ALL ROADS LEAD TO TEHRAN

THE UNITED STATES SEDUCES THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC... IS ISRAEL SHIPPING SPARE PARTS TO IRAN???

The United States in late September dispatched Kuwait's Defense Minister to Tehran. He conveyed a message to Iran: Stay out of the way of American diplomacy and war against Iraq, and the United States will reserve a role for you in the security of the Arabian peninsula; and perhaps even the Middle East. As a sign of American good will, the United States instructed the Defense Minister to sign a Memorandum of Security between his country and the Islamic Republic. The presumption: If Tehran behaved, the Memorandum would develop into a full security agreement with Kuwait, and possibly with other American protectorates in the Gulf. This would include the prize of them all, the protectorate-to-be: Iraq.

IRAN COOPERATES WITH THE UNITED STATES

For now, Iran is cooperating with the United States. Iran allowed the Iranian-sponsored Higher Council of the Islamic Revolution to participate in a conference of U.S.-sponsored Iraqi opposition groups in Washington, D.C.. Too, Iranian leaders have made it clear that their country will not stand in the way of an American invasion, nor will it take advantage of that invasion. In Tehran, this policy is referred to as "positive neutrality."

(AMERICAN)-ISRAELI SPARE PARTS TO IRAN?

It is possible that the U.S. seduction of Iran has taken an all-too-familiar ring: weapons for cooperation. (Remember Iran-Contra?) In late August, German customs officials stopped an Israeli ship which was carrying spare parts for tanks and which was heading to Iran. The Israeli ship had declared Thailand as its final destination, a camouflage uncovered by the Germans. The Germans had signalled their opposition to U.S. intent to invade Iraq. The invasion could threaten their increasingly extensive commercial interests in that region, and that of their European community partner, France.

WHY IS IRAN COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES?

The Islamic Republic would applaud the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, which are credited for the Iranian decision to allow Iraq to win their war in the 1980s. Iran understands that these weapons are meant for it, as deterrent against invading Iraq, and establishing a Shiite regime. To that extent, Tehran could be seen as a silent U.S. ally. But not for long.

While Iran will not oppose an American invasion, the Islamic Republic would want to see democracy in Iraq, not a pro-American junta ruling the country.

IRAN WANTS DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ

Iran will champion a one-person-one-vote democracy because the Iraqi Shiites are the majority in that country. They are of Persian descent and historically close to their country of ancestry. Democracy in Iraq will thus assure the Islamic Republic a virtual takeover of Iraq.

THE UNITED STATES DREADS DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ

COMMERCIAL MARGINALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The very benefits to Iran of democracy in Iraq are of concern to the United States. After all, we are there in good part to secure an uninterrupted supply of cheap oil, and to gain 25 million affluent consumers: the Iraqis. (Please make an effort to think imperially.) But if the Shiites take over, Iran will be able to dictate the supply and prices for oil, for at least two major producers (itself and Iraq). Should this materialize, the European Community would assure its lucrative Iranian and Iraqi markets. Airbus Industries, not Boeing, for instance, have been cleaning up in the Middle East. Too, Iran is increasingly looming as a most important source of natural gas for Europe. Not to mention the rather successful boycott of American products in the Arab world. (There are rumors that this boycott is financed by European companies.) In short, commercially, the United States is being marginalized in that region of the world. An Iranian take-over of Iraq is likely to further this marginalization.

THE COMING CIVIL WARS?

Iran wants a democratic Iraq. Lest SPC's readers think SPC's analysis is balance of power speculation, here are some supportive declarations. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Chairman of the Council for the Determination of the Interest of the [Government] System, and a former President, made it clear in October that Iran is opposed to a military government in Iraq. General Rahim Safwi, the General Commander of the Revolutionary Guard, noted in October that prudence dictated staying out of America's way, lest Iran became a target. But, ominously, he warned: Iran would not allow the dwarfing of its role and that of its Iraqi allies in the new Iraq.

How is one to balance Iran's declared "positive neutrality" and cooperation with the United States with its insistence on democracy in Iraq?

On a practical level, Iran would stay out of the way of an American invasion, and would work with the United States in the new Iraq. If the United States fails to give the Shiites their due role, Faylaq Badr (The Badr Brigade--made up of Iraqi Shiites armed by Iran and based in that country) and many well-armed Shiite clans in the south and north of Iraq stand at the ready to ignite a civil war.

