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Saturday, March 01, 2003

SPC ALERT: THE COMING MASSACRES OF CIVILIANS IN IRAQ

If efforts to unseat the Iraqi President fail, expect the following:

As soon as the United States launches its uncertain war on Iraq, the powers that be in that country's government and secret services, and the Shiite Da'wa party in southern Iraq, should stage bloody massacres against civilians.  These massacres will see a civil war rage in Iraq, pitting Sunnis against Shiites, while the United States is conducting its fancy bombing from the skies.   So, in effect, two wars will be taking place, both uncivil.

Sensing that the massacres against the Iraqi Shiites are the work of the Sunni powers that be, Iran will be forced into the fray, to assist its co-religionists.   It'll ignore all the secret promises made to it by the United States to buy its neutrality in the American war.   It will send armed Iraqi Shiites from the Bader Brigade (currently stationed in Iran) into Iraq.  The civil war's tempo will then reach a higher level, and massacres against civilians will become the call of the day.

With Iran's help, the Shiites might very well gain the upper hand, and threaten to take over Baghdad, especially if Iraqi Sunni officers heed the American call to defect and join their foreign bank accounts.

Should the Kurds move south, they'll do it only with Iranian consent.  And they could very well join forces with the Shiites in the center of the country.  Meanwhile, the massacres by Kurds against Arab Sunnis, and vice versa, would also spread across the country.  The Christian minority will hide behind Sunni lines, and their sympathy would be with the once secular regime that gave them equal access to government and the economy.
 
Most likely, the United States will have to freeze its operations and support the Sunni regime.  Any other option would mean that the U.S. will have to accept partnership with Iran in Iraq, where Iran has the upper hand.   Unless, of course, the United States widens the war, by bombing Iran.

AN IRANIAN CONSENSUS IS EVOLVING: GO AFTER THE U.S. BASES, AND KEEP THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CIVIL WAR RAGING

The United States' buildup and its goals had once confused the Islamic Republic.  Slowly, however, a consensus is evolving within Iran about U.S. goals and Iran's interests.

Though still disgusted with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the Iranians are now leaning in the direction of adopting the adage, "Better the devil you know."  After all, an American-inspired coup would bring someone to power who doesn't need them, and would turn Iraq into an American threat to the stability of the Islamic republic.

In contrast, Saddam Hussein's government is weak and helpless, and needs Iran for any protection it can provide it  against the United States.

Superficially, Iran is still coordinating among some of the Iraqi opposition groups, especially the Shiites and the Iraqi Kurds abutting the Iranian-Iraqi border.  The U.S. could never replace Iran as protector of the Shiites, and the Kurds could never ignore the havoc Iran could sow within their ranks.  The United States has all but given up on the Iraqi opposition, after it came to the realization the Iran could have more sway on them than it could.

Besides drawing closer to Syria, there's evidence that Iran's opposition to America's military presence in the region will take the form of mobilization of the local population against the American military bases. The Sunni public already is mobilized against what it sees as the American-Israeli assault against Arabs and Moslems, in Palestine and Iraq.  The same public is now describing America's presence as colonialism.

Iran can feed this mobilization with money.  Already, as liberal America pushes for democracy in the Gulf countries--more as an imperial tool to subdue these countries than a serious effort--groups are sprouting (especially in Bahrain and Qatar) which are demanding the furtherance of their civil rights.  These groups should become target for financing by the Iranians in their campaign against the American bases.  For instance, in the second half of November, a group of 300 scientists, including Saudis, issued a statement condemning the United States for its use of force and its Crusader-like assault on the countries of the region. 

SYRIA, IRAN, AND IRAQ DRAW CLOSER

The Message: Please Let Us Return to a Sense of Normalcy.

American allies and foes have coalesced to try to appease the United States.  Turkey recently (mid-January) convened a conference of countries around Iraq.  The dominant feeling was that Iraq should cooperate with the United Nations.  These countries had different reasons for joining together.  But the common denominator was their quest for a return to normalcy--to focus on development and trade, not war and the misery it brings about.

Another coalition with more in common has also formed, a tad secret.  
 
The intelligence services of Iran, Syria, and Iraq seem to have coalesced, in defense of their interest against the United States and Israel.  In early December, 2001, an Iraqi hit squad visited the city of Tyre in Lebanon and assassinated an Iraqi opposition figure.  That squad left Lebanon by land, through Syria--an indication that Syria is currently coordinating with Iraq.

