Iran Will Launch a Tet-Like Offensive

Should the United States (or Israel) Rebound from Defeat?

So, in essence, we have lost the war, since Iran de facto rules Iraq. In fact, Iran has us under the threat of a Tet-like offensive any time we (or Israel) attempt to rebound from defeat, by activating its thousands of operatives in Iraq against our troops, a la Tet.

We have now met reality: that force and power (the shock and awe stuff) only shock and awe us--and hardly affect the ability of old civilizations to fight back. Increasingly, all in that region are reverting back to Islam (including our unwilling protectorate: Iraq) and away from the progress they had made. The chief victim: women. For Islam, when used to resist a total war of subjugation, can hardly afford to be liberal. (It's nothing short of pathetic to witness hitherto Saudi-owned press in London, after going on the U.S. payroll, feature articles about the condition of women in the Arab world. As if these articles can stem a massive tidal wave back to the roots--to Islam--as the fastest way for a civilization to fight occupation and colonization. With Islamic Iran having won the day, that tidal wave is bound to become a tsumani. Unless, of course, the United States offers yet more concessions to Iran. In which case, Iran's take-over of Iraq would be complete. The other option: wage conventional war on Iran (shock and awe stuff), and face unconventional warfare, a la Israel in Lebanon--which, to remind the readers--ended with Israel's defeat.

The OPPW Iraq war resulted in yet another defeat: that of Israel. The American rapprochement with Islamic Iran, and the need to avoid more chaos, has made OPPW all but concede the Bomb project to Iran. (The Iranian Bomb is meant to balance Israel's extensive nuclear arsenal.) All of this after OPPW (and Republican strategists) had used the American Jewish support for Israel as a pillar for the war on Iraq--to garner as much public support as they could. (Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans in the aftermath of September 11 had volunteered in large numbers to help out against terrorism. But the war on Iraq so befuddled them that they reverted to a state of apathy.) The Jewish right in Israel became excited and, for a while, it seemed that the Bush administration had made a significant dent in the Jewish community's historic support of the Democratic Party.

But now that American lives are in the balance--and the chances for the re-election of the President--OPPW has sent a message to Prime Minister Sharon: Here are some high-tech weapons (useless in the age of unconventional warfare); play with them--but, whatever you do, stay the hell away from affecting the welfare of our troops in Iraq.

SPC WARNING: OPPW personnel, blinded by ideology, should not think they can outsmart the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. In other words, they should beware of playing up an act, where what Israel does...Israel does, and we cannot control them. The killing of the Americans in Gaza was a message by the Revolutionary Guard that, as far as Iran is concerned, what Israel does is what America wants it to do; and even if that was not the case, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard will act as if it were.

Leonard Binder's book, edited in the early 1960's (1961 I believe), Politics in Lebanon should be good reading for the OPPW personnel, those at the Pentagon and those on the Pentagon's payroll, indirectly--the same ones who threatened to break up the Saudi Kingdom. Memory tells me that in the last chapter Professor Binder warned against direct American intervention in the Arab world; that better results were obtained with indirect intervention. And the right wing American Israel enthusiasts--made use of by OPPW and by Republican campaign strategists--would do well to read another book that my memory recalls vaguely--Amin Maalouf's The Crusades as Seen by the Arabs.

THE ANATOMY OF OUR DEFEAT IN IRAQ

It scares this editor to think that we were defeated; the fact is: we have. Iran has won the war against us in Iraq, and possibly in the Middle East. The OPPW ideologues had failed to see that the "defeat" of the Sunni regime in Iraq will result in a de facto Iranian victory over us. These ideologues became victim of their own propaganda.

OPPW has now placed the United States in the position of being beholden to Islamic Iran. Instead of modulating the

Sunni-dominated Iraqi Baathist government (to open up political participation), and pressuring Israel to withdraw from all lands it occupied in 1967--and support the formation and stability Palestinian state--OPPW set the United States on an anti-Arab Sunni course. Worse, it brought into Iraq first-rate con-artists, about whom the Iraqis (Sunnis and Shiites) know only one thing: that they are con-artist who hunger for money, and have never done any public service for their community. Some legitimacy for an American occupation.

Iran's victory is buttressed by the fact that the Bush administration is worried about Iraq's impact on the upcoming presidential elections. It is concerned--even running scared--that the continued high rate of American casualties and chaos in Iraq will lose it the re-election. To avoid an Iranian-induced exponential increase in those casualties and in chaos, this administration has had to strike a deal with the devil, so to speak: Iran. Accordingly, it has reached an agreement with the Islamic Republic: That the latter ease up on the United States in Iraq, by not activating its thousands of operatives within that country and using its influence to keep the Iraqi Shiites tame and cooperative with the occupation. In exchange the United States has offered the following major concessions:

1) The United States will concede partnership for Iran in Iraq. Read: Defeat.

2) The United States will abate its campaign for regime change in Iran. Read: Defeat.

3) The United States will rein in the Mujaheedin Khalq--or it'll have its puppet government in Iraq do it. Read: Defeat.

4) The United States will ease up on the Iranian nuclear bomb project, by giving Europe a voice which the U.S. had hitherto denied. Read: Defeat.

