THE ARAB STREET MARCHES FORWARD

UPDATE--1/1/06:

AN INSIGNIFICANT DEFECTION


Abdel Halim Khaddam, former Syrian Vice-President, recently appeared on the Saudi-owned al-3Arabiyya. He revealed "secrets" about the current government in Syria, including a Syrian presidential threat against Rafiq al-Hariri, the theft of Lebanon's wealth (different and apart from the theft of Lebanon's public purse by the current Lebanese leaders), and public corruption in Syria.

Khaddam's defection from the Syrian leadership should be seen as part and parcel of a dangerous mis-reading of the regional balance of power by the coalition of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and France. This coalition is incapable of putting troops on the ground (but for the 150,000 U.S. troops in a war that needs one million troops for the next thirty years), and has instead resorted to frivolous marketing stunts. It's the hope of this coalition that the stunts will balance the significant power on the ground of the Iranian-Syrian-Hizbollah alliance.

Dangerous? The alternative to the Syrian regime--if ever it is changed, a highly unlikely proposition--is a Sunni Islamist one which could evolve into a symbiosis with the Islamic branch of the Iraqi insurgency, and not (I repeat: NOT) a U.S. puppet regime. (The neo-cons have experimented with the puppet regime idea in Iraq, and ended up giving away Iraq to Iran.)

Public statements to the contrary, the hope of the U.S.-led coaltion is to replace the current Asad regime with a Sunni one. (Abdel Halim Khaddam is a Sunni who was part of a mostly Alawite state.) But this hope is one of those which spring eternal. Iran and Russia should keep the Asad regime flush with money to survive these machinations. And the U.S.-led coalition could not control what Sunnis will replace Asad, if ever.

In that sense, the gamble by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and France is just that.

Why is this gamble so dangereous?

The message that the U.S.-led alliance is sending is that it can disturb Syrian domestic peace if Syria heightens tension in Lebanon. The danger lies in the fact that Syria and Iran have immense military presence on the ground in Lebanon, while the U.S.-led alliance in Lebanon has defenseless politicians and journalists. In Syria, the U.S.-led alliance has very little: some closely-monitored Kurds, and a few Jordanian and Israeli agents who can explode a little bomb here, one there. Nothing that would threaten the staying power of the government.

In sharp contrast, in Lebanon, Syria and Iran control the Palestinians, Hizbollah, (even Amal,)and a good part of the Lebanese government's security apparatus (e.g. Amn al-Dawlah--State Security.) Not to mention that the Lebanese Army is made up of mostly Shia recruits who are unlikely to turn their guns on Hizbollah.

In short, stunts such as the parading of Abdel-Halim Khaddam do not scare the practitioners of realpolitik--Syria, Iran, and Russia.


Saudi Arabia should be concerned about a policy built solely on public relations' stunts. True, the Kingdom is now so flush with money from the Greenspan-Bush glut that the opposition within it has all but evaporated. (The one in London is losing its members.) But Iran could easily retaliate in Bahrain, so close to the Kingdom. Remember: The Iranian-Syrian alliance is built on tests--see below--and Iran will feel constrained to meet the test of the defense of Syria.

France would've done so much better if it had coordinated with the United States in secret while espousing a policy that calls for concrete steps for the return of the Golan Heights. By so doing, France would still have been relatively effective in Lebanon and would have provided political deterrence against Syria's proxies. (You assassinate and we will renege on our "concrete steps" policy.) The fact that Jubran Tweini was assassinated so soon after his "secret" return from France was compelling evidence that France had no relevant connections within the Lebanese government security system.

Which begs a larger question: Does the U.S.-led alliance appreciate the importance of a "concrete steps" policy for the return of the Golan as the only effective stunt--without which the U.S.-led alliance could not hope to distance Syria from Iran? Or to gain Lebanon some peace?

Does it appreciate the fact that all the misery Lebanon has witnessed--including the civil war and the theft of its purse by the victorious Lebanese sects and the pillaging Syrian leaders--was (and is) a by-product of the Syrian political dynamics which places the Golan at the heart of the Syrian political consensus? And that this dynamics is bound to never leave the Syrian political psyche, come what may?