Syria's nervousness about the possibility that Iran will strike a deal with the United States has caused Iran to draw closer to Syria, as assurance. Both countries are now pursuing similar policies: a visible policy of dialogue with the United States; and a not-so-visible one of limited support to Iraq in its resistance to the American assault.  

The United States is doing similarly: it is pursuing its establishment of bases, while sending Iran repeated messages that it doesn't intend to attack it or its nuclear facilities.  It is also likely that the U.S. is promising trade concessions--anything to turn the Iraq project into a success for the Bush Administration.  The latest such message was brought to Iran by Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Kurdistan National Union.  The Qatari Foreign Minister did similarly.

In an effort to assure Syria of Iran's commitment to their alliance, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi visited Syria and Lebanon (currently under Syrian control) in the first half of December.  The visit could be seen as a message to Israel that a war against Lebanon's Hezballah will see Iran fully involved on the side of its co-religionists.  The Syrian President is expected in Tehran in February.

KEEPING THE ARAB PUBLIC MOBILIZED BY FIGHTING OFF ISRAEL'S THEFT OF PALESTINIAN LAND

Iran is aware that the mobilization of the Arab Gulf public against the American bases is made easier by the continued Israeli theft of Arab land and the suppression of Palestinian society.  Therefore, Iran should be expected to increase its financial assistance to the Palestinian fighters to intensify their operations in Palestine and Israel.  (The Iranian press bears out an acute support of and sympathy towards the Palestinians.)  Iran's job shouldn't be difficult, as it has an ally in Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his Likud Party.  


It is probable that the intelligence services of Iran, Syria, and Iraq, have reached, or are soon to reach, an agreement to ignite the Lebanese front with Israel as soon as the United States invades Iraq, if ever it does.  This would be Iran's concession to its Syrian ally, which is more sympathetic to Iraq's lot than the Iranians.  At this stage, the Iranian-Syrian-Iraqi effort is to sabotage the attempts by the United States, via Egypt, to quiet the internal Palestinian front.   This explains Hezballa's operation in early December, in which a bomb exploded in northern Israel, near the Lebanese border, which injured two Israeli soldiers.  In addition, Hezballah staged an attack on an Israeli outpost in the Shebaa Farms area as recently as January 21.

To counter Iranian policy, The United States, through Egypt (and indirectly, Saudi Arabia) is trying to diffuse the Palestinian-Israeli civil war, by convening the various champions of Palestinian liberation in Cairo to persuade them to ease up on armed resistance.  But Egypt's hands are tied:    Unless the left of Labor in Israel gains power, it would be difficult to persuade the Palestinian fighters to stand on the diplomatic foot, so to speak.  This is particularly true if one considers that the Israeli Prime Minister is intent on continuing on with his assassination campaign against the Palestinian leaders; worse it was reported that his secret service intends on killing Palestinian activists overseas, in Europe and North America, taking advantage of the West's war on terror.

The United States, via British Prime Minister Tony Blair, is also trying to moderate the Palestinians by holding a conference for them, in London, on the reforms needed for the Palestine Authority--a conference that was conducted mostly by video since Prime Minister Sharon did not allow the occupied Palestinians to travel.  (Prime Minister Sharon and the Likud just can't stand the idea that the Palestinians are capable of signing on as clients of the West, just as the Israelis have done.)

The hands of the United States are tied: the U.S. is unwilling to force Israel out of the occupied territories.  It can only hope for more accusations of corruption against Prime Minister Sharon, and Likud's eventual defeat.  Amram Mitzna's refusal to join a coalition government should result in an such defeat for Likud, or in forcing the extremist party to soften its stand on withdrawal.

Amram Mitzna (a mayor of a city who has Palestinian constituents) seems to be coordinating with the West.   To contain Sharon, Britain is playing up to the Labor leader, grooming him in the hope of diffusing the tension in the occupied territories.  Britain is doing America's bidding, since the British leadership has more room to maneuver on Israel than any American administration.

The hands of the United States are tied for yet another reason, as members of its ruling elite spout out hateful comments.   For instance, one member of the Defense Policy Board, ruling the Pentagon, revealed his views of Islam.  He called it "militaristic."  He went back to Islam's founder, the prophet Muhammad, and depicted him as a warrior who had no affinity for peace.  Such views are flashed on the pages of the Arab press, owned mostly by Saudi Arabia and therefore pro-American, and are read by the same public which sees the U.S. bases as a colonial enterprise.

