dead. The Palestinian suicide bombers and Jenin had thus revived Arab pride and nationalism--even in hitherto insulated Saudi Arabia.

The Israeli Prime Minister accused Saudi Arabia of supporting terrorism, thus giving Abdallah yet more room to regain legitimacy for the Saudi government at home. And so the Kingdom finally stood its ground: Prince Ahmad bin Abdel-Aziz, Deputy Foreign Minister, responded to the Israeli accusations that the Kingdom is supporting the suicide bombers by providing humanitarian aid to their families. He told reporters: If the Israelis accuse us of being implicated in terrorism because we provide humanitarian aid to the families of suicide bombers, then terrorists we are. And he asserted the Kingdom's continued support of the Palestinians.

To bring the point home to the Saudi populace, the Kingdom's armed forces held maneuvers in the Northwestern region of the Kingdom. SPC looked at the map and decided that these maneuvers were a message to Israel. And, in SPC's view, a message to the Saudi public. Inspired by America's advertisement culture, the military maneuvers were called "Sword of Peace."

THE ROYAL FAMILY PURSUES THE ALLEGIANCE AND READINESS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND SECURITY AGENCIES

The Saudi establishment was rattled not only by the September 11 attacks on the United States, but also by the spreading Western analyses that the Kingdom's government was in danger of collapsing. The Saudi government was never at risk, of course. Still, a crisis was afoot--in legitimacy and with the United States. And there was, it seems, a cautious concern that a popular turmoil could after all materialize and threaten the governmental status quo.

Under Abdallah's leadership, there was a flurry of arranged meetings between high-ranking members of the royal family and the commanders of various branches of the armed forces and the numerous security agencies. These publicized meetings, in SPC's assessment, were probably the tip of the iceberg. Abdallah and his people must've done substantial legwork to awaken and secure the allegiance of those upon whom the responsibility would fall to protect the government.

So, for example, in late November, the Crown Prince briefed the highest Saudi officials, and the commanders and high-ranking officers of the armed forces, the National Guard, General Security, Internal Security Forces, the Royal Guard, and other security and intelligence agencies of the Kingdom about developments involving the Kingdom after September 11. The Crown Prince referred to the anti-Saudi campaign abroad. He gave special thanks to the men of the General Investigations, noting the ability of these men to speedily identify the perpetrators of bombings in the Kingdom. The Crown Prince of course would hope that the same agency would be as effective and alert in these trying times.

Also in late November, Prince Sultan bin Abdel Aziz, the Minister of Defense and Air Force, held a breakfast meeting (Iftar) for the highest-ranking officers of the Army, and the national guard, and security forces. As in the meeting held by the Crown Prince, Prince Sultan spoke about the campaign being waged against the Kingdom overseas. Indirectly, he too was assuring himself of the allegiance of those who would count the most in case of a public revolt.

Prince Sultan congratulated the men of the armed forces, General Security, intelligence, and National Guard for their love of and dedication to their country. As if to respond to the campaign abroad against the Kingdom, and send a cordial message to Abdallah, Prince Sultan noted the democratic nature of the Saudi government. Where else but in the Kingdom, he pointed out, would a Crown Prince meet with a citizen from one of the most rural areas of the kingdom, and have dinner with him?

Defending government extended to the mobilization not only of the armed forces and security agencies, but also of the Princes who ruled the various regions of the Kingdom. At a meeting, which took place also in late November, the Crown Prince briefed the Princes on his efforts and on the campaign being waged against the Kingdom overseas.

Was this campaign necessary? It probably was. News overseas of an imminent collapse of the Saudi government could have the result of demoralizing those who are slated to defend it. Too, Abdallah and his people probably saw this crisis as a good time to secure a larger role in Saudi political life.

THE HOUSE IN ORDER: THE ROYAL FAMILY REACTS TO SEPTEMBER 11

CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH FORGES A NEW PATH. WILL IT LAST?

Following the September 11 attack on the United States, ordered by an opposition Saudi politician in exile, Usama bin Laden, the royal family awoke to a mess: Not only had the Saudi government's intelligence services failed miserably--their failure was now risking Saudi Arabia's historic alliance with the United States.

There was anger in the United States against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. September 11 and America's indignant reaction caught the Saudi establishment by surprise. That establishment suddenly felt under a three-pronged attack. First, domestically, the establishment discovered the popularity of a politician-in-exile, Usama Bin Laden. It could see that, perhaps, things could disintegrate and a hitherto pliant public go rebellious. Second, regionally, the establishment could feel the rage in the Arab world against the United States, and its foremost ally, the Kingdom, brought about by the heavy-handed and eminently unequal Israeli military assault on the Palestinian Arabs. Third, internationally, the establishment could taste for the first time the true possibility that the United States could break its relationship with the royal family and its government.

Crown Prince Abdallah and his associates went to work. They launched a campaign of their own to achieve three goals. First, they wanted to make sure that their government was safe and protected. To that end, they assured the allegiance of the various military and security outfits who would have to protect the government, should popular turmoil materialize. Second, Abdallah needed to absorb domestic anger and dissatisfaction. And third, Abdallah wanted to re-confirm the special relationship with the United States, albeit the Saudi citizenry believed the latter was behind the military onslaught against the Palestinians.

Mission Statement

ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER

The horrific suicide terror attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Virginia revealed the importance of Saudi politics.  Saudi domestic political opposition, after all, had found a way to spill over into deadly attacks on U.S. territory.

Depression, indignation, and repulsion characterized early American reaction.  Since then, the nation has been coming to terms with the new realities of international relations.  Over-reaction and hyper-alertness are the call of the day.

All is not well.  Sadly and dangerously, important sectors of the American polity have unleashed a hostile campaign against Saudi Arabia, expanding on what had hitherto been reserved generally for Arabs and Muslims.  The open editorial pages of The Washington Post, for instance, historically replete with arrogant tirades against the Palestinians, and eminently callous about the suffering of the Iraqi people, have now found license to devastate yet another Arab country--Saudi Arabia.

In short, all Arabs and Muslims without exception have now become fair game.

While indignation and repulsion at the September 11 attacks are fully understandable, a campaign that smacks of racism is not--and is indeed very dangerous.  It could lead, could it not, to wholesale murder in the event Iraq is invaded.

Saudi Arabia is fortunate in that some of the American political elite will forgive and forget, as this elite holds a strategic and commercial world view.  It therefore understands the role Saudi Arabia plays in the welfare of the West, as a stabilizer of oil prices.  Furthermore, some of this elite is commercially integrated to Saudi Arabia, and could not therefore entertain a hostile course towards that country.

But it is a different set of elite which is generating the hostile and war-mongering campaign against Saudi Arabia and Arabs; this elite is found in the media, the populist Christian right, and the right-of-center of the Israel lobby.

OUR COMMITMENT

SPC will endeavor to contribute reason to the debate about Saudi politics.  SPC will investigate relevant aspects of the Saudi polity, and will supply commentary about it.  Though SPC is aware that information about local Saudi affairs is not readily available, the analytical nature of this newsletter will allow it to draw analogies and reach (hopefully) enlightening conclusions.

In short, SPC will try and demystify Saudi politics and give the reader the ability to read it, so to speak, as she is able to read American politics.

SPC will use brief to-the-point analysis and commentary, similar to those found in some financial newsletters.

CONTRIBUTIONS

SPC welcomes contributions.

SPC will gladly translate to English contributions in Arabic.

SPC reserves the right to edit all contributions, summarize them, or turn them down.

SPC will respect the contributor's wish to use a pen name.