ARTICLE: AMERICAN ILLUSIONS AND IRAQI REALITIES (written July 2003)

To belittle Sunni armed resistance to U.S. occupation, the Pentagon tacticians assert that this resistance is the work of "Saddam loyalists" or "Baathist fighters." There's a distinct possibility, however, that this resistance has the unmitigated support of the greater majority of Iraqi Sunnis. As one Iraqi traveler in Jordan recently protested to this author, "They talk about the Baath; don't they know over half of the Iraqis were members of that party?" Baath or no Baath, the Sunnis believe that the Americans intend to marginalize their role in the future fate of their country. In addition, the Sunnis blame the United States for the secession of the northern Kurdish region and the break-up of Iraq.

The Pentagon tacticians have adopted a macro approach for the Middle East, aware that one crisis feeds on another. They have labored for a tentative resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian civil war. By so doing, they are hoping to defuse a sensitive issue that causes tremendous Arab anger, and to give the American occupation of Iraq legitimacy among the Iraqi Sunnis. As if to compete, and to mobilize the Iraqi public, the Sunnis have portrayed the American invasion of their country as the work of pro-Israeli right wing elements in the United States, who dispatched U.S. troops to subdue an Israeli foe.

The Pentagon tacticians' macro approach will not work. The Arab public sees the current disentanglement in Israel/Palestine as a blunting by the United States of a natural course of resistance to Israeli occupation and settlements. The Arab public sees Abu Mazin, the Prime Minister of the Palestine Authority, as an American agent, until he proves himself otherwise. He will have to deliver back to the Palestinians the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem--land and water. The Arab public strongly believes that the United States is a dishonest broker in the Palestinian and Syrian conflict with Israel--that Israel in fact wouldn't have set up colonial settlements but for the financial and military support it receives from the United States. The Pentagon tacticians therefore will not see armed resistance abating in Iraq thanks to the (precarious) diffusion of tension in Israel/Palestine. If anything, the Sunni Arabs in Iraq will increasingly perceive themselves, in their resistance to occupation, as the defenders of Arab and Muslim honor. Their perception will likely be shared by all Arabs.

Moreover, the Iraqi Sunnis suspect that the Shiite religious leadership is backing the United States in order to eliminate Sunni resistance. Only then would that leadership unleash its own armed rebellion against American occupation. The Sunni interpretation could very well be correct. The Shiite religious leadership, historically conservative and therefore averse to impulsive political action, is not beyond wanting to see the Sunni resistance wiped out before it pushes for total American withdrawal from the country. Additionally, the Shiite leadership is aware that the United States can help Iraq shed its estimated $100 billion in debt and another $200 billion in compensation (war penalties) for the Kuwait wars. In short, the Shiite religious leadership wants control of an Iraq that is free of debt and of Sunni power.

The Sunni view of the Shiite leadership's agenda is not farfetched. But the Sunnis (and the Pentagon tacticians) would be wrong to think that the Shiites will stray far from Arab solidarity. Like their brethren in Lebanon, the Iraqi Shiites are going through political maturation, and should take on with success the burden of reuniting Iraq. Their Lebanese brethren have shown us that they would welcome death to liberate their country and will defend it against any foe or occupier. Moreover, like their Lebanese brethren, they are unlikely to stray far from Arab solidarity. But unlike the Lebanese, the Iraqi Shiites belong to a country that has precious and coveted oil reserves. In managing these, one can reasonably conclude that they have learned lessons from the paranoid regime that preceded the American occupation. I therefore don't see them squandering their country's resources on imperial ambitions, nor do I see them falling for the manipulations of the greedy West. In other words: they will not be duped. Their country is wealthy; their numbers are large; their fighting ability, now that their native oppressor is gone, is unlimited. They have flocks to feed, and that should keep them preoccupied.