That civil war could spread to the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. That province's population is mostly Shiite. Armed civil strife could further spread to other Gulf Emirates, which have sizeable Shiite communities. Saudi Arabia and these Emirates now rely on direct American protection.

NO WAY OUT: THE SAUDIS WILL HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE THE UNITED STATES

Deteriorating relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia have reached the lowest point ever. The American national security bureaucracy is weighing heavily on the Kingdom.

The Saudi Kingdom will have to live with a new reality: that its usefulness as agent against the Soviet Union in the cold war has now ended. It would need to find a new role to serve the United States. Too, its role as swing producer within OPEC (to keep oil prices reasonable and stable) could be coming to an end, should the United States succeed in installing a proxy regime in Iraq. Saudi Arabia's room to maneuver has thus tightened immensely, in its relations with Washington, regionally (See section below about Qatar and the end of the Gulf Cooperation Council) and domestically (See text below about the socio-economic problems.)

Unhelpful is the diffusion of political power in at least three centers: around Crown Prince Abdallah, around Prince Nayef at Interior, and around Prince Sultan at Defense (Not too much should be made of this; we have centers of power in our Executive Branch: Note the shadow national security government in the Defense Policy Board; yet we are not experiencing paralysis). The United States lacks experience in subduing a multi-pronged royal government. For each center of power shifts gears so often, to balance its relations with the United States against its need for approval from the traditionalist Islamists. All of this is done as good old politics, by one center to trump the power of the other.

A SAUDI POPULATION EXPLOSION: UNEMPLOYED, MULTIPLYING, AND LOSING STANDARD OF LIVING GROUNDS

There are significant domestic reasons that have restricted the Kingdom's ability to accommodate the United States fully. Political mobilization has swept the young and unemployed. This mobilization has been helped significantly by the perceived American-Israeli assault on the Arab Sunni world (the continued colonization of Palestine and the assault on a Sunni regime in mostly-Shiite Iraq.) Usama bin-Laden and his al-Qaeda have understood the stunning mobilization potential of this assault, and operate to take full advantage of it, with the hope of uniting the Sunni world.

This "American-Israeli assault" couldn't have happened at a worse time for the Saudi government. Unemployment in the kingdom is conservatively said to be at 25% and population growth at a high of 5.3%. In the last twenty years, it is reported that the per capita income in the Kingdom has fallen from $28,000 to $7,000. (We know that the de-classe, those who fall from one standard of living into a lower one, and not the poor, are the most easily politicized.) In essence, the production of children is at a high by world standard, yet employment opportunities are not expanding. To meet this challenge, the government is increasingly reserving certain jobs for Saudis, and taking them away from foreigners--most recently the driving of taxis. Too, agencies associated with the government have been investigating the possibility of importing labor from such countries as Vietnam and Cambodia, who are cheaper than the labor they would be replacing from such places as Pakistan and India. (These laborers hold jobs that are too low-paying--e.g., maids, nannies--to interest Saudi nationals.)
Add to these sources of turmoil the fact that the Saudi state is operating at a deficit, and the public debt is estimated at a conservative $168 billion--more likely $200 billion. (Most of this money is borrowed internally from pension funds--similar to the situation we have where our deficit is financed from social security funds.) To finance the deficit, and repay the debt, the Saudi state has begun to investigate the possibility of accelerated privatization of various public sector agencies.

The somber state of the government's finances has much to do with that government's funding in large part of the American war to liberate Kuwait--an estimated $60-8$80 billion. (SPC suspects that the estimates vary depending on whether the arms purchases after the war--another payoff to the United States--are included in the calculation or not. The American estimate of the cost of the war to Saudi Arabia is significantly less.) One way to interpret the kingdom's reluctance to cooperate fully with the United States on Iraq is that the U.S. wants to shake it down for money to finance the operation, at a time when public money is scarce, and public welfare demands are high.

(SPC NOTE: The effort to privatize should help the Kingdom in easing its relations with the United States. Should this privatization be open to Americans, it would create yet another pro-Saudi constituency in the United States, to join the oil and weapons constituencies.)

THE UNITED STATES TO SAUDI ARABIA: CONTROL WAHHABI ISLAM

Adding oil to the fire, liberal America has continued to insist on a total and radical change in curriculum in Saudi schools, and for the containment of Wahhabi Islam as a pillar of the regime. This demand is difficult to meet. Naively, the United States believes that a more liberal education would lessen the possibility of more terrorism emanating out of the Kingdom. A realistic correction of vision is in order. Consider Algeria, where education had once been liberal and French. Is there less terrorism emanating from that country, so close to Europe? Hardly.