Watch if you will how the Syrian government will portray Khaddam as a traitor who had met with Israeli agents in Paris. (The Israeli press is helping along.) Watch the Syrian press create stories about Khaddam capitulating on the Golan to those agents. And do tell where the Sunni public in Syria would stand: With Alawites willing to fight (viaLebanon, of course; God forbid they should fight via the Golan) for the recapture of the Golan, or with a Sunni who has gave away a part of his country to the occupiers?


Talking stunts: Can a stunt succeed at a time when the Saudis acquiesce to Israeli sovereignty over Arab lands, such as the Golan? Have the Saudis stopped caring? If they have, then they should know that those Arabs who still care have accepted Persian Iran's leadership. (Read below on Ahmadinejad's cunning tactics.) Iranian President Ahmadinejad welcomes the leadership of those who still consider themselves Arab. He has built a Trojan horse and rolled it into their heart. But he will not stop there. He intends to roll that horse into the midst of each and every once-Arab society.

SPC fully appreciates that the Saudis are still smarting from the murder of Rafiq al-Hariri. But they should ask themselves: Is quitting their Arab identity really a way to recapture Iraq? And is it a way to protect Lebanon?

The Editor





UPDATE12/28/05:

NO WIN...NO WIN...
IN THE DESERT STORMS...
WE...SPIN

Muqtadha as-Sadr joined the Shia United Iraqi Alliance in the recent elections in Iraq. Closing the Iraqi Shia ranks was one of Iran's responses to an American tilt in favor of the Arab Sunnis. The White House, fearing a Shia backlash (possibly armed)against U.S. troops (for America's pro-Arab Sunni tilt), responded by approving of the results of the elections. It is strongly believed that the Shia Iraqi alliance had all but cleaned up these most recent elections.

Islamic Iran has masterfully blocked every American attempt at using Iraq as a launchpad against it. In addition, it has turned Iraq into a swamp for the United States and any country that dares use Iraq for anti-Iranian purposes.

The sum of it all is as follows:

1. Iran controls the Iraqi Shias; even Muqtadha as-Sadr, hitherto open to the Arab Sunnis, appreciated the need to close Shia ranks.

2. Iran has significant say among the ranks of the Islamic Baath (the young guard);

3. Iran, through Syria and Russia, has some say among the ranks of the Arab nationalist Baath--the old guard; and

4. Iran has some say among the Kurds, mainly through its ability to sow some chaos in northern Iraq and launch one Islamic movement here, another there.

In contrast, the U.S. has some say among:

1. the Baathist old guard, including the former President (Yes Virginia!); it exercises this influence through Jordan; and

2. the Kurdish north.

The following outlines the possibility that a pan-Islamic movement might find propitious grounds to launch itself from the Land of the Two Rivers.


12/21/05

IRAN’S ISLAMIC FRONT MEETS AMERICA’S PLURALIST FRONT:
THE UNITED STATES TILTS TOWARDS THE ARAB SUNNIS.

Khaled Mishaal, head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, recently visited Tehran. He announced that his group would retaliate against Israel should America’s protectorate attack Iran.

Wait a minute: Was the counter-threat against Israel the reason behind Mishaal’s visit? Nope. Iraq and not Israel/Palestine concerned Mishaal’s hosts. Iran has been preoccupied by the dispatch to Jordan by the U.S. of intelligence-associated mandarins at “think tanks” to negotiate with the Arab Sunni insurgents. Mishaal was one antidote.

The Arab Sunni resistance has been fearless and highly effective. It already has achieved one of its main objectives: The American public now is re-thinking its support of the invasion. For instance, NPR's Daniel Schorr, ever perceptive but equally cautious, is sounding angry with the Bush Administration and the Iraq mis-adventure. With the change in the public sentiment, a least popular president has ordered the Pentagon to clean up after his once favorite people, the neo-cons. The generals have taken over. The tenacity of the insurgency has convinced them (and a beaten Secretary of Defense) that a tilt towards the Sunnis wouldn’t be so bad.

Iran worries: Could the United States tilt all the way? If it does, what chance would Iran stand in Iraq? Zero?

Meanwhile, Mr. Rumsfeld sends out desperate and highly non-persuasive (though folksy) messages: Where the heck did all these people get the idea that we are/were interested in having military bases in Iraq? Or in its oil? Gone is the arrogance of a couple of years past. Now he has to face Cindy Sheehan and the mothers of those young men and women who died in an arrogant, sadistic, and unnecessary war.