The understanding with Iran was reached thanks to multiple visits by American proxies to Tehran. The understanding is limited to Iraq. Outside that country, it's war, including a war of assassinations waged by the Israelis and the Americans against the Iranians and the Syrians. The latter won that war hands down when three Americans were killed in Gaza. Read: Defeat. (See SPC Alert.)

The costly neutralization of Iran in Iraq should not have much impact on the ongoing armed resistance to occupation. The resistance has the full support of the Arab Sunnis. These see the American occupation as meant to establish Kurdish and Shiite domination over them. They perceive an expat con-artist as an OPPW tool--a traitor who epitomizes lust for money--and nothing and no one else.

Worse of all, our defeat lies in the very fact that Iran increasingly is becoming the main referee in Iraqi politics. Syria's experience in Lebanon is certainly on Iran's mind, as Iran proceeds to swallow oil-rich Iraq. In fact, Syria's role as referee among the sects in Lebanon is so crucial to the running of even the day-to-day affairs of that country, that Syria should not be able to resign that role even if it wanted. Iran is fast gaining that role in Iraq, thanks to the stupidity of OPPW (Office of Propaganda and Psychological Warfare) and the right wing ideologues at the Pentagon, Likud enthusiasts included.

THE GROWING DESPERATION OF CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH

Crown Prince Abdallah is desperate. He has set himself the goal of putting the House of Saud and its Kingdom in order, following the September 11 events. He has met little success.

Abdallah's task had become difficult, if not impossible, as he needed to tame the United States, the main aggressor against the Kingdom's government, yet the Kingdom's chief ally. The Americans, following September 11, had used their Office of Propaganda and Psychological Warfare(OPPW)--we'll call it that, since its real name remains unknown--at the Pentagon not only to wage psychological warfare against the Iraqi Baath; they have used OPPW to coordinate the process of establishing full control over the Kingdom's government. The rationale: The United States cannot afford to trust that government. Not after September 11.

By unleashing aggressive ideas about breaking up the Kingdom--by men who seemed to owe their jobs to OPPW and to the Pentagon, outside and inside of government--in an orchestrated bad cop(OPPW's men)-good cop(the Bush family)act, and by insinuating that some of the Kingdom's princes were implicated in September 11, OPPW mobilized an already-infuriated American public in support of anti-Saudi policies. With the American public behind it, OPPW set about to establish full control of Saudi Arabia's government.

The strategist at OPPW feel that the Saudis are unable to govern themselves. Accordingly, OPPW has initiated intervention in the various aspects of governance in Saudi Arabia: from school curricula to the installment of King and Crown Prince. Abdallah watches but is helpless at modulating the increasingly iron-clad American mandate over his family and his Kingdom.

The divisions, jealousies, and incompetence within the royal family are at the heart of Abdallah's helplessness. Some of his half-brothers can't seem to appreciate the true aims of OPPW, and feel that, whatever the aims of the American strategists, these could be beneficial to them individually. Abdallah's helplessness is made all the worse by the absence of a local or regional broker who can forge agreements and consensus among the members of the royal family. Divided, the Saud brothers have become pawns at the mercy of the American national security establishment. OPPW can whip the American public into an anti-Saudi mood almost instantly by leaking a "concern" any time it meets any resistance to its wishes in the Kingdom.

The absence of elections in the Kingdom contributes to the helplessness Abdallah feels. True, the Saudi government has launched an initiative for municipal elections, to take place in one year. But the turmoil in that country might delay these elections, and the delay can be disastrous for Abdallah's cause of preserving some independence for the Saudi government. How?

Only elected leaders with a popular mandate can stand in the way of the Pentagon's OPPW--and its contractors: its paid tentacles in consulting firms and right-wing think-tanks. (The left has ignored the importance of balance of power analysis in the unipolar world; but such analysis is still crucial, especially when unconventional warfare is factored into it.)
Elected leaders in this modern unipolar world will be the royal family's best protectors against OPPW's goal of total control of the Saudi government. In other words, the royal family will have to chose: To become marginalized by the United States self-righteous ideologues or to take a risk and have elected leaders preserve a role for it, one that is independent of Big Brother.

An elected leader can tell Big Brother that his/her constituency will not stand for this or that, and may direct his/her constituency accordingly. A non-elected one will not be believed, however much his/her supportive press protests otherwise. (Besides, Big Brother is buying into the Saudi-owned media, anyway, especially the one based in London and other places outside the Kingdom.)

Abdallah has tried to use foreign policy as a way of balancing OPPW's schemes. But, in this unipolar world, where the Kingdom had invested nearly its entire money and political capital in the United States, OPPW can afford to ignore--and has-- Abdallah's foreign policy moves, which it has deemed non-consequential in every sense.

Only elections will save some independence for the Kingdom's government and a role that is significant for the royal family.

SAUDI OPPOSITION TAKES TO THE STREETS

On the evening of October 14, 2003, Saudi Arabia witnessed a rare popular demonstration. People gathered near the commercial al-Mamlakah Center in Riyadh's downtown, located near the meeting place of a Saudi Red Crescent conference on human rights in which the United States was a participant, but to which Amnesty International was not invited. Demonstrations were also held on October 23, in various cities.

It remained unclear how many participated in the demonstrations. It seems certain, though, that the numbers were in the hundreds, not in the 50,000 range alleged by some in the opposition.