But the American national security establishment needs to so something. This becomes particularly urgent in the context of pressure by right-wing pro-Israeli forces in the country. These forces have labored as hard as bin Laden to turn the war on terror into a Christian-Muslim civilizational clash.

The American pressure on the Kingdom has not gone unanswered. Crown Prince Abdallah has shown quite a lot of courage by initiating a realistic plan to end the Arab-Israeli conflict once and for all (See the first issue of SPC). This initiative has cost him dearly in political capital among the religious traditionalists. This constituency, our nemesis, is nonetheless important in Saudi politics--similar, in a limited sort of way, to the importance of the Evangelists in American politics. Moreover, Abdallah was systematic in removing the administration of girls' schools from religious institutions to the Ministry of Education. This policy was the result of the avoidable death of fourteen schoolgirls in a fire at a school in Mecca in March, where the religious police (Al-Mutawwain) pushed the girls back into the burning school, and actively hampered the efforts of the male rescuers, to avoid the intermingling of girls and men. As a result, demonstrations and protests were said to have spread throughout the Kingdom, mostly by women, though others took advantage to air their grievances. Many of these protests were said to have taken place in the mostly-Shiite Eastern Province. A crackdown followed. While not directly in response to U.S. pressure, the Crown Prince was swift at using the occasion of the Mecca fire to dilute the power of the traditional Islamists by weakening their influence over the education of girls.

Statements by Prince Nayef and Prince Sultan indicate that the Saudi establishment is moving to contain the Islamic traditionalists. One of Nayef's statements contained a veiled threat to the religious police, reminding them that their salaries after all, come from the state. He asked them to ease up.

On the security level, the Saudi government has increased its monitoring of mosques (an estimated 80,000), and has forbidden the discussion by the "mosque orators" (Imams) of bin Laden's ideas and of attacks against the West and Israel. A spate of car bombings against Westerners in the kingdom point to a campaign by the exiled politician-turned-cult-leader to discredit the government--to prove it unable to keep peace in the country and rein in chaos. In fact, the Saudi opposition repeatedly warns about the "coming chaos," so much so that one is left with the distinct impression that it is praying for it.

WHY USAMA BIN-LADEN WILL NOT MURDER SAUDI CIVILIANS

As a corollary, the bombing campaign, if it intensifies, could result in forcing out the large Western expatriate community, which would open new job opportunities for Saudis and fellow Arabs, Sunnis in particular. In short, if bombings intensify, they could force multinational companies to hire more Arabs. But it is doubtful that the bombing campaign would in fact intensify. Why? The Emir-in Chief, Usama bin-Laden, knows that intensifying the bombing could result in the death of Saudi civilians and a backlash against him in his homeland. Better focus on Americans and Israelis as a way of uniting the Sunni masses, without risking his popularity.

But he (or his cells) might lose patience. The bombings (and a recent clash involving bin-Ladennites and Riyadh police--mid-November), if anything, have shown bin Laden to have failed miserably in Saudi Arabia, since they hardly have risen to a level of seriousness sufficient to cause a mass exodus of Westerners. (Forgive the stereotype: Westerners have such a missionary zeal about career, money, non-taxed life overseas, and cheap maids and nannies, that they don't exit easily. When SPC's editor worked for Arab-American organizations, he advised numerous callers to avoid accepting positions in Lebanon, at the height of Iranian-sponsored kidnapping of Westerners; these warnings fell on deaf ears, as the Ph.D.s and the businessmen still opted for money, the non-taxed existence, and the cheap maids and nannies.)

THE ONGOING MARGINALIZATION OF SAUDI ARABIA

The American pressure on the Kingdom is mitigated by good relations among the elite in both countries. Consider, for instance, the warm relations between Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the United States and the Bush family, including the President. The Saudi elite has little choice but to stick to the United States, regardless of how heavily the national security establishment pressures the kingdom. For that elite's investment in the United States is estimated by some to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Freezing that money (and making it available to pay damages as a result of law suits) would deal that elite the blow of its life. Withdrawing that money is not as easy as it may seem, since there's nowhere else to go with such a huge amount of capital.