The Generals Try to Correct the Course of U.S. Occupation


In their attempt to correct the occupation’s course, the generals face severe limitations. The neo-cons have saddled the United States with the wrong alliances: to Iran’s Shia agents, and to Israel’s regional pets, the Kurds.

(NOTE: See what happened to Israel’s former Lebanese pets: They’ve become fully insignificant in the political life of Lebanon. Once defeated, hungry packs robbed the public purse to the tune of 37 billion dollars. Now the Maronites of Lebanon are Lebanese in their debt obligations. The Kurds' descent into misery will be less pronouced, since they had never reached the level of economic development of the Lebanese.)

The generals’ dilemma: They cannot please the neo-cons’ allies, yet be in bed with the Arab Sunnis. If they had the troops, they would quell them all. But their troops already are stretched thin, and the epicenter refuses to raise taxes for more troops or for a draft. Worse of all, over 70 million baby boomers have begun to enter retirement while the country’s private pension plans are in disarray. If Iran kills Iraqis, Shia kill Sunnis, Kurds kill Turkmen...What do we care, seems to be the thinking of the American public.

With all these limitations, what’s Empire to do?

If it leaves, it fears that Iran will become more dominant--a myopic perspective since Empire already had delivered Iraq to Iran. Additionally, Empire is concerned that, if it leaves, the Gulf Arabs will hear their teeth rattle.

What’s an imperial power to do?

For one, it dispatches its intelligence mandarins in the “think tanks” to do some good old politics: Convince the Sunni Arabs that they can no longer monopolize government. The gist of their message, which they sing to the ears of Saddam’s men:

Please let go of the past
We didn’t mean to create a mess
Work with us...
Get us out of this morass
We’ve always loved you
And had always wished you the best.

Song only: Copyright, Tony Khater, 2005


A convenient argument, but not a persuasive one. Why? To the Sunni Arabs this is a self-serving American reading of the past. The Sunnis ask: Was the Baath rule really based solely on Arab Sunni monopoly of power, or was it a more complex rule, based on a modernist and secular pan-Arab ideology which successfully fused Shias and Sunnis into one Arab identity? And a ruthless system of oppression to complement this ideology? And couldn’t a variation of this once successful formula be revived, this time as an Islamist ideology, significantly more potent since it would reach into the Kurdish camp? A new ideology that would bring in most of the Shias, some of the Kurds (They’re Muslim and not European, you know), and all the Arab Sunnis?

A New Islamist Political System?

So, goes Arab Sunni thinking, a new ideology could be devised, couldn’t it, one that would bring into a wider Islamic participatory political system the children, grand children, and great grand children of the old Baatist generation.
Islamism seems to be the ideology of choice to accomodate the Iraqi street and re-create a sense of unity.


The United States is lobbying hard for a consociational system to reflect a pluralist reality. This government would be weak, by definition. (For education and tears, read Michael Hudson’s seminal book on Lebanon and its pluralism, The Precarious Republic.) In contrast, Iran is working as hard to develop an Islamic front to include the Islamic Baath, that young generation of Sunni Arab warriors who stood and stand in the way of the Crusaders. And who, by their resistance, protect it from Empire and its plans for bases next door.


Iran's Tentacles Spread Moderately Deep Among the Arab Sunnis

It’s unclear how deep the Islamic Republic’s tentacles extend into this camp. We know the Islamic Republic uses Syria, which itself supports old Baathists (Alawi’s generation) to pump aid into the fighting camp, Islamic or not. We also know that Russia provides financial support to Syria (See “An Imperial Blind Side...); so, in effect, Russia supports the Arab Sunnis, possibly part of a new Baathist (a mix of old and young guard) secret state in Iraq. What we don’t know is how independently deep (or shallow) the relations are between Iran’s secret government and the Islamic Baath. Mishaal’s visit sheds some light on this. It shows that the Islamic Republic could be using its Palestinian proxies to develop and deepen its relations with the Islamic Baath, just as I would suspect it is using the effective Hizbollah warriors to concretize its relations with Muqtadha as-Sadr. (I’m going on a limb here since I’m not privy to fancy intelligence. Mr Bush, Mr. Cheney, and Mr. Rumsfeld were. And their judgement was just peachy.)