The demonstrations were called to protest the campaign of arrests launched by the Saudi government in the aftermath of the May 12 suicide bombings in Riyadh. The arrests have targeted members and sympathizers of al-Qaeda, including some women.

The Islamic Movement for Reform in Arabia (Islah), based in London, called for the demonstration. A few month ago, Islah had launched a radio station and later, in early May, a satellite television station directed at the Kingdom and the Gulf region.
The Saudi government intervened successfully with the German host of the satellite television station to stop Islah's broadcasts, starting around October 22.

WILL THE GOVERNMENT OVER-REACT? SUCH IS THE HOPE OF THE OPPOSITION

On balance, the government for now has not over-reacted. But the risk is eminently present that it could. It's unclear how many Shiites in the Eastern Province are Islah sympathizers. (The fact that the United States closed its consulate in Dhahran on November 7 is probably related to the war of assassinations between Iran/Syria and the United States/Israel--See SPC Alert-- and not to a concern for riots and demonstrations. ) The United States should be concerned that Iran might want to flex its muscles in the predominately-Shiite Eastern Province. At any rate, over-reaction in that province (e.g., the shooting of demonstrators) might result in a Shiite backlash which neither the government nor the local established leaders would be able to easily control. This would be more dangerous to the stability of the Kingdom than Islah-inspired demonstrations in the rest of the country.

In calling for public demonstrations, the opposition hopes to emulate the Iranian experience. Iranians had taken to the streets and had brought down the Shah's repressive and self-deluded American-installed government. For years now, wishfully perhaps, the Saudi opposition has warned of the chaos to come. But Saudi Arabia, geographically and demographically, is different from Iran. Taking over in one city might just be limited to that, and the government should be able to push back the opposition's control of that city, especially if it has the help of foreign troops. (See below) On a scale of probabilities, only in the Eastern Province could the "chaos" spill into widespread riots.

THE OPPOSITION CHANGES STRATEGIES

The opposition's call for demonstrations contrasted with the methods used by the foremost opposition leader, Osama bin Laden, who had opted to wage war against the royal family and its allies from such faraway places as Afghanistan and Pakistan. The demonstrations came at a time when the paramilitary opposition is facing suppression at home and abroad. Feeling the heat of the government domestically, and the U.S.-led international community the world over, the paramilitary opposition has resorted to desperate action, such as the bombing on November 8 of the residential compound in Riyadh, housing mostly other Muslims and Arabs.

As the paramilitary activity loses steam, the demonstrations have come to replace them, and may in fact signal the beginning maturation of the opposition, as it has opted for peaceful means to make its demands. (The demonstrations should go on hold while the government and the armed opposition engage in confrontations.) The idea clearly is to embarrass the royal family before the United States, the closest of Saudi allies. It plays to the American rhetoric calling for overnight democracy in the Kingdom. Islah has called for more demonstrations, including a large one to take place in the holy city of Mecca during the holy month of Ramadan. (The Saudi government in early November had intensified its campaign to rein in opposition groups in Mecca, especially that a number of these are armed and very well trained.) Unfortunately for the London-based opposition, the desperate paramilitary acts of the al Qaeda-connected Jihadists, as they kill other Muslims and Arabs, should dampen domestic support for all the opposition--peaceful and paramilitary. This dampening of support should be temporary.

THE ROYAL FAMILY RESPONDS WITH A RARE INITIATIVE: PARTIAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

In the first half of October the Saudi cabinet announced its intention to hold partial municipal elections to take place in one year. The royal family will keep a role for itself, as half of the membership of these councils will be appointed by the King or those representing him.

THE OPPOSITION CRITICIZES PLAN FOR PARTIAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Commentators who are close to the opposition have criticized the government's plan to hold partial municipal elections. They saw the plan as falling short of meeting the expectations of the public. They pointed out that the partial municipal election plan was a regression, as regions such as Hijaz have had full municipal elections as far back as one hundred years ago.

These commentators, inspired by the overseas’ Saudi opposition, maintain that the announcement is too small a step to take seriously. In their view, these partial elections of local municipal councils are meant to conceal runaway corruption and the wasting of public monies by the princes and their allies within the merchant class; they stress that equality before the law is absent and that the judiciary lacks independence; they further allege that women's rights are the subject of daily abuse; and, eminently, they note the absence of elections in the national political system- –a reference to the fact that the Consultative Council is an appointed entity and hardly a true elected parliament, and that the Governors of the Provinces are also appointed.

THE PARTIAL ELECTIONS COULD PRODUCE A NATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The opposition's criticism notwithstanding, the promise of partial elections of municipal councils is a historic leap forward. And it could strengthen royal rule, as it will diminish somewhat the hostility that some sectors of the population hold towards the royal family.

Importantly, the election experiment--though local and partial--could very well result in bringing into the open the hitherto underground political activity--or activity that is taking place in such faraway places as London, Afghanistan, and the Northwest Province of Pakistan. In other words, these partial elections should provide a venue for political participation, which results could prove wider in scope than their local nature would foretell. They should bring forward a new, young, and possibly populist leadership. True, the opposition's criticism that the royal family will co-opt the elected municipal leaders is valid. But it is unlikely that the royal family will be able to co-opt all the elected leaders. Not to mention that the royal family does not speak with one voice. Note the recent criticism of that family by one of its prominent members: al-Waleed bin Talal.