Shiite power is so great and secure that the Shiites should be able to reunite the country with little vindictiveness towards their Sunni and Kurdish compatriots. Accordingly, they will compromise with the Sunnis on symbolic issues such as Iraq's stance on Israel. As a consequence, the Pentagon tacticians and their self-serving Iraqi agents will see their illusion about Iraq's relations with Israel shattered. In other words, the new Iraq will seek any political consensus that will reunite its three major ethnic/religious groups. Solidarity with the Palestinians and Syrians (about the Golan) is likely to be a pillar of that consensus. In short, as with the Arab public at large, the new Iraq will get its cue on how to perceive Israel from the Palestinians and the Syrians. This is certainly not what the Pentagon tacticians are playing for.

In this process of rebuilding the new Shiite-led Iraq, the United States can either get in the way, or get out. Let's see the Pentagon tacticians call this one. Knowing so much about them from the press, I would bet they would expose the children of American mothers to unnecessary martyrdom.

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There have occurred at least two armed attacks against British and U.S. troops is parts of Iraq that are predominantly Shiite. In reaction, Muhammad Baqer Hakim, once President of the pro-Iranian Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, announced in his Friday sermon on June 27, 2003, his preference for peaceful means to liberate the country. He said that he preferred negotiations and peaceful demonstrations. He obviously meant this statement as assurance to the United States that the operations against the British and the Americans were passing matters. Other major Shiite political forces and personalities, including the Islamic Da'wa Party and Muqtadha Sadr, are still in the camp of peaceful resistance against, and limited cooperation with, the Americans.


Reassuring statements aside, these operations should have been an early and clear signal to the Pentagon tacticians that the resistance to occupation will spread. Note one important aspect of Shiite politics: Shiite leaders are for peaceful resistance against U.S. occupation, not for peaceful co-existence with that occupation or its agents. Baqer Hakim in his statement seemed as if he was defending a losing proposition: that the Shiites should not launch guerrilla attacks against the occupiers. There will come a time, he knows, when he will no longer be able to hold them back.

In that vein, the Pentagon tacticians should stop seeing Iran and Syria as the enablers of Sunni resistance. If they are, their role is marginal. All indications are that Iran and Syria will avoid instigating the United States. I'm not naive: the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Syrian intelligence are unavoidably coordinating against the "American bully" and his junior Israeli partner. But they are too realistic to want the United States to cause damage to their countries' military infrastructure. Instead, they can let the Sunni resistance do its work without tainting it with their assistance.

Baqer Hakim's above statement should be seen from this Iranian vantage point. For now, Iran's priority is to acquire nuclear weapons to balance Israel's arsenal. This is basic balance of terror: if one country introduces nuclear weapons, others in the region are bound to follow. Accordingly, Iran is not interested in making life difficult for the United States in Iraq. Not before it secures its Bomb. But should the Pentagon tacticians increase U.S. pressure on Iran, to a point where this pressure threatens the survival of that country's system of government, Iran should be expected to lend support to the Sunni resistance in Iraq. It would also lend support to those Shiites in Iraq who are eager to ignite a Shiite armed rebellion against the occupation to compete with the Sunnis. (Iran can certainly make life difficult for the United States in Iraq. For one, Iran seems to have the run of that country. For instance, on June 19 of this year, an Iranian opposition figure who ran an opposition radio station from Baghdad was kidnapped. His Iraqi wife has accused the Iranian government for his kidnapping.)


Regardless of Iranian self-restraint, the Iraqi Shiite leadership can ill-afford to wait before it joins the armed resistance to the American occupation. Why? If that leadership fails to act, it'll be out-maneuvered by a new leadership that is willing to get the job done. For Iran should not be seen as carrying more clout with the Iraqi Shiites than it does in actual fact. After all, Iraqi Shiite nationalism is distinct from the Persian, as the Iraqi Shiites trace their origins to Arab tribes, not to Persia. With Iran's help or without, that nationalism cannot stand idle while the Sunni leadership under the banner of Islam gains popularity among the Shiite youth for its daring armed resistance. If the Shiite leadership doesn't join the armed resistance, it'll risk seeing Shiite youth leave its ranks in droves; they will either join the Sunni leadership or accept a new Shiite leadership that is willing to fight.