(Meanwhile, the Public Broadcasting Network, PBS, played a charming and objective account of Islam and the Prophet.  PBS has a sense for the dangers that lurk in extremist views spouted by some American opinion-makers about Islam.  Perhaps the public relations firms hired by the Saudi government should think about creating a foundation that supports PBS instead of wasting money on advertisements in newspapers.  These advertisement have a bitter taste to them as they remind Americans of September 11.)

NUCLEAR IRAN

Iran could not win a conventional war against the United States.  It is therefore reluctant to be drawn into such a war.    More importantly, Iran wants to assure the launch of its nuclear industry before the United States becomes comfortable in the region and attack Iran's nuclear sites.  
 
In late December, 2001, Iran signed an agreement with Russia to hasten the construction of the nuclear reactor at Boushahr, in the south-western part of the country.  This agreement requires Russia to investigate the possibility of building yet another reactor.  The "speed up" clause is obviously meant to take advantage of American reluctance to attack the reactor, or to ask the Israelis to do it, while the United States is firming up its presence in the region.  In other words, the White House would need to show success in Iraq; an attack on Iran by the U.S. or Israel will hasten the process of Iranian active opposition to U.S. policy--and possibly the Iranian-induced eruption of a civil war in Iraq, making the American task significantly more difficult.

The United States is concerned about the Boushahr reactor and another Iran is planning to build with Russia's help.  It is also concerned about two other sites in the middle of the country where it suspects Iran is preparing to build nuclear warheads.  But it seems unlikely the United States can do much to slow down this process, unless it is willing to sponsor a region-wide demilitarization effort that would include Israel's nuclear warheads and other suspected Israeli weapons of mass destruction.  The American helplessness in facing Iran is made all the more acute by the American Administration's need to show success on Iraq. Accordingly, it is willing to compromise with the Islamic Republic.

Iran's military industry has set as its goal to balance Israeli power in the region.  Israel is known to possess hundreds of nuclear warheads.   Syria, it was reported in early January, is negotiating with Russia for the construction of its first nuclear reactor.  

Iran will encourage the linking of the Arab public's campaign against the U.S. bases to Israel's extensive arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.  Elements of this linkage are already in evidence.  For instance, as recently as January 26, 2003, the Iranian Secretary of the Higher Council for National Security,  Mr. Hasan Rouhani, asserted that all weapons of mass destruction should be eliminated.  He pointed to America's ally, "the Zionist entity," as possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.  In Lebanon, around the same time, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah of the Iranian-sponsored Hezballah, talked about the U.S. bases as an expression of America's intent on subjugating the region and controlling its oil resources.  (Fadlallah is not on good terms with the powers that be in Iran, who finance Hezballah; still, his statements could only be a reflection of some of the current thinking in Tehran.) 

In a clear message to the United States, Rouhani also noted that Iraq is within the "national security jurisdiction" of the Islamic Republic, sharing 1300 kilometer of common borders.

WHAT MOTIVATES IRAN

There are other reasons which explain Iran's attitude towards the United States:

1) Iran is worried that the United States will use nuclear weapons, or a version thereof, referred to as "bunker-busters," to blast the Iraqi underground bunkers and, as a result, pollute the region.  Just like us, Iran feels it is more responsible than the rest of the world.

2) As mentioned in earlier issues, Iran is aware that it is now the leader of the Arab world, by default, since Egypt has become a beggar for scraps of food from the United States, and Iraq has been exhausted by years of war and sanctions.  This leadership gives it breathing space and access to the Mediterranean through Syria and Lebanon.  Iran has spread its power into these two nations.  It has turned Hezballah into a sophisticated fighting entity at the service of Syria.  This party recently has shown an ability to infiltrate the Israeli defense establishment.  (Note the arrest of an upper rank Israeli officer of bedouin descent  who is said to have passed security information to Hezballah.)  Iran is concerned that American control of Iraq will be a thorn in its waist, and block it from access to the Mediterranean.  As things stand now, Iran would benefit economically from the evolution of an Iranian-Iraqi-Syrian-Lebanese economic bloc.   In contrast,  U.S. control of Iraq would weaken Syria, and suffocate the Islamic Republic.