Besides, some of the elected municipal leaders are bound by necessity to gain a national reputation and, one would hope, to keep an eye on the princes and on such issues as corruption and the wasting of public funds.

ABDALLAH DOES HIS BEST TO ACCOMMODATE LIBERALS AND REFORMERS

The announcement of partial elections of municipal councils came under long-lasting pressure from liberals and reformers. These have met with Crown Prince Abdallah and have conveyed to him the seriousness of the domestic turmoil and the need to institutionalize public participation in the political life of the country. The more recent announcement by the liberals and reformers came in the form of a document titled, “Protecting the Nation.” An earlier document, “A Vision of the Current State of the Nation and Its Future,” had made similar demands. In essence, these documents focused on the need to reform the Kingdom to allow for elections of such legislative entities as the Consultative Council. Additionally, these documents have urged the Crown Prince to focus on ways to eliminate the “wasting of the public resources” and eradicate wide corruption.

The Crown Prince has kept an open mind and has been willing to meet with many who have sought his attention. He nonetheless has been unable to deliver the full democratic reforms they have sought. Would he have gone further than partial municipal elections had it not been for the divisions among the centers of power within the royal family? Maybe. At any rate, within that family, the Crown Prince represents the weaker wing. According to knowledgeable Saudis, Nayef, Sultan, and Salman seem to feel that reform is not necessary and that a better handle on internal security would provide more safety for the family and stability for the Kingdom. This is an uncertain assessment of the thinking of these men, but one that probably carries some truth in it and explains, in part, the half-way initiative for municipal elections.

DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN THE KINGDOM WILL TAKE AN ISLAMIC COURSE; THE PARTIAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS ARE A COMPROMISE STEP IN THAT DIRECTION

Another reason for the limited nature of the democratic initiative lies in the social layout of the Kingdom. Socially and historically, Saudi Arabia is unique among Arab countries. This is one country which has never been fully colonized, and has not therefore for a long time felt the need to emulate the West--to modernize. Its social norms, therefore, have remained more intact than those of the other Arab countries which have been subjected to invasions, colonization and foreign mandates. Accordingly, Saudi society, having been saved the devastation of colonization, remained relatively insulated. At the risk of exaggeration, large sectors of that society froze into a stiff conservative mold.

This insulation was very much in effect even after oil companies expanded their presence in the kingdom. Abdel Aziz bin-Saud, the founder of the Kingdom, continued to protect the traditional and conservative society from the onslaught of the these companies. By shielding the Saudi social fabric from the onslaught of blind Western capital (and its virtues and vices) the Sauds in effect used income from oil to preserve the old social and political forces. This came natural to them, as it did to the founder of the kingdom, without malice or forethought. After all, they themselves were the product of that same society, about which they felt paternalistic and protective.

This conservatism is currently fostered and accepted in good part because of the Islamic world's expectation (and the expectation of a substantial number of Saudis) that the Kingdom, the birthplace of Islam, should remain authentically Muslim. In this powerful Islamic context, reform will not succeed unless it is inspired and propagated using an Islamic discourse. The Saudi opposition knows that. Its literature is nothing short of masterpieces in Islamic teachings and the principles of Islamic rule.

In short, reform in Saudi Arabia should and will take a form that is uniquely Saudi and uniquely Islamic. It'll have to be inspired by Islamic precepts, and will have to accommodate among regions (e.g., Hijaz v. Najd v. Asir) and among three main political forces: The thousands of princes (paternalistic and recipients of free money and status), the traditionalists, including the clerics who are on the government payroll (primarily concerned about the possible weakening of Islam by the princes and by the modernists), and the liberals and modernists, found mostly among the merchant class (concerned with integrating the kingdom--commercially and culturally--with the region and the world.) All three forces will have to give in some, if only to assure that the birthplace of Islam remains peaceful, and the sons and daughters of that birthplace not hateful towards one another. In that light, the promise of partial municipal elections looks like the result of compromise among the three forces. The campaigners in the partial municipal elections will very likely use Islamic images of egalitarianism--a powerful force in Islam.

SPC WARNING:

The elections are better held as soon as possible, as they should diminish the tension found in Saudi society. It'll be unwise for the Saudi government to delay these elections under the pressure (or excuse) of the bombings by extremists and the otherwise general conditions of turmoil, as delay will worsen that turmoil. For many are still incredulous that the very word "election" is mentioned in the Kingdom. Delay will increase skepticism and will heighten support for the opposition, para-military and political. Elected leaders, in contrast, should pull the rug from underneath the feet of all opposition. In addition, the very process of campaigning and electioneering should get the country feeling better about itself and its rulers.

DID CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH ESCAPES AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT?

Opposition sources revealed that, in mid-July, there was possibly an assassination attempt against Crown Prince Abdallah in the Khalidiyyah area of the holy city of Mecca. It was claimed that a fire fight erupted between the bodyguards of the Crown Prince and armed men, at around the same time that his motorcade was to pass in the area. If that is true, it seems that Abdallah’s security detail did an excellent job, concealing his exact time of travel and the means of his transportation.