My guess is that the Islamic Republic’s tentacles run moderately deep within the Arab Sunni insurgency, to the displeasure of a large part of the old Baathist guard. Additionally, I suspect that Syria’s assistance provides the old guard an alternative to Jordan and its American sponsor. This allows the old guard a wider room to maneuver. And, for now, the U.S. (which destroyed their rule and put their leaders on trial) and Israel (which provides the most potent mobilizational issue) are the bigger threat to their status, not Iran. These old guard Baathists know that eventually the U.S. will have to rely on them to balance Iranian power.) No one else can do it. But they will wait before they flip on Iran. Why? This wait-and-see-while-fighting stand avoids an intra-Arab-Sunni civil war, between the young Islamic Baathists (Iran's Trojan horse) and the old Arab nationalists.

(I had predicted way before the invasion that the Iranians and the Baath will close ranks. Only that the Iranians somewhat outsmarted me: They closed ranks with the Baath only after the U.S. had unseated it from power. And: they nursed a new Baath into this world, more to their liking, made up of young men and women, and significantly less willing to compromise with the Americans. I refer to it as the Islamic Baath.)

To illustrate: Years ago, Yasser Arafat found himself in a similar situation. Had he been alive he would have told you that Fateh's Aqsa Brigade was his way to remain politically relevant. Fateh (the old guard) was losing ground to the Islamits--the Palestinian young guard in Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In the absence of a true partnership with , and honest concessions from, the Israelis, he risked becoming politically irrelevant. Al-Aqsa Brigade was his way of absorbing some of the young guard into the Fateh movement.

Importantly, the young Iraqi warriors should not allow the old guard to strike a deal with the United States. They’ve now opened shop of their own, so to speak, and would not accept a pluralist country, but a united Islamist one. Though accepting of Iran’s help in arms and ammunition, these young men and women would probably turn on Iran once the right circumstances are met. In other words, their alliance to Iran is not set in concrete. Iran for now is helpful, even essential. And, for now, a pro-Iranian Islamism (that will some day be more inclusive) beats pluralism (that is divisive) hands down. The U.S. unleashes the Bader Brigade and the Kurdish militias against them, donning government uniforms. Their best hope to thwart these is to introduce a Trojan horse into the heart of the Shia and Kurds. The horse: Non-sectarian Islamic ideology, defining the Iraqis as different from the Christians (the Americans) and the Jews (the Israelis), and adopting the masses' perspective that this was/is a Christian-Jewish war against the Muslims to appropriate their chief resource, oil, and to use their country as a pro-Israel base in the region. The Islamic Republic couldn’t be happier, though it might in the future regret its assistance to this ideology. But the future, for now, is far away.

(Note: To the Iraqi Christians: Think fast about getting out of the country. In the evolution of pan-Islamism, at least early on, life should be very difficult, even deadly, for you. You have no protection whatsoever. Islamism's very definition will exclude you. This would not be the humane Islam you once knew, kind and generous. This will be a vicious political movement that would target you to consolidate its ranks. You will therefore be a target. Pan-Islamism, once it matures, might allow you back in. But, for now and the near future, life will become increasingly dangerous, especially if U.S. troops withdraw. And you may not have time to pack your bags fast enough when the U.S. withdraws. Words to the wise.)

THE ARAB SUNNI RESISTANCE LOOKS SOMETHING LIKE THIS:

The picture of the Sunni resistance therefore looks something like this:

(1) Old guard Baathists with unlimited supply of Russian glut-oil money, working through Syria, to steer the insurgency. These old guard work closely with the Islamists (remember the Arafat/Aqsa Brigade example) since, for now, their goals are similar: Defeat the American-Israeli project. Syria’s interest: Defeat a project which aims at not returning the Golan and its water to Syria unless Syria is humiliated, and then not all of it.

Russia, driven out of Iraq by the invasion, has memories of Afghanistan. Defeating the U.S. in Iraq would for a couple of decades chill American military interventions meant to rob Russia of some of its global reach–in this case Iraqi oil contracts and sales of weapons.