3)  Iran is aware that the United States and Israel are trying hard to ignite a civil war in Iran, to have the armed forces rein in the Revolutionary Guard and the fundamental Islamists who run the security and religious establishments.  Hence the suspected shipment of Israeli spare parts for tanks for the Iranian army.  (See the last SPC issue). Iran would rather keep things as they are: the moderates give it access to Europe and the United States, and the Islamists to the Arab masses, Syria and Lebanon.  Together, they give Iran the world status to which it feels it is entitled.

4)  Iran is trying to mobilize all countries into a yet undefined pact to cooperate as a way of keeping Israel's ally, the United States, out of the region.  For instance, Iran re-established diplomatic relations with Egypt, which it had severed in 1979, in the aftermath of Sadat's signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.  This opening should fit well into Iran's policy of supporting a political (for now) campaign against the U.S. bases in the Gulf.  It will provide Iran with diplomatic access to Arab countries, and place its people closer to groups which are forming to oppose the American bases.

5) Iran will continue on with its suspected secret nuclear weapons program.  While at first that program was intended to balance the Iraqi program, it now has as goal the balancing of Israel's known nuclear weapons capability.  The United States will try to de-couple the various intertwined issues: e.g., on the one hand, the continued Israeli colonization of Palestinian land, the continued Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, Israel's not-so-secret huge hydrogen/nuclear bomb capability from,  on the other, America's wish to deter Iran from developing its own bombs, from supporting the Palestinian war of national liberation, and from supporting Syria in its efforts to regain the Golan.  In short, Iran perceives the United States as the obstacle to the achievement of Iran's national aspirations.

THE UNITED STATES HAS  ACHIEVED ITS GOAL: PERMANENT PRESENCE IN THE GULF. WILL IT BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN IT?

The United States has now entrenched itself in bases in the Gulf region, under the guise of war against Iraq.  It has signed a twenty-year agreement to use the $1.4 billion Al-Adeed base in Qatar.  In addition, SPC is confident the U.S. will always have free use of the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.  (See previous issue.)  The U.S. also has bases or military presence in the other Gulf states.  The bases are in the following locations:


1) Turkey:  the most important base is Incirlik, which stands at less than a 600 miles from Baghdad.

2) Kuwait: The Doha Base; the Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base;  The Ali Salem Air Base;  the $200-million 'Arifjan Military Camp.

3) Saudi Arabia: The Prince Sultan Air Base.  In addition, according to Saudi opposition sources, Crown Prince Abdallah has granted the United States the use of a military base belonging to the National Guard, in the Fuaylaq Valley, near Riyadh.

4) Bahrain:  The small country is now the naval base for the U.S. Fifth Fleet.  In addition, the United States has the use of  the Shaikh Issa Air Base.

5) Qatar: Al-Adeed (has the longest runway of all bases--4500 meters and is therefore able to host large transport planes.  It also features fortified hangars that can protect as many as 100 fighter jets.)

6) The United Arab Emirates: The Zafra Air Base.

7) Oman: All bases are available to the United States, including the International al-Sayb Airport, and the bases of Tamrit and al-Massirah.

8) Djibouti: The U.S. in Djibouti monitors Yemen and Somalia.  The U.S. has troops at the Camp Le Monier, a former French barracks, and U.S. ships can and do use the Djibouti harbor.

9) Diego Garcia: It is reported that the United States is expanding the facilities in that island, which is owned by Britain, in the Indian Ocean.

THE RATIONALE FOR THE AMERICAN BASES

This extensive military presence by the United States is meant not only to invade Iraq.  It is meant to balance Iranian power, now that Iraq is no longer able to do it.

While the United States in the 1980's had accepted that Iraq balance Iran's power, the U.S. nonetheless has always had reservations about that country's government.  The United States has felt that Iraq's Arab nationalism was a threat to the rest of the Gulf, and to Israel.  Moreover, the United States could not hope to domesticate the Iraqi government, which had historically used Europe and Russia as commercial and military partners, having deemed the United States too hostile, for its unwavering support of Israel.

But the extensive U.S. military presence is obviously an overkill, if meant only to balance Iranian power. The U.S. could after all erect a trip-wire meant for both countries not to cross.  U.S. strategists, however, have high hopes of taming Iraq, fully, and turning it into an American protectorate, a la Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries.  But the task is so mired in the possibility of bloodshed and further misery to civilians--high-tech weaponry notwithstanding--that the same strategists are still hoping to see a coup in Iraq, by pro-American officers, or self-exile by the Iraqi President and his entourage.  Egypt will most likely be the country of choice for Mr. Hussein, albeit having recently refused to see one of his emissaries.  (See below for the reasons why the United States is reluctant to invade Iraq.)