THE KINGDOM MOVES AGAINST AL-QAEDA SYMPATHIZERS

The kingdom intensified its campaign to round up the al- Qaeda sympathizers and disrupt its network within the country. The serious campaign has been ceaseless ever since the May 12 suicide bombings against compounds housing Westerners. Nearly every week, there are news of clashes between government troops and members of the armed opposition. Arrests are common, though it is unclear how many are now detained. (The number most quoted in 600.)

The November 9 bombing in Riyadh (against residences housing other Muslims and Arabs) reveals that al Qaeda network still has a lot of life in it--though its methods should backfire. That the bin Laden network would conduct bad reconnaissance and murder as a result other Muslims and Arabs, instead of Westerners, is difficult to believe. More likely, the bombing of compounds housing other Muslims reflects the difficulty of reaching Westerners, who are very tightly protected. Too, impatience may have had much to do with the November 9 bombing. In fact, SPC had predicted in an earlier issue that impatience with the stalemate could tip the balance in favor of al-Qaeda operations within the Kingdom. Add to that the fact that some of al-Qaeda's leaders are currently based in Iran. Accordingly, they have to prove themselves to their host--to keep the Sunnis mobilized lest the United States' tenure in the region become permanent.

SPC estimates that the campaign will become a way of life in the Kingdom, until the al-Qaeda network is fully under control.

Additionally, the Saudi government has moved against Imams, firing hundreds, and banning more than 1500 of them from orating in mosques. (Yemen is reported to be importing moderate Imams from other countries.)

SAUDI-AMERICAN RELATIONS IMPROVE

THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TOTAL CONTROL OF THE KINGDOM'S GOVERNMENT

ONLY ELECTIONS WILL SAVE THE KINGDOM FROM TOTAL AMERICAN CONTROL

Saudi-American relations improved, in spite of some classified allegations made in the 900-page congressional report about the events and failures that led to 9/11. The allegations seemed to originate in the federal security bureaucracy, frustrated at Saudi reluctance to allow American personnel to participate in investigations of bombings of American outfits in the Kingdom, starting with the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers. The campaign by right-wing Likud-inspired nouveaux republicains--the former Democrats who joined the party to teach it colonialist-inspired Likud methods in subduing Arabs and Muslims--opened the door wide to Democrats to attack the Kingdom for September 11.

(No one wants to admit the obvious: Both the American and Saudi security establishments proved incompetent before September 11. To be fair, though, in assessing incompetence, one should be aware of the fact that the Americans trained the Saudis, not the other way around.)

The improvement was due in part to the disillusionment of U.S. policy-makers with Iraq. These policy-makers had spinned themselves into such high hopes and wishful thinking about Iraq replacing the Kingdom as a favored client-state. Iraqi realities, however, have sobered these policy-makers. Suddenly, in retrospect, the relationship with Saudi Arabia was seen as such a stable and beneficial arrangement. The invasion of Iraq, if anything, is threatening the stability of this one ally, as a Shiite upheaval (in Iraq and in the Kingdom, as a result of raised expectations) could de-stabilize the old Arab ally. In effect, the United States risks losing the once-stable Saudi Arabia without winning Iraq.

(SPC NOTE: It's somewhat unacceptable within Arab circles to talk about the Shiites as a separate entity. With good reason. Shiite nationalism is hardly separate from the larger Arab public solidarity once known as Arab nationalism. Shiite nationalism is basically a movement within the larger Arab nation, moving towards equality with others within that nation, not for secession or the monopoly of government.)

In addition to disillusionment with Iraq, American-Saudi relations improved thanks to intensified cooperation between the two countries in the investigation of the financing of al-Qaeda by neo-charitable organizations and Saudi businessmen. This cooperation has been extended to cover the financing of populist Palestinian paramilitary resistance groups, such as Hamas. A team from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has moved into the Kingdom, starting in May, to delve into charitable finances.

The United States has also seen increased cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in security matters, and between Yemen and the United States.

More cooperation was revealed when reports circulated that the United States will now be training all the branches of the Saudi armed forces. This in effect expands the American military training program in the Kingdom. Historically, the U.S. had provided training to the Saudi Air Force and the National Guard. Ironically, this expansion could set the stage for a future coup d'etat by pro-American officers in the kingdom. Better deal with a few officers a la Latin American juntas than with a multi-pronged royal family that has a rather paternalistic perspective towards its people, and shares with them some "antiquated" Islamic teachings.

This virtual take-over by the United States of the Kingdom's government, made possible by September 11, can be seen in the perseverance of the Federal anti-terrorism investigators in digging up the sources of financing of al-Qaeda. These investigators seem to suspect that at least one part of the Saudi government--Islamic Affairs--has financed questionable charitable organizations, possibly knowing that the money was being directed to al-Qaeda. Moreover, these investigators would like to know whether princes were involved in this process, perhaps out of jealousies they hold against the more powerful amongst their ranks. The U.S. investigation of the Kingdom's financial affairs will teach it a lot about who is involved in the Islamic affairs network. Already, the United States has a lot of dirt on the princes--mostly from eavesdropping; but it is now seeking to know more about the clerics and Islamic ideologues, who once benefitted from government largesse.

Along with the training of all Saudi armed forces and the intervention in the process of royal secession, this American penetration of the Saudi body politic is so deep as to amount to a virtual American mandate over the Kingdom. At the risk of some exaggeration, the United States has now adopted the view that the kingdom of Saudi Arabia should not be allowed to govern itself.