Again, money is not an issue. Greenspan/Bush have glutted the world with dollars, a good part of which has fattened the pockets of Iran and Russia.


(2) Iranian-sponsored “independent” shops, including the Zarqawi factor. (I say “factor” since I suspect many a group works semi-independently under that leadership; not to mention that U.S-allied Arab intelligence services (very) possibly claim bombings against civilians in the Jordanian’s name to discredit his Islamic credentials. Note how the insurgents are ususally hard at work kidnapping or assassinating Arab and Islamic diplomats. They do this because these pro-American Arab diplomats are getting in the way of the Islamists' and Iran's plans for Iraq.)

(3) Old guard Baathists with unlimited supply of Pentagon money, working through Jordan, to steer the insurgency away from Iran, Syria, and Russia. These, as agents of the U.S., are willing to accept a consociational government in Iraq.

These pro-American old guard play the role of the spoiler to the Islamic insurgency. A number of car and motorcycle bombs that are not directed at the new state security institutions but only at Shia civilians are (I suspect) the work of these elements, blamed (credited to) on Zarqawi to diminish the young insurgents’ pan-Islamic credentials. (I'm going on a limb; but I bet you I'm still ahead of Mr. Rumsfeld's Pentagon.)

The idea behind these bombings is to defeat Iran’s project to form an all-Iraqi Islamic front. If the Shias retaliate for the killing of their civilians by car bombs of their own in Sunni neighborhoods, the Sunnis would then be reluctant to join in with the Shias in an Islamist front. So goes the thinking of the Jordanian proxies.

(4) Tribal leaders who are torn between the two, and have access to money from Syria (Russian), the Pentagon, and Jordan.



OF THE PENTAGON’S PUBLIC RELATIONS TACTIC AND ARAB 3ASABIYYAH

Before proceeding further, let’s call things as they are: the Pentagon rolled us into this war, unprepared, and the Pentagon still is calling the shots, albeit lame. The generals are welcome to deflect the blame onto the Bush Administration. They wouldn’t be wrong.

The Pentagon is in a no-win situation. It has resorted to such comical tactics as, for example, allowing Iraq’s former President a larger role in his illegal trial. Comical? Desperate and naive? I’m reluctant to use the “Arab mind” approach. But here it is: Among Arabs, there’s a concept called 3asabiyyah which translates roughly into something that is unacceptable to entertain for a melting-pot country such as ours. 3asabiyyah is akin to the concept of a “genetic pool,” or that of a “blood line,” where people of the same blood line would ban together in times of war. This concept (perhaps) in part explains the unmitigated solidarity of the Arab- man-in-the-street with his Palestinian brothers. And it explains in good part his solidarity with his Arab Sunni brothers in Iraq.

From the 3asabiyyah vantage point, the U.S. may be up to something with the freedom it is giving the former Iraqi president. But the Sunni Arabs have not forgotten how his sons were murdered at the height of Empire’s arrogance and stupidity; and the Sunni Arabs (and their children) have not forgotten the “turkey shoot” outside of Kuwait city, a slaughter of defenseless troops which came to a stop thanks to Colin Powell. (The others were like robots who were happy to “do my job.”)

(I wouldn’t have remembered the Iraqi bitterness about the turkey shoot but for the stellar reporting by Anthony Shadid, a fellow Arab-American, at The Washington Post, a war-loving paper which hate of Arabs is unmitigated. Watch for the Islamic Republic piecing together and embellishing the facts about the “turkey shoot” and spreading them across the Arab Sunni world.)

An American tactic based on 3asabiyyah might have some impact. But the turkey shoot, the killing of Hussein’s sons, the starving of the Iraqis, the dismantling of a country where the Sunni once were prominent, the backing of Kurdish de facto independence, the use of Israeli advisors–all lobby against success for this public relations stunt.

Not to mention that the generals in the end will have to murder Mr. Hussein. After all, they are Mr. Bush’s men, and Mr. Bush governed Texas, the state that has executed more fellow Christians than any other. If the generals don’t kill him, they would risk the wrath of Iran’s Shia agents, the very ones who eased us into quagmire. No-win.

(U.S. Senator Arlen Specter would speed up the process by instructing the judges. :o) Good going Senator.)