SPC NOTE: If ever this money is frozen, the Kingdom's royal family will break up and a good part of it will be co-opted by Islamist Iran.

Warm relations between two royal families notwithstanding (the Najdi Sauds, reliant on fundamental Islamists for political power, and the Texan Bushs, reliant on traditional Christians for the same), the American military establishment has marginalized the Kingdom. Unable to subdue it fully to serve its purposes, the United States has side-stepped the Kingdom. It has chosen Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait as its new favored clients in the Gulf. Suddenly, the Saudi rulers are no longer able to influence all the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as member-countries are fast establishing their direct relations with the United States, without need for Saudi brokerage.

Saudi Arabia's insistence that the United States desist from using the Prince Sultan Air Base in the planned (still hypothetical) invasion of Iraq contributed much to this marginalization. But that was in no way the most important reason. After all, some secret agreement could've been worked out, (and may have been,) for the use of the base (If SPC were to bet on it, SPC would not hesitate for a second in asserting that such a secret agreement has in fact been reached, and the denials by the Saudi establishment are nothing but food for public consumption). It is that the other countries, particularly Qatar, have taken it upon themselves to lure a willing and eager United States. Only with the United States in their midst could they feel secure.

NEW WAYS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO USE THE KINGDOM

The Kingdom's usefulness in U.S. foreign policy hasn't totally withered away. Under Abdallah, the Kingdom is better integrated in the family of American client states. For one, the United States relies on Saudi Arabia in occupied Palestine. One American-Israeli plan for that wretched land would've required the forced retirement of the commanders of the Palestinian police. Saudi Arabia had accepted to pay the pension salaries of these commanders, probably in response to an American request (Why else would they do it? Since Prime Minister Sharon has instructed his people to mobilize against the Kingdom in the United States). Hence, Saudi usefulness to American foreign policy. Should Iraq cease shipping cheap oil to Jordan, (another client state), the United States would hope that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would replace the Iraqi supply. For now, though, the two countries are insisting on market prices. But some American pressure, along with repeated visits by King Abdallah to both countries, should change their mind.

Moreover, the Kingdom, through Egypt--with whom it cooperates very closely--is trying to rein in Hamas, and therefore control if not put an end to the Intifadha--a favor to the United States and to the thankless Israeli right-wing expansionists. Too, Saudi Arabia might be helping in other ways. SPC has noted the recent opening of Saudi business enterprises in the Sudan. There exists the distinct possibility that this expansion is meant as a way for the United States and the Kingdom to track down the finances of terror, having failed to do it the traditional way--by enacting laws, and creating vigilant bureaucracies. The money for the new enterprises is probably Saudi, the idea American.

But all is not bad for the Saudi government. The Kingdom's rulers can count on an indelible source of public pride. The concerted right-wing Israeli campaign against the Kingdom in the United States is providing its rulers with ample legitimacy. The many pro-Israeli think-tankers who are now running the shadow American government (e.g. the Defense Policy Board) have done some significant favors to the Kingdom's rulers. By spreading ideas about breaking up the Kingdom, and treating it like an enemy state, these people have provided the ruling family with domestic fodder to boost its legitimacy. Israel now is seen as the enemy behind all these efforts at subduing a defiant Kingdom.

THE COMING MARGINALIZATION OF ISRAEL

The marginalization of the Kingdom in American foreign policy is due in large part to the establishment by the United States of bases in that region, in countries other than Saudi Arabia. Iran is the only country that can create costly trouble for the United States--by allowing civil wars to ignite and through unconventional warfare against American troops. Accordingly, from now on, Islamist Iran will become increasingly important to our foreign policy, even crucial. An Islamist Iran, without an Arab power to balance Iranian power, (e.g., Iraq), will continue the course it has taken to balance the only military power left: Israel (and, to a lesser extent, Turkey.) It will take a radical change in Iranian domestic politics for that country to sell out the Palestinians and its co-religionists in Lebanon. From that standpoint, the United States will have to accommodate the Islamic Republic lest it risks the safety of U.S. troops in the Gulf, and the surge of intractable civil wars and terror all over the region.

In contrast to Islamic and relatively stable Iran, Israel, standing at the opposite pole in the regional balance of power, is not Islamic, even anti, and is rocked by a civil war. It is unable to make the historic decisions--to withdraw from the occupied territories occupied in 1967 (unless it is paid handsomely by the United States, and even then, not a full withdrawal). Too, Israel has failed to work out a partnership with the Palestinians, by hampering their attempt at gaining client status with the United States (Note the campaign against Arafat, the architect of the client relationship with Washington). In contrast, Iran made the historic decision when it stopped the war with Iraq.