Oddly, only elections can save the Kingdom from total American control, as the rise of a new elected leadership with a popular mandate should be able to check (somewhat) the U.S. penetration of the Kingdom's government, and its takeover of that government.

THE UNITED STATES AS UNWANTED BROKER IN ROYAL SECESSION; IT WANTS BANDAR BIN SULTAN AS CROWN PRINCE

The U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, in early July, was reported to have intervened in the politics of that country. It was claimed that he told some of his Saudi guests that the United States had decided to make Crown Prince Abdallah King, and to appoint someone to replace him as Crown Prince. The guests were reported to have been surprised--even offended--since royal succession–-as it stood-–assured that Abdallah would in fact become king, and would be followed by Sultan at Defense as the new Crown Prince.

But Ambassador Gordon was said to have asserted that the Crown Prince will be a relatively young person. It wasn’t clear whether Mr. Gordon was referring to the Saudi Ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Choosing him might avoid alienating his father, the current Crown-Prince-to-be, while securing the throne (once Abdallah passes away or is incapacitated) to a relatively young king. The Americans would hope that the U.S.-installed king would further the process of completing the American stewardship over the Kingdom.

If the reports about Ambassador Gordon's statements are correct, they would indicate the current thinking within the foreign policy establishment in the United States about Saudi royal secession. This thinking is not without merit. The aging of the Saudi rulers, and their division, weakens governmental rule, as it seems at times that Abdallah runs one government, and Sultan, Nayef, and Salman, run another--or even other governments. This diffusion of power is inefficient, and it pits centers of power against each other, resulting in the government's failure to respond well to crisis. But some division of power does have advantages: Abdallah provides the royal family with a connection to the modernists and reformers, while the others keep the bridges open with the clerics and the traditionalists. The roles at times are reversed.

Still, the royal family does seem to be in dire need for a broker, one who can generate and enforce agreements and consensus about government and royal succession. But, following the American assault on the Kingdom by the Likud-inspired enthusiasts at the Pentagon--about breaking up the Kingdom and subduing Arabs and Muslims with force--the United States can hardly play that neutral role. It is perceived by most Saudis as a dishonest and ungrateful broker. Even members of the royal family are still bewildered and seething from the affront laid at the Kingdom's door by the nouveaux republicains, and unchecked by the American President. These royals would've understood criticism for their true guilt: incompetence--not blamed for September 11, about which the American intelligence community was as incompetent as they.

UNEMPLOYMENT PLAGUES THE KINGDOM BUT THE PICTURE IS MORE COMPLEX THAN IT SEEMS

The Kingdom’s press is rife with articles expressing concern about the unemployment crisis. While the Kingdom provides employment to millions of foreigners, its sons and daughters seemingly find themselves without a means to make a living. But the picture is more complex.

The truer picture is that the more significant number of jobs provided to foreigners are low-wage, and therefore unappealing to the Saudis. The reporting of news is accountable for the confusion surrounding the employment situation. For instance, it was reported in early October that over 40,000 young men competed over 80 positions that became available in the Ministry of Finance. Many in the press used this story to illustrate the severity of the unemployment crisis in the Kingdom.

But SPC suspects that this large number can be explained not only by the unemployment crisis in the kingdom–-a real crisis-–but also by the fact that the jobs offered were at the Ministry of Finance. In many countries, that ministry overseas real estate transactions, and a job there is a sure way to becoming wealthy on bribes.

(To illustrate: Compare to the American scheme of revolving doors, connecting the public sector to the private, and benefitting entrepreneurial employees and politicians and their family members. To its credit, the Middle Eastern system is more direct.)

Though low-paying, these available jobs--in the millions--cumulatively generate a large capital. It was revealed in early June that foreign labor in Saudi Arabia transfers as much as $20 billion each year in remittances to their families. (This estimate, proffered by a Saudi economist, was meant to prod the Saudi government to introduce legislation to lure some of that money to be invested in the Kingdom.)

The low-paying job are so substandard that it would be hard to imagine Saudis competing for them. For instance, 1.3 million Bangladeshis work in the kingdom. Most are paid the minimum wage of $16 per month, a wage that seems to have been the result of negotiations between the two governments. (Per capita income is Saudi Arabia is estimated at $8540. In Bangladesh, it is estimated at $360.) It's unlikely that even the very poor in Saudi Arabia would accept to work for a measly $16 per month. In politics, however, these unemployed young Saudis are eminently open to mobilization, as they see a relatively large number of young princes and young members of rich merchant families flaunt their wealth, unearned. An egalitarian Islamic discourse should therefore appeal to them; in fact, the opposition's literature is rife with such discourse. The future doesn't bode well for the young, as it’s also estimated that nearly 45 percent of the Saudi population is below the age of fifteen. The crisis therefore should get worse.

The happy news for Saudi Arabia: Oil revenues peaked to a twenty-year record number of $85 billion.

KING ABDALLAH OF JORDAN USES THE UNITED STATES TO SHAKE DOWN SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND THE UAE

The U.S. self-appointed mandate over the Middle East has proven beneficial to Jordan. Saudi Arabia, along with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, grudgingly continued to supply that country with 100,000 barrels of oil per day, free of charge. This was in response to U.S. pressure, to replace the Iraqi oil that Jordan once received at discount prices, and to assure Jordan’s political stability which could be jeopardized by an economic crisis.