The other problem with 3asabiyah stunts is that the new Baath is mostly an Islamist one, not a Saddam Hussein or an Ayad Alawi party. It’s manned by young people. These are the same young ones who wreaked havoc in Algeria; the same ones who are members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad; the same ones who defeated Israel in Lebanon. The Lebanese ones taught the Arab street how to build solid community credentials; how to avoid corruption; how to provide real services; and how to do all of this while building roadside and suicide bombs. (They’re now busy along with state security in assassinating pro-American politicians and journalists in Lebanon.)

America’s reliance on Ayad Alawi to develop a pluralist coalition that would be an antidote both to the Sunni Islamists and to Iran’s Shia agents, while resourceful, will hardly achieve its goal.

(My guess is that the Pentagon is financing the street demonstrations by the Arab Sunni and secular parties which are protesting the integrity of the recent elections. Hope springs eternal--for the Pentagon. Iran's agents responded by using a weapon which the Pentagon had taught them: They dug up a "mass grave" in Karbala to mobilize the Shia public.)

Alawi represents the old Baath, a weakened force, and is too secular for Iran’s Shia agents. Not to mention that he is perceived as the agent of an empire which cargo goes to its own people (let’s pay an American truck driver $80,000, tax-free and avoid hiring an Iraqi driver who will accept $3,000) , not to the natives, and which cargo is diminishing by the day. I believe him when he says that he is a target, probably of Iran’s secret government, if only because he and his old Baath buddies have such a close relationship to Jordan, a US proxy. If they ever win, they could face the same prospect as Rafiq Hariri and Jubran Tweini and the others. So, in a way, losing saves their life. Unless they become double agents. In which case they'd be welcome in Washington, and Islamic Iran would allow them a few more years. Maybe.


(And don't you forget that Russia, China, and Iran, thanks to the Bush/Greenspan dollar glut, now have cargo too. This very glut probably explains the rebellions against Empire in Venezuela and Bolivia. China has pocketed so much dollars that it can act as an alternative to Empire. It does that with the money we spend at Wal-Mart. Go figure!)

About a pluralist government. Ask yourself: Why should the Sunnis join (in a genuine and sincere fashion) a pluralist/consociational government? If they don’t, they would be the only actor to receive Russian, Iranian, and Gulf merchant support and remain a capable fighting machine. And they know that they–when the time comes–are the only ones who can stand up to Iranian power. The U.S. therefore eliminates them to its own detriment. At worse, they will be active in the Iranian-supported Islamic front, building bridges with their fellow Muslims: Shias and Kurds. As a consequence, the government they will evolve would regain Iraq its glory. Why should they settle for less?

The Pentagon is relying on Jordan (and other Arab protectorates and dependencies) to disturb Iran’s effort to build an Islamist alliance in Iraq. Jordan is using old Baathists of the Alawi generation in its meddling in Iraq. Hence the dispatch by Iran’s factions in the Islamic Baath of the suicide bombers into the heart of Amman--the hotel bombings.

The Jordanians, proxies of our intelligence services, were getting in the way of Iran’s Islamic front project. And the U.S. was squeezing Iran’s ally, Syria. Better send the U.S. and Jordan a clearest message --suicide bombers who say: (1) That the Islamic project will go forward, and Jordan better not get in the way; for Iran can de-stabilize it; and (2) Should the U.S. de-stabilize Syria, Iran’s budding Islamic front in Iraq will de-stabilize Jordan. Tit-for-tat.

In short, a no-win situation for the Pentagon.

(Note: Iran cannot de-stabilize Jordan, especially if the Pentagon pumps money into the Kingdom. I just finished reading the excerpts in Al-Hayat of Nicolas Nassif’s book on the Lebanese Army intelligence service known as the Deuxieme Bureau. Mr. Nassif reveals that Jordan put up 80,000 troops when it quelled the PLO in 1969. If Jordan were able to muster that many troops, and had the money to pay them, it’s unlikely the Islamic Republic can de-stabilize it. See Nicola Nassif, The Deuxieme Bureau: The Secret Ruler [Arabic] (Beirut?: Dar Mukhtarat. As excerpted in the Al-Hayat, mid-December- a four-part series.)


.
IRAN ASSERTS ITS LEADERSHIP OF THE ARAB MUSLIM STREET: TARGETING GERMANY.

