U.S. PRESSURES SAUDIS: REIN IN THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS AND WE WILL CALL OFF OUR UNCERTAIN INVASION OF IRAQ!

HAS THE UNITED STATES TAKEN OVER SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY??

Here's the American deal:  Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt and Jordan, will intervene to rein in the Palestinian fighters.  Why?  Because if they don't, the United States will fire up even harder its dis-and misinformation campaign of psychological warfare on Arab Iraq.  The United States will promise an imminent invasion of Iraq, now dear to the mobilized Arab public (mainly because of the American threats to its unity), leaving these governments, especially the Saudi, to deal with their public's wrath.  Preparation is underway for the intelligence services of these three countries to work under U.S. leadership to build new security agencies for the occupied Palestinian territories, without even a hint of a promise of an Israeli withdrawal.  There's even talk about importing Palestine Liberation Army troops from Jordan, who would be willing to suppress the Intifadha--an unlikely prospect.

But Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon wanted to be heard. Having no affection towards the Saudis (See below), he sent in a jet fighter into Gaza to assassinate a Palestinian Islamist leader.  Nine dead children later, and five to six adults, left the budding American-Saudi effort in shambles.  Prime Minister Sharon, after all, is the best thing that's happened to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Aqsa Brigade.  A de Gaulle-like Israeli Prime Minister, who would order withdrawal from all the occupied territories, is too much to ask for in the Middle East.

Editor's Note:  To assess the mood of the Arab public,  SPC relies on editorials, letters, poetry and prose in Arabic newspapers.  SPC is aware that most if not all of these newspapers are financed by countries.  With that in mind, SPC does its best to ferret out truth from fiction.

Saudi Arabia seems to have chosen a course that both pleases its American ally (contain Iran) while perhaps helping Iraq.    So recently, Jalal Talabani, the Kurdish leader of the Kurdistani Nationalist Union of northern Iraq, a Sunni, visited the Kingdom, accompanied by a delegation.  SPC speculates that the reason for his visit falls into the Saudi attempt to keep the Iraqi house as Sunni as possible.   Talabani is allied to Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of the Higher Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, a Shia armed opposition group based in Iran, and supported by that country.  That alliance necessarily expands Iran's influence in northern Iraq.  The Saudis probably placed pressure on Talabani to break his alliance to the pro-Iranian Shia Baqir Hakim, to rob Iran of increased influence in Iraq.  Superficially, this Saudi scheme runs counter to the American, which wants to include al-Hakim in a united Iraqi opposition front.  But at a deeper level, it doesn't, as the chances of the Iranian-supported Baqir al-Hakim coordinating with Sunni leaders, and vice-versa, are nearly nonexistent.  Iraq can break up any such coordination by increasing tension with Iran.

In fact, the Saudi Sunni approach to the Iraqi dilemma resonated in an Iraqi-initiated increase of tension with Iran.  Iraqi gunships are said to have fired on Iranian fishing vessels.  Additionally, Uday Hussayn leveled accusations and threats against Iran for its alleged territorial ambitions inside Iraq.  Too, Iraq announced the break-up of an Iranian terror group.

Tension with Iran, for now, is useful as it keeps the Sunni troops of the Republican Guards--and the Sunnis in general--mobilized.  It has the further advantage of revealing Iranians eventual goals (supremacy in the Gulf) and thus should cause the Saudis some worry.

EDITOR'S NOTE:  Iran announced that it is expecting hundreds of thousands of tourists from the Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia.  What a terrific opportunity for recruitment for the next round of Iranian-sponsored unconventional warfare in the Gulf!

So Saudi Arabia became nervous in early July, when Israel Radio reported that Crown Prince Abdallah had sent Prime Minister Sharon a message via American intermediaries.  If true, that would indicate that American influence over the Kingdom's foreign policy has in fact increased markedly.  It also means that the Saudi leadership is now dealing with the enemy--Likud.  Disinformation or not, the Kingdom couldn't afford to be seen as negotiating with the oppressor of the Palestinian Arabs. Hence the retort by Saud al-Faysal, the Kingdom's Foreign Minister.  In Washington in the latter part of July, he told reporters that Sharon would lead the region to tragedy and conflict.