(The two most important political forces in Jordan are the Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Needless to say, these can disturb that Kingdom’s stability, should their people be pushed below the modest lifestyle they are accustomed to.)

Moreover, Jordan is providing extensive intelligence and police training services to the United States in Iraq--a dire need for the English-speaking superpower.

SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY: PAKISTANI TROOPS TO THE KINGDOM?

Pakistani sources in late September claimed that Saudi Arabia had asked the Pakistani government to dispatch Pakistani troops to the Kingdom. This, if true, would be meant to achieve the following:

1) It would trump any infiltration by al-Qaeda of the Saudi armed forces and the National Guard. There's a distinct possibility that this already has taken place. Non-Arabic-speaking Sunni foreign forces should be more manageable than local forces, whose training has been limited for fear they would stage a coup.

2) It would assist the Saudi government in suppressing any wide-scale Shiite rebellion in the Eastern Province, now that the Shiites have the upper hand in Iraq, and Shiite nationalism (within the wider Arab nationalism) is reaching peak mobilization. (The majority of Pakistanis are Sunni.) (In late April, 450 Saudi Shiite activists presented a petition to Crown Prince Abdallah, asking for equal rights with the Sunnis.)

3) It would send a message to Iran that the Saudis are ready for any disturbance where Iran plays catalyst. (Too early. Iran, for now, can rely on the mobilized Sunni public. Prime Minister Sharon helps it out, by building a wall and stealing yet more Palestinian land.)

4) It would send a clear message to the United States that the Kingdom is no longer certain about the American commitment, especially when viewed in tandem with Prince Abdallah’s September visit to Russia. Though the Crown Prince is close to the United States, he probably has misgivings about the American goal to take full control of the Saudi government.

5) It would provide the Kingdom with a nuclear cover, to offset Israel’s nuclear weapons and Iran’s development of the same.

Defense Minister Prince Sultan has denied on October 22 that any military deal has been reached with Pakistan. But a balance of power analysis would indicate that a Saudi-Pakistani alliance and the dispatch of troops are distinct possibilities. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon visited India in early September, in what looked like an affirmation of a new political-military alliance. It was claimed that Israel concluded an agreement with India to sell it over one billion dollars in weapons. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries should be concerned about India's alliances, as millions of Indians work in the Gulf countries, and Indian nationalists have voiced claims to that region's wealth.

At the beginning of September, the Crown Prince paid Moscow a visit. Arab sources seemed to agree that the visit–symbolic in general, with some commercial agreements--was a message to the United States. In essence, following the invasion of Iraq, the pullout of U.S. troops from the Kingdom to Qatar, and the continued anti-Saudi campaign in the United States by conservatives and liberals, the Kingdom was now searching for it security everywhere. It continues to work on its alliance with the United States, but has decided to expand its horizons and seek alternative sources of security.

SPC NOTE : Arab observers have failed to see that Abdallah's visit to Russia was not meant only as a message to the United States, but also as a desperate attempt to slow-down the take-over by the United States of the Saudi government--succession and all. The reason why the otherwise astute Arab observers have failed to see in Abdallah's moves the desperate attempt to preserve some Saudi independence: The majority of thee observers are on the Saudi or the U.S. payroll, or both. Bye-bye astuteness.

IRAN

Iran and the United States continued their not-so-discreet skirmishes. Iran and Syria seem to have increased their cooperation to counter an intensified American-Israeli cooperation. The fighting arenas: Lebanon, and the Palestinian occupied territories. The subjects: nuclear Iran, Hezbollah, and Israel's repression of its countrymen in Palestine. Note: Iraq, for now, is only a minor arena of conflict.

The United States may have bought itself an Iranian promise, precarious at best, to not make life more difficult for the United States in Iraq. The United States had sent messengers to Tehran to reach some understanding on Iraq. It's unclear whether Iran would continue to heed the implicit understanding: Stay out of America's way in Iraq, and the Bush administration would abate its campaign for regime change in Iran. Iran couldn't trust the United States, and vice versa. Iran recalls that it assisted the United States in Afghanistan but saw the Bush Administration later blast its silly dogs of propaganda and psychological warfare against it. (The Pentagon's psychological methods of warfare fray the nerves not of foreign troops--who disband fast--but of Americans. Thank you.)

That the United States is kissing Iran's ass--to avoid trouble in Iraq--was obvious when, in early October, the United States dispatched Ayatollah Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim to Tehran. (The United States had earlier dispatched King Abdallah of Jordan.) The leader of the Higher Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (HCIRI) and member in the U.S.-sponsored Iraqi Governing Council, told the press that he sought to mediate between the United States and Iran. The American carrot: Iranian partnership in Iraq.)

Confidence-building measures are now in evidence between the Islamic Republic and the United States. Iraqi soldiers, re-trained and supervised by the United States, are now working with Iranian soldiers in joint patrols to monitor the border area between the unwilling Arab protectorate and the soon-to-have-a-nuclear bomb Islamic foe. In fact, the Bush administration has softened its campaign against Iran's nuclear program. This stop-gap softening is meant to assure Iran's neutrality in Iraq, until the President is re-elected. By then, Iran better have its Bomb, since, likely, Iran and the United States will go at it in Iraq, especially if the Sunni resistance is weakened.