The strength of the Arab street is made all the more enduring by the friends it finds. As things stand now, the Arab street finds its best friend in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mishaal’s visit to Tehran and his pronouncements are part of the Islamic Republic’s ploy to trump the U.S. tilt towards the Arab Sunnis in its attempt to reel them back into Saddam Hussein/Ayad Alawi’s old Baath. (Yes, Virginia; Mr. Bush and his generals love that Saddam Hussein!) Hamas carries a lot of clout in the Arab street; Mishaal’s pronouncements are meant to strengthen the bridges the Islamic Republic has built with Iraq’s Arab Sunni Islamists. Not to mention that Mishaal’s visit was a message to the Arab Gulf countries that normalizing relations with Israel–a cornerstone of the neo-cons’ all-but-defunct Greater Middle East–carries serious risks. Mishaal has weight with the Islamists in Saudi Arabia. (Remember 3Asabiyyah?)

The beauty of it, for the Islamic Republic, is that Mishaal’s visit complements Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s recent anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli rants. What’s he up to? Is he odd? Absolutely not. His is a cunning European policy, meant to disturb the European-American coalition on the Middle East. (The Islamic Republic-Syrian alliance is now after France. Note the recent kidnapping of the French citizen in Iraq. The focus: France has been working with the US against the Iranian-Syrian alliance in Lebanon.) Israel, always awaiting a Palestinian Uncle Tom to police the natives on its behalf while it appropriates land and water, is only Ahmadinejad's convenient and willing-to-serve excuse.

Think about it this way: If Iran champions the formation of a Palestinian state and the return of the Golan, and is credible about it (unlike the U.S. and Europe); and if it champions reparations from Europe, especially Germany, and is resolute about that (since it wouldn’t cost it anything), wouldn’t the Islamic Republic be seen as the true friend and leader of the Arab street–of the Arab masses? If Iran popularizes within the Arab world Germany’s “duty” to pay reparations to the Arabs, as it did to the Jewish holocaust survivors (as it does when it ships submarines to Iran’s Israeli arch-enemy), wouldn’t the Islamic Republic be perceived as champion of the street’s Arab Muslim man?

Would the Arab street appreciate German reparations to the Palestinians and to those Arabs who hosted them since 1948? You bet it would. Ahmadinejad is looking like he is trying to put Euros in the pockets of the masses of the Arab street. Now Gaza families with 223 children each can look for a bright future, made possible by the Islamic Republic. What a nice guy, Mr. Ahmadinejad! How can the Pentagon and Germany out-play this? (And poor France. How can it continue on coordinatiing with Empire when its 90 technicians in Iraq are sitting ducks for the Pasdaran and their Islamist proxies?)

Germany moved like lightening to put a fast end to Iran's campaign against it. No sooner did this Iranian anti-German campaign begin, and Iran’s proxies kidnaped a German national in Iraq, that German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis lost interest in the Hariri investigation (pursued by the U.S. as part of its campaign to split the Iranian-Syrian alliance) and Germany released a Lebanese Shia involved in the hijacking of an American plane in the 1980s, and the murder of an American citizen.


Whose Money is it Anyway? Financing the Pentagon's Stay in the Neighborhood.

All evidence indicates that the face-off between the Pentagon and Iran in Iraq and the Gulf will be a long one. The big money question: How is the Pentagon going to close the holes Iran will punch into the damn built over the years to contain the Arab street? The answer: The Pentagon should be expected to use the Gulf countries’ budgetary surplus from oil revenues to finance its lengthy stand-off with Iran, since the American taxpayer is not willing to bear that burden.

(I try to sense public sentiment by asking questions of two very competent civil attorneys--both males, both Republican, who live in the suburbs. They both want out of Iraq. "If the Shias have won the elections, let it be. It's their country, too. And if Iran bomes more powerful, who cares?" Said one of them this morning. 12/29/05.)

Oddly, higher oil prices are in effect the taxes that should have been raised to finance the war, but were not. The Pentagon will take away a good portion of the Arab Gulf oil surplus; so the $400 billion income from oil might just become $200 billion. (My advice to the Gulf countries: Hurry up and buy Cyprus before your new-found wealth finds its way into pockets of the defense industries of the U.S. and the U.K.; take it from me: Cyprus rocks; or maybe it used to, when I was younger.)