In short: the Iranian era in U.S. foreign policy is witnessing a rebirth, and the Israeli era is witnessing a concomitant decline.

THE SAUDI-QATARI COLD WAR: ONE CLIENT STATE MARGINALIZES ANOTHER

What is Qatar known for? You guessed it: Al-Jazeerah. And what does Al-Jazeerah do--other than broadcast a cultist's threats of cold-blooded massacres against innocent civilians? It hosts programs featuring opposition figures from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, and runs documentaries about royal families that these perceive as debasing. Qatar, 600,000 in population, is now standing tall.

For America's Central Command is no longer in Tampa--but in Adid--the Qatari base that has cost $1.4 billion and should soon be completed. With the United States firmly established in Qatar, Sheikh Hamad can now look east (Iran) and west (Saudi Arabia) and smile: he has achieved true independence and security. And rich he is: Qatar is known to possess over the third largest reserves of natural gas in the world.

Qatar's maneuvering is not without justification. Qatar has learned the lessons of an earlier decade. Saudi Arabia, the leader in the Arabian Peninsula, had failed in its mediation of a border dispute between Qatar and Bahrain. Too, Saudi Arabia had failed in preventing Iran from occupying three islands that belong to the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, Saudi Arabia had failed to stop Iraq from invading a fellow Gulf country--Kuwait. What good then is Saudi protection, or diplomacy, with no effective armed forces to back it up?

Many are angry with Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani, the ruler of Qatar and the owner of Al-Jazeerah. He had snubbed Saudi Arabia and most other Arab countries by refusing to rein in his television station. Too, he has initiated progressive reforms that some of these states, Saudi Arabia in particular, are unable to emulate, to the chagrin of a sizeable section of their population. For instance, Hamad had given women the right to vote. His wife, the Sheikhah Moza, is known as a liberal and a champion of educational programs and she campaigns for women's rights--someone who is unusual to the Gulf. In short, Shaikh Hamad, already dear to America's military, has set his country on a progressive course that will endear him to America's liberals. A superb achievement.

Saudi Arabia has launched its own media campaign against Qatar, accusing it of fostering prematurely warm relations with Israel (Qatar has opened a commercial and liaison office with Israel). Surprisingly, at least one major Palestinian (and not Saudi-financed) nationalist media source has remained pro-Qatar in spite of that country's opening towards Israel. Why? SPC attributes this paradox to money. Shaikh Hamad seems to be generous with the media. But Al-Jazeerah and its owner may soon face a dose of their own medicine: it is rumored that Crown Prince Abdallah has provided the funds necessary to start a station similar to Al-Jazeerah, with the help of a successful Lebanese television station.

Part of Saudi Arabia's bitterness stems from the fact that Qatar's newly-found independence has cost the GCC its cohesiveness. For all practical purposes, that organization is dead, in good part because Gulf countries are drawing their security directly from the United States, without brokerage. Even poor Yemen, rife with tribal and clannish divisions, has found a way to establish a direct relationship with the United States, albeit one that would continue, perhaps worsen, the tradition of low-level civil conflict in that country. Suddenly, very few need Saudi Arabia.

Though, not Yemen. For that country has a large contingent of workers in the Kingdom, and a long border from where the bin Ladennites can infiltrate, back and forth, and endanger the security of both countries. Cooperation, thus, is a must. Hence the Saudi initiative to bring poor Yemen into the club of the rich: the GCC.

Qatar should beware: the Kingdom is on a course of establishing yet new ways to serve the United States, and the United States could still prove unreliable should it, for example, cement a deal with Iran (unlikely, but possible) and leave the little countries at the mercy of the Persian power. So, Plus ca change...

A WARNING!

The United States, for its part, would do well to recall that adage, too; for Iraq has always balanced Iranian power, in a way the United States couldn't. Iraq has sacrificed hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives, and unlimited billions of dollars, to balance Iranian power. Is the United States up to that task? Doubtful. Tampering with Iraqi governance therefore should be done with utmost care, not with a zeal adapted from exiled Iraqi generals, who left their home-country with millions of dollars to their name, and who had executed the Iraqi President's policies with faith and dedication.