WHY DOES IRAN FIGHT THE UNITED STATES AWAY FROM IRAQ?

Iran can try to modulate America's policies by fighting it in Iraq. Knowing that, the United States has abated its campaign for regime change in Iran, lowering tension, and choosing instead to mobilize Western governments against the Iranian nuclear bomb project, meant to balance Israel's nuclear arsenal. Abating the campaign for regime change has weakened Iranian resolve to fight the United States in Iraq. More recently, the U.S. has also abated its campaign against nuclear Iran. Bluntly put, the Iranian ability to cause an exponential increase in the death rate of American troops in Iraq places the Bush administration at the mercy of the Islamic Republic, as a decision by Iran to fight the U.S. in Iraq--and kill U.S. troops--would certainly dampen the President's re-election prospects.

(SPC NOTE: ABOUT SYRIA: The United States has resorted to child-like complaints against that country. These complaints are strange in that they are not commensurate with the American super-power status. These complaints reflect U.S. paralysis towards Syria. This paralysis can be explained by the fact that any serious disturbance of the Syrian system of government will result in chaos, a la Iraq. The United States can ill-afford to face yet another armed popular resistance. It has therefore become acutely aware that Syria could double its nightmare, not to mention that Syria enjoys protection from Iran. And the United States can ill-afford to disturb its arrangement with Iran in Iraq.

That armed popular resistance will face U.S. troops in Syria, if the U.S. ventures into that country, should be amply visible to American generals, who would do well to silence the civilian ideologues at the Pentagon. For SPC strongly suspects that the Syrian Baath has by now devised its contingency plan, one that is similar to the one devised by its Iraqi counterpart: To avoid as much as possible conventional war with the United States/Israel and to break up Syrian troops into "civilian" cells, armed to the teeth; to adopt an Islamic ideology that widens the otherwise secular appeal of the Baath; and to wage guerrilla warfare against the American (and possibly) Israeli occupation. Expect the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to have devised similar plans.)

Abating the campaign for an Iranian regime change and for the immediate freeze of the Iranian Bomb project has also had the benefit of pulling some of the rug from underneath the Iranian hard-liners. They now couldn't get the Iranian body politic behind them, in the absence of a clear U.S. or Israeli aggression against Iranian territory, or an active campaign to de-stabilize Iran. The Revolutionary Guard could not secure the support of the Iranian armed forces in an active campaign of armed opposition to the United States in Iraq. The Guard and the religious establishment mistrust the officer corps of the Iranian armed forces. They know that these can be bought with U.S. dollars and green cards, as many of their Iraqi counterparts had. This explains the stationing within the barracks of the armed forces of Revolutionary Guard units, and other paramilitary and intelligence units representing the hard-liners. See previous SPC issue about the suspect American-Israeli arms shipments--of parts--to the Iranian armed forces, probably in the hope that these would rein in the Guard.)

Hence the understanding to stay out of America's way in Iraq. But should the United States or Israel bomb Iran, all bets would be off. It's an easy trade-off for Iran, as the Sunni resistance is gaining momentum without its help. By the time the Sunni resistance loses steam--if it does--Iran would be all-entrenched in Iraq, joyful at the bounty it captured as gift from the Americans. Iran will have obtained what it had failed to achieve in a decade of bloody battles with Iraq--a gift from the Americans, paid for with American lives.

IRAN OCCUPIES IRAQ--WHILE THE UNITED STATES SITS PRETTY AND LOSES TROOPS

That Iran can wage war in Iraq--forcing the administration to make difficult choices in the absence of compelling support at home--is borne out by the fact that it now practically occupies Iraq. SPC suspects that Iran now has thousands of Arabic-speaking operatives in that country. For it would be unthinkable for Iran, from a balance of power perspective, not to be present in a neighboring country which is experiencing such a power vacuum--English-speaking American occupation notwithstanding. The United States is aware of the Iranian presence, and has taken to periodically arresting Iranian "reporters." But it is unclear whether the U.S. appreciates the magnitude of this presence--relatively peaceful for now, but ready to break the peace should Iran or Syria be attacked. (The U.S. appreciates the potential for trouble from Iran, not its actual extensive presence in Iraq.)

Moreover, the United States doesn't seem to appreciate the fact that it cannot win an unconventional war--Special Forces or not. It cannot, for instance, commit massacres and assassinations, directly or by proxy, a la Israel in Lebanon (e.g., Sabra and Shatila, Qana), or a la Syria in Lebanon (e.g. Damour, Bhamdoun). To do so would lose it even the veneer of support it now has from the weak and tired Sunni Arab governments, who themselves are hostage each to its demographic time-bomb--in numbers and in anger at the American-Israeli suppression of Sunnis in Palestine and Iraq and, eventually, for the loss of Iraq to Shiite Iran. It is worrisome to read news about the United States forming a special Iraqi unit to go after the guerrillas. This is a prescription for massacres; the Israelis and the Syrians did it in Lebanon, to the tune of thousands of massacred civilians. Proxy forces are uncontrollable; they bring with them a thirst for blood, the like of which one finds only in serial killers.

November 2003