IRAN AND THE U.S. BASES

Iran will deal with the U.S. bases politically--for now--and not militarily.  

There are clear indications that the political opposition in the Gulf countries will turn the U.S. military presence and bases into its rallying cry.   While Iran will be reluctant to face the United States conventionally, it can nonetheless finance the Arab Sunni opposition to the bases in the Gulf countries--a rather inexpensive yet effective option.

A SAUDI MESSENGER VISITS BAGHDAD: DID HE RELAY AN AMERICAN MESSAGE? AND WHAT WAS IT?

In early January, the Saudi government dispatched a messenger to Baghdad.  Here's SPC's assessment:

The messenger carried an American message, not a Saudi.  And the message could very well have been more conciliatory that we are led to believe.  For one, the message probably  wasn't for the Iraqi President to leave Iraq, although such was likely an option.   Whatever it was, it was rejected by the Iraqis, which might explain Secretary Powell's volte face on war, as he has  become more vitriolic in his anti-Hussein rhetoric than the American Likudists. 

It is possible that Hussein's obstinacy is tied (foolishly for him) to his hopes based on promises that Iran will support him.    But it is also possible that the message back was a cold-blooded one: should America attack, the Iraqi government will make sure a civil war erupts. (See the outline in the first section of this e-newsletter: SPC ALERT: THE COMING MASSACRES OF CIVILIANS IN IRAQ.)

At any rate, SPC estimates that the Bush Administration is looking for a face-saving way out for itself.  Here's why the Bush Administration has reasons to be conciliatory:

-- It has failed to catalyze a coup in Iraq.

-- It has achieved a good part of its goal: the establishment of extensive military presence in the Gulf, Turkey, and East Africa, having used the Iraqi war skillfully to mobilize the American public for enough time to firm up U.S. military presence.  (Never mind that we Americans feel so much poorer now, and the tension of war has taken a toll on our well being.)

-- It has become all too acutely aware of the huge costs to the American economy now in deep recession of the invasion of Iraq, having failed to secure contributions from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Japan, and Germany.

--  It has become yet more sensitized to the human cost of the war, to Iraq, and what these costs would entail to its image in the world.  More importantly, it has come to realize that the death of Iraqi civilians will forever be used by the Arab opposition against the United States and the regimes it supports. 

Even the humiliation of Iraq's army in-and-by-itself will forever be used by the popular opposition.   And this opposition will now find it so much easier to link America's humiliation of Arabs to America's financing of the theft of Palestinian land.  And if the Iraqi army resists, it'll create an Arab epic, more powerful than Jenin's resistance to the overwhelming assault by the Israeli army.

 -- It has sensed yet more opposition from the American public.

-- It is now certain that its dialogue with the Iranians is shallow, and is meant by Iran to delay an American attack on Boushahr and suspected nuclear sites, and not as a genuine fear of U.S. power, or a true hatred of the Iraqi President and his government.

In SPC's view, the Saudis are playing a constructive role as brokers for peace.  (See the first issue of SPC for the reasons why Saudi Arabia dreads an American invasion of Iraq.)  The question now is whether the Saudis can find a creative face-saving way out for this Administration from the predicament it has created for itself.  If Hussein doesn't abide by American conditions, there will be bloodshed--and the challenge for the Saudis is to act fast to avoid the spilling of Arab blood by Saudi Arabia's closest ally.

Otherwise, Saudi Arabia continued its effort to rehabilitate Iraq.  In early January, Iraqis and Kuwaitis met in Amman to discuss the fate of missing Kuwaitis.  A Saudi delegation attended the meeting.

DOMESTICALLY. . .

Domestically, there were reports in early January issued by the Saudi opposition in London about forty al-Qaeda suspects in a Saudi prison, who have staged a hunger strike to protest their treatment.  Some were later released.

In its effort to consolidate its internal front, and to continue the course of improved relations with Iran, Saudi leaders turned to their country's Eastern Province.  Reports circulated that Saudi Arabia had in early December begun the release of dozens of Shiite political prisoners.  The Ministry of the Interior (Justice) is said to have commuted the sentences of around one hundred of these prisoners, seventeen among whom had been awaiting execution. 