SAUDI ARABIA'S POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ: PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO LET UP AND CONTAIN IRAN

The American campaign of psychological warfare against Iraq was dizzying.  Its purpose, SPC believes, was to divert the Arab public's attention away from Israel-Palestine. In that, it was successful.  Suddenly, Iraq became the most prominent issue, as the U.S. campaign ignited one fire after another, forcing all to pay attention.  But some fires were comical--though few saw it that way.   Note, for instance, the charade of an American-sponsored conference (who else would pay for it in the heart of London?) of former Iraqi army officers which met in London about mid-July.  It was part of the intense U.S. campaign of disinformation which implicated Jordan as an important launch pad for the American assault on Iraq--embarrassing that country, which benefits immensely from cheap Iraqi oil.  (A taxi across Amman costs between one and two dollars; across Beirut: twenty-five to thirty!)  And note the attendance at the officers' conference of the Jordanian king's uncle, Prince Hasan bin Talal.  The conference brought back a slice of Arab history in a surrealistic British setting with a bunch of exiled officers now probably on our payroll!  But it worked.  It got the Arab public and press so preoccupied with the prospect of an invasion that less space was given to the Intifadha!

The conference of former officers, while part bluff, was real nonetheless, and did fit into a pattern of preparation for some action in Iraq.  Here's SPC's explanation for Hasan bin Talal's attendance:  we know that an American assault on Iraq could result in an Iraqi civil war, Shia against Sunni.  The Shias man many of the regular armed forces; the Sunnis the Republican Guard and the Special Forces.  Iran would go in.  A Shia-ruled Iraq--even if Iran controlled only a part of it--would thus be part and parcel of Iran, a la Syria-and-Lebanon model.  A Shia powerhouse would threaten the Gulf countries.  The United States' propaganda specialists needed a way out of this perception, to ease the fears of the Iraqi Sunnis, especially within the officer corps.    So our government probably smooth-talked Prince Hasan to make an appearance at the conference, giving the Sunni doubtful some assurance.  (The very prospect of a war with Iran, to liberate the south of Iraq or to control Iran's guerrillas, is by itself a complicating factor in the hypothetical invasion of Iraq.) 

Iraq remains stubborn.  It wants a total lifting of the sanctions in return for allowing international inspectors back into the country.    What weapons of mass destruction it has--if it has any--it'll continue to conceal, as these are its only effective means of defense against its more powerful Shia neighbor: Iran. 

In the middle of America's campaign of psychological warfare,  Iraq turned to Saudi Arabia for help. Uday Saddam Hussein wrote an article which smacked of nervousness; he said that the United States planned to break-up Saudi Arabia into cantons,  similarly to Iraq, and that Iraq would defend the Kingdom.  This "analysis" can be read as part of the Iraqi government's continued rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.    For Iraq is torn strategically between allying itself to Iran, or seeking shelter in Arab (Sunni) solidarity.  For now, it has chosen Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, of course, cannot offer military assistance.  The most it can do is to persuade its ally, the United States, to ease up.  To that end, it can point out that an invasion of Iraq might very well result in the rise of Iraq's Shia majority, resulting in an Iraq that is totally allied to anti-American Iran.  It can also remind the United States that it has become the most hated country in the Arab world and the kingdom thanks to its alliance with Israel and its anti-Iraq campaign.  At an extreme, its policies may threaten the very survival of the current pro-American Saudi government.

POSSIBLE IRAQI STRATEGY

Iraq will try the Arab solidarity route.  Should that route not produce results, Iraq will have no choice but to turn to Iran.  Should an American invasion materialize, and the Iraqi government feel threatened, it will open the door wide to Iran to come in.  The Iraqi leadership will bring Shia commanders of the armed forces into prominence and give them the keys to the house. 

Should Iran prove reluctant to accept the invitation, the Iraqi Republican Guard and Special Forces will unleash against the Shias and a civil war will erupt, forcing Iran into the fray, and throwing to the wind American warnings against Iranian intervention.  Iran can do it a la Syrian model in Lebanon: dress its troops in various local militia uniforms, use each and every local difference in Iraq, create fictitious political and armed groups to execute Iranian policies.  In the end it'll establish itself as the main power broker in Iraqi politics, a la Syria-Lebanon model. 

The war against Iraq, and the threat to Iran, should strengthen the position of the anti-American militants in that country.

Turkey will be forced to come in from the north, allegedly to protect the Turkmen minority in Iraq--and quell (as viciously as can be imagined) the Kurdish de facto state in the north.  American troops in Saudi Arabia will become an integral part of the kingdom's life, since Iran would've become a more formidable rival, having laid its hands on yet more oil resources.

Egyptian troops could be expected in the kingdom to quell popular uprisings.

AN OVERBEARING UNITED STATES PRESSURES A NERVOUS SAUDI ARABIA

HAS THE UNITED STATES TAKEN OVER SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY?