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The Pentagon tacticians should shed any dreams of control of Iraqi oil and of using an Iraqi puppet regime as a means to bust OPEC. (Note the statement on April 27, 2003, by Fadhil Chalabi, a former Iraqi oil minister and current advisor to the U.S. government, that Iraq may have to quit OPEC, to allow it to pump more oil.) Neither the Shiites nor the Sunnis will allow for lower oil prices. An Iraqi woman bears on average six children. This is a prescription for population explosion. That population will need every resource of that country to live and thrive. Additionally, the tacticians' attempts to bust OPEC would get the Saudi government in trouble. For a population explosion is afoot in that country as well. Worse, the Saudi government is in debt to the tune--some think--of over 250 billion dollars. Any diminished income for the Saudi, Iraqi, and Iranian governments would spell trouble in the region. At a minimum, it would hasten the armed rebellion by the Shiites against the American occupation, and place U.S. troops in Iraq in more danger.

Moreover, it is extremely doubtful that the United States will be able to thwart opposition to lower oil prices by spreading duty-free zones and most-favored-nation status in the Middle East--promises recently made by the United States at an economic conference in Jordan. (I had lunch in Jordan with an astute observer of that country's scene. He pondered how the Jordanian working class is getting by; he told me so many are making 90 Jordanian Dinars per month, the equivalent of around $150, while supporting five or six children. Many make even less. This is a time bomb, he said. It hasn't fully exploded (it had in Maan), he speculated, because the King has been able to obtain hundreds of millions of U.S. aid and oil at discounted prices from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, not because of the new economic ties to Israel or the liberal access to the American market.) Economic intervention might work, but only if the United States injects uncounted billions into the pockets of Arabs, Iraqis in particular. Still, the results will not be assured. Unlike wretched Egypt and Jordan, Iraq has wealth and cannot be bought cheaply. And wealth buttresses Iraqi nationalism. In other words, the Iraqis are not some desperate cargo cult that believes in ships bringing back the ancestors and a cargo of goods from the United States. Their nationalism is real: Arab or Islamic, secular or religious. At any rate, the very middle class the cargo will create--if it ever does, if Congress allows the cargo to materialize--in the context of Iraqi pluralism, will end up pitting one sectarian middle class against another. And a civil war will erupt, especially if Iran is living a state of tension and possible explosion. Some tacticians might see the civil war as an excuse to keep American troops in Iraq. These tacticians should beware of what they wish for, especially if the price is paid by the children of American mothers.

Evidence suggests that the United States isn't willing or able to spend the countless billions needed to turn the Iraqis into a cargo cult. In fact, some press reports have revealed that the United States is unwilling to spend more than $2.5 billion this year on the rebuilding of Iraqi infrastructure. This is not sufficient to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis, starved by years of wars followed by years of sanctions.

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The winds of armed Shiite rebellion against the United States could blow from an unpredictable direction, e.g., Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, or somewhere else. The least likely scenarios could spark Iraqi Shiite nationalism into that certain rebellion. Consider for example the increased activism of the Saudi Shiites, native to the Eastern Province, where most of the Saudi oil is found. Encouraged by America's talk of a new age of democracy in the Arab world and sensing the throbbing power of their brethren in Iraq, the activists within that community are voicing their grievances about their second class treatment in their own country. Note for instance the petition, signed by 450 Saudi Shiite personalities, titled "Partners in the Nation," which was presented to Crown Prince Abdallah in late May, 2003. The Petition outlined Shiite grievances and called for equality with the Sunnis. Crown Prince Abdallah has been doing his best to appease all concerned. But he is besieged by jealousies, succession problems, incompetence all around him, competition from his half-brothers Nayef at Interior and Sultan at Defense who have created states within the state, American pressure to rein in the religious establishment and right wing threats to break up the kingdom, and deteriorating economic conditions.

In short, Saudi Shiite activism could not come at a worse time for the Saudi government. That government is bankrupt and may not be able to meet Shiite demands with the largesse it once knew. Force could replace largesse. Should the Saudi state overreact to demonstrations in the Eastern Province, and kill Saudi Shiites, we should expect the Iraqi Shiites to rebel against the United States, which is perceived as the main protector of the Sunni Saudi government.