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Thursday, January 01, 2004

DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN THE KINGDOM WILL TAKE AN ISLAMIC COURSE; THE PARTIAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS ARE A COMPROMISE STEP IN THAT DIRECTION

Another reason for the limited nature of the democratic initiative lies in the social layout of the Kingdom. Socially and historically, Saudi Arabia is unique among Arab countries. This is one country which has never been fully colonized, and has not therefore for a long time felt the need to emulate the West--to modernize. Its social norms, therefore, have remained more intact than those of the other Arab countries which have been subjected to invasions, colonization and foreign mandates. Accordingly, Saudi society, having been saved the devastation of colonization, remained relatively insulated. At the risk of exaggeration, large sectors of that society froze into a stiff conservative mold.

This insulation was very much in effect even after oil companies expanded their presence in the kingdom. Abdel Aziz bin-Saud, the founder of the Kingdom, continued to protect the traditional and conservative society from the onslaught of the these companies. By shielding the Saudi social fabric from the onslaught of blind Western capital (and its virtues and vices) the Sauds in effect used income from oil to preserve the old social and political forces. This came natural to them, as it did to the founder of the kingdom, without malice or forethought. After all, they themselves were the product of that same society, about which they felt paternalistic and protective.

This conservatism is currently fostered and accepted in good part because of the Islamic world's expectation (and the expectation of a substantial number of Saudis) that the Kingdom, the birthplace of Islam, should remain authentically Muslim. In this powerful Islamic context, reform will not succeed unless it is inspired and propagated using an Islamic discourse. The Saudi opposition knows that. Its literature is nothing short of masterpieces in Islamic teachings and the principles of Islamic rule.

In short, reform in Saudi Arabia should and will take a form that is uniquely Saudi and uniquely Islamic. It'll have to be inspired by Islamic precepts, and will have to accommodate among regions (e.g., Hijaz v. Najd v. Asir) and among three main political forces: The thousands of princes (paternalistic and recipients of free money and status), the traditionalists, including the clerics who are on the government payroll (primarily concerned about the possible weakening of Islam by the princes and by the modernists), and the liberals and modernists, found mostly among the merchant class (concerned with integrating the kingdom--commercially and culturally--with the region and the world.) All three forces will have to give in some, if only to assure that the birthplace of Islam remains peaceful, and the sons and daughters of that birthplace not hateful towards one another. In that light, the promise of partial municipal elections looks like the result of compromise among the three forces. The campaigners in the partial municipal elections will very likely use Islamic images of egalitarianism--a powerful force in Islam.

SPC WARNING:

The elections are better held as soon as possible, as they should diminish the tension found in Saudi society. It'll be unwise for the Saudi government to delay these elections under the pressure (or excuse) of the bombings by extremists and the otherwise general conditions of turmoil, as delay will worsen that turmoil. For many are still incredulous that the very word "election" is mentioned in the Kingdom. Delay will increase skepticism and will heighten support for the opposition, para-military and political. Elected leaders, in contrast, should pull the rug from underneath the feet of all opposition. In addition, the very process of campaigning and electioneering should get the country feeling better about itself and its rulers.