The Crown Prince paid attention to the poor in the second part of November.  Abdallah visited some of the poorest neighborhoods in Riyadh to show his concern.  Sultan, at Defense, handed deeds for new homes, as part of a project dedicated to him.  He also inaugurated a military hospital in Dhahran, which is said to have cost the state $2.6 billion.

The attention paid to the poor was caused by the Crown Prince's genuine concern for their lot.  (Again, Abdallah has a stellar reputation.)  But it also smacks of good old political jockeying, to place Sultan and Nayif on the defensive. 

On the night of January 24-January 25, an armed clash pitted Saudi police with armed individuals who were said to belong to the opposition.  (Opposition sources call them Jihadiyyin--those who are fighting under the banner of Islam for Islamic Justice.)  No arrests were made.  While no one should expect a country to be free of opposition, armed at times, the incident nonetheless pointed out that the bin Laden people are around, and are armed.  Possibly, it also pointed out that the Saudi police can be quite ineffective.

At any rate, Abdallah and the royal family are in for a tough time: the U.S. military presence in the Gulf, while Israel is devastating Arab brothers in Palestine, has placed--and will continue to place--the Kingdom's leadership in a difficult spot.  Osama bin Laden, or his political heirs, will reap tons of legitimacy in opposing the U.S. bases.  Add to that the fact that their discourse is Islamic and egalitarian, and therefore quite moving in its power to mobilize.  Not to mention that money should be flowing to these groups from Iran, and from other countries which oppose U.S. bases.

SPC expects that each and every country that is threatened by America's expansion into the Gulf (and SPC is including Europe), will pass secret and untraceable money to groups opposing the U.S. bases.

ABDALLAH LAUNCHES YET ANOTHER INITIATIVE

Crown Prince Abdallah tried yet again to absorb popular disquiet and placate America's uncertain drive for reform.  The Crown Prince launched the Mithaq al-Islah al-Wad' al-'Arabi (The Declaration of Reform of the [Political] Condition).  SPC estimates that the Crown Prince now has a think tank that doesn't sleep a night before designing yet another progressive idea.  But this idea has the advantage of (hopefully) placating the United States' equally impractical (and eminently non-serious) call for reform. 

Abdallah presented the Mithaq to the Arab League. The more important part of the Mithaq is its call for the adoption by the member-states of reforms, and the widening of political participation. Without spending too much ink on this initiative, SPC predicts its quiet death. 

Take the Kingdom, for example:  to execute his initiative, the well-meaning Crown Prince will have to jump over the entrenched centers of power.  (These are: Sultan at Defense, Nayif at Interior (Justice) and a son of King Fahd's at the Royal palace).   These centers have their own ideas about how things should be done, and are likely to see the Prince's initiative as a means to subdue them. 

Additionally, the Crown Prince will have to deal with the powerful religious establishment, well-entrenched, which will fight any diminishment of its power. 

Historically, other ideas for Saudi reform had evaporated just as soon as they were launched.   They were conceived to deal with the tension brought about by internal or external events, and they died a convenient and quiet death.

SAUDI ARABIA USES OIL TO SOBER UP  SOME ARAB HATERS AMONG AMERICA'S LIKUDIST ELITE 

Oil remained the weapon of choice in the Saudi public relations arsenal with the United States.   Saudi Arabia used increased pumping of oil to remind the Sharonist (civilian) "hawks" at the Pentagon that the United States still needed the Kingdom.   With Venezuela's strikes, and Nigeria's chronic turmoil, Saudi Arabia stood as an island of productive stability.

It is estimated that the Saudis supply one-sixth of America's oil needs.  Saudi Arabia is known as the only producer with the spare capacity to replace oil which others, such as Venezuela, might fail to produce.  The Saudis are credited for quickly tapering off the severe oil disruption that took place in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. 

It is estimated that U.S. dependency on Gulf oil will increase in the coming twenty years.

SAUDI-AMERICAN RELATIONS

There were indications that the Israel lobby in the United States will exert pressure on the Kingdom by pressuring the U.S. government to oppose Saudi Arabia's application to the World Trade Organization. That lobby accuses the Kingdom of still being active on the Arab boycott of Israel, and of companies that transact business with that country.