Coordination with the United States is unavoidable for the Kingdom, since it needs the U.S. to balance Iranian power in the Gulf. Historically,  the Americans would err when they'd hope that the Kingdom's need could translate into a united front of pro-American governments that would include the Israeli.  Not under Sharon, and not while Israel occupies even an inch of pre-1967 Arab territory.  Post-September 11 Arab politics place yet more constraints on the freedom of movement in foreign policy for the Kingdom; and these constraints could spread to other countries. 

The Saudi public's anger with U.S. support of Israel's occupation and repression, Iranian money and recruitment, and Syria's openness toward Iran (to regain its Golan Heights), should assure that Saudi foreign policy could not align itself fully with the American-Israeli. 

But the current coordination among intelligence services--to create Arab government-like repressive agencies to quell the Intifafha--points in a new direction.  It reveals the possibility that the United States has successfully forced the Saudis' hand--that, in fact, the United States has taken over Saudi foreign policy. 

The mechanics of the take-over could include a quid-pro-quo:  Saudi relative submission on the Israel/Palestine front for an American let up on Iraq;  moreover, these mechanics would have to include the Saudi concern that American foreign policy bureaucrats can, relatively easily, ignite an anti-Saudi campaign in the United States.  Call it blackmail; but we seem to be there.  What a difference a couple of months makes--since the appearance of SPC's first issue.  Suddenly, Crown Prince Abdallah is less visible, and one pro-Iranian source is waging a mis-information campaign about him.

CAN'T WE TURN THEM ALL INTO AMERICAN CLIENT STATES? -- AN IRANIAN UPDATE

Iran and not Iraq can cause headaches to U.S. foreign policy.  The American Presidency gave up publicly on its effort to lure the moderates within Iran.  In truth, what the U.S. Presidency gave up was its loud chatter about its flirtation with those moderates, which had hurt their cause.  Now, with the U.S. keeping some distance, perhaps the moderates under President Khatami could clinch power.  A doubtful proposition, since these moderates are now being outbid by yet more pro-Western forces: the students.  So it's chaos, an environment where moderates fare badly; and the threat of an American invasion or strike against a nuclear facility, should weaken the moderates even further.  But hope springs eternal.

Why is Iran so important to the United States?  For one, Iran's Islamic populist policy, pitting it against Israel, has gained it a lot of popularity in the Muslim and Arab world.  There's no Arab nation that is able or willing to defend Arab . . .honor; Iran is.  Hence its popularity. And with popularity comes the dream of regional leadership--and space.   Iran needs to breathe, and the region is its natural outlet. 

Iran is the only country at present which has accepted the challenge posed by Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and satellites.   Israel had introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East, and Iran intends on catching up, and it probably will.  Policy-makers in both countries continually ridicule each other about the state of that winless race.  The Arab public watches and is impressed by Iran's daring policies.

Second, Iran had taught the Shias of Lebanon and the Palestinians of Israel-Palestine about the effectiveness of unconventional warfare, including suicide-bombing.  That method has rocked Israel, the American ally par excellence in the region.

Third, Iran stands in the way of an American invasion of Iraq.  True, Iraq is not keen on too rapid a deepening of its relationship with Iran; but recent military maneuvers by the latter in he Sea of Oman and on its borders with Iraq are messages intended not to Iraq but to the United States.  Iran could not afford to see the United States control Iraq and its oil, both for commercial self-interest (oil prices) and for the strategic value of having access to Syria and Lebanon--to the Mediterranean, North Africa and Europe.  Space is important to a country which feels trapped from east (the United States in Afghanistan and the former Russian republics) and west (the United States in the Arabian peninsula: in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain.)

Fourth, Iran is Syria's only capable military ally, and the Arab public can see that.  But for Iran's influence over the Shias of Lebanon, Syria would lose its most powerful weapon against Israel.  Syria can use the Palestinian refugees, but these would have to go through Shia lines to get to the Lebanese-Israeli border.  Syria keeps its negotiating line open with the United States,  on the chance that the U.S. would convince the Israelis to fully relinquish the Golan.  But Syria is no fool.  It would be relatively easy for the United States to diffuse some of the tension by forcing its ally to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders.  But it isn't willing to do this.  Therefore, Syria will hold dear to its Iranian relationship, allowing Iran the influence it feels it deserves.  (In Lebanon, Syria has kept the Palestinian camps under the control of their residents, a weapon that it would unleash at will should its hope for a return of the Golan through American pressure wane.)