Tension between the two countries' governments continued to be in evidence.  In late November, The Washington Post revealed that a National Security Council task force was recommending an action plan for the President to force Saudi Arabia to crack down on terror financiers within ninety days, or force the United States to bring the suspects to justice in this country.  Of the nine financiers, seven were Saudis.  Capitol Hill weighed in:  U.S. Senator Richard C. Shelby (R-Ala) was quoted as saying that the Saudis had "a lot of answering to do." 

There was frustration in Washington at the less-than-total responsiveness of the Saudis to agreed upon joint plans to rein in terror financing.  The Post reported that shortly after September 9, the two governments had agreed to designate one Saudi citizen as terror financier and move to freeze his assets.  But no more than 48 hours later, senior Saudi officials publicly disowned the designation of said Saudi subject.  Reacting to the wavering, a senior U.S. official described Saudi Arabia as "one of the epicenters of terrorist financing." 

As SPC had noted in its previous issues--one of which assessed that Saudi foreign policy may have been taken over by the United States--blackmail was one weapon at the disposal of the American national security establishment to subdue the Saudi royal family.  (Again, not Abdallah; the Crown Prince has a stellar reputation, but he could not ignore blackmail against other members of the royal family.)    That establishment owns a wealth of information about princes and the corruption of some. In addition,  it now has at its disposal the one-trillion dollar law suit brought in U.S. courts by the families of the September 11 victims.  The Post's article made it clear that the Bush administration is allowing the law suit to weigh in on the Kingdom, without interference by the Executive, until such time as that Kingdom is fully subjugated to American demands on fighting terror.  Unstated in the article was that the law suit could also serve to blackmail the princes on other matters, as well, including the use of bases.

The lawsuit is preoccupying Saudi officials; the Post's article revealed that they had expressed their concern repeatedly to the administration.

American officials estimate that as much as one hundred million dollars have been given by Saudis to terrorist organizations.  But it is not clear how much of this flow was sent to Palestine (for legitimate humanitarian assistance in that nation's struggle to free itself from foreign occupation and colonization) and how much to organizations associated with Osama bin Laden, or to groups is Europe or Russia--groups which may or may not have us on their target list.

Saudi Arabia continued its diplomacy cum public relations effort to mend relations with Washington, and checkmate the right-wing Israeli campaign against the Kingdom

In early December, the Saudi Ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, revealed that the Saudi government was instrumental in supplying the Central Intelligence Service (CIA) with information on three of al-Qaeda's leaders, and that this intelligence led to the arrest of Abdel-Rahim al-Nashiri, responsible for al-Qaeda's operations in the Gulf.  Prince Bandar's revelation came in the aftermath of the Washington-made scandal--made so apparently by a vindictive bureaucracy--implicating his wife in sending money to a needy Saudi family on the west coast, which money found its way into the hands of Saudi terrorists.  Obviously, the Ambassador's wife didn't know about the re-routing of the money, and it was clear that she had sent the money for purely humanitarian reasons.

January 28, 2003

AMERICA'S STRATEGY: APPLY PRESSURE FOR A SUNNI COUP

(TO AVOID ARAB SUNNI UPRISINGS AGAINST CLIENT GOVERNMENTS--WITNESS MA'AN IN JORDAN.)

The United States's strategy, for now, is to have troops ready in Kuwait and other countries nearby. Their mission: to move in as soon as Iraqi Sunni officers stage the long-hoped-for coup. Or, to effect incursions into Iraq in such a way as to instigate a coup. The U.S. will then provide support for the new junta--weapons and logistics. It will also show enough force to deter Iran from invading Iraq should Iran be displeased with the new regime. (This would be a dangerous game, as the Shiites in the south could take advantage of these incursions, and act independently of Tehran, igniting a civil war at a time not of Tehran's chosing. The responsibility for quelling that war, or managing it, would then fall onto American troops.)

Why not an outright invasion? What's going on in Jordan (mid-November, 2002) is an early look at what might occur should American-generated tension not subside. Following the assassination of an USAID employee, tension increased between Islamists and government. The latter moved against the town of Ma'an, to arrest prominent Islamist rebels. The town in response staged what amounted to an armed uprising. This armed rebellion reflected in good part the rage of the Arab Sunni world. This world feels under attack and encircled by the United States, Israel, Turkey, and Iran. Too, the Arab Sunni world sees its governments as incompetent and treasonous. The continued and ongoing colonization of Palestine, and the American psychological and other warfare staged against Sunni rule in Iraq, are fanning the flames of revolt.