By appropriating Arab oil surplus money, the Pentagon saves the American taxpayer the burden of financing the face-off. In the past, this protection money had taken the form of huge defense contracts. (Note to self: Start an American defense industry; locate a British national as partner.) For now, Britain is taking advantage of this to the tune of over seventy billion dollars. To speculate: It's possible that the $70 billlion dollar deal is an American-British deal, not only British, and is meant to conceal money going to American companies as the United States is such a sensitive issue in the Kingdom. (Note to self: Locate defense industry in the U.K.; find an American partner.)



IS THE ISLAMIC BAATH IN THE DRIVER SEAT?

To the extent it can, the Islamic Baath will (eventually) play the U.S. against Iran, and vice-versa. (Too early to do it now. For now, the Islamic Baath is beholden in part to Iran, in part to Baath old guard working out of Syria.) If the U.S. doesn’t come through with returning the Baath (old and Islamic) to power, the Islamic Baath sooner or later should try out Iran’s proposed Islamic front.

Along with Iran’s secret government, the Islamic Baath will look for issues that can unite it with Iran’s Shia. The easier issue would be the Kurds’ threat to secede. The two will likely do what Syria and Iran are now doing–I suspect. Fearing that the other might strike a secret deal with the U.S., Syria and Iran show off to each other by directing assassinations in Lebanon, through their proxies, and by having their proxies declare responsibility for this or that bombing or kidnaping in Iraq. (The U.S. sent back one Lebanese former army officer to that country to provide protection and deterrence to the pro-American personalities. He has failed, obviously.)

In other words, any deal that is struck between the Islamic Baath and Iran’s secret government will breed various tests to assure that one party will not quit on the other. Kuwait could provide another outlet for cooperation; Bahrain another; Qatar, another. Saudi Arabia, another.

(That’s why the Gulf governments, in particular the Saudi and Qatari, strike me as so eminently ignorant in their sophomoric disputes. Wake up Virginia. What’s coming your way is too big. And nuclear Iran is not the real threat, regardless of what the imperial mandarins say. The real threat: a very long and grinding Islamist turmoil in the Arabian Peninsula, which turmoil has its Islamic engine in non-secular Arab Iraq. )

But these tests will not be easy ones mainly because the proceeds from oil are so huge that the opposition within these countries is bought out as soon as it arises. That should rob the Iranian-Islamic Baath alliance of some of the “tests.” But this alliance might live with more modest goals: Disturb the huge bonanza in construction and local stock markets which the Arab Gulf countries are currently witnessing thanks to dollar glut and its concomitant $400 billion in annual oil income.

Why would these tests revolve around disturbing the peace in the Gulf? The answer: Once pan-Islamism develops, it’ll be looking to spread itself. Where better to do it than in the Gulf countries where Shias and Sunnis live side by side?

Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC)eventually will have to take sides. They've begun to do so--both the GCC and Saudi Arabia. Saud al-Faysal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, probably coordinating with the Americans, has drawn a line in the sand against Iran. He had come to terms, a few years late (better late than never, right?) with the fact that the American invasion was for the Saudis like shooting oneself in the foot. (Note to self: I could've told him and the Pentagon so--but I did, in the earlier issues of this newsletter! NO one listens to an independent analyst.) Let’s hope Mr. Faysal’s foot has healed. (In Mexico once, in a remote area, I used honey on a cut and the wound healed! Words to the wise: Honey is it! Flood Islamists with honey. :o))

The U.S. and Arab Gulf countries can try to financially dislodge Iran and Russia from sponsorship pf the Baath, Islamic and secular. The U.S. has had a bit of success in doing that with Iran’s Shia proxies, but only because Iran has allowed it. Iran needs U.S. troops in Iraq as hostages to move against (by proxy, of course, and unconventionally, naturally) when and if American pressure proves too strong.

The problem with a financial strategy is that the dollar glut(“expansion”) that the Bush Administration and the Federal Reserve Bank have engineered has flooded Russia, China, and Iran with the international currency. So there exists now a financial balance of power. (See “An Imperial Blind Spot..”) Russia now can afford to place the Baath on the payroll, so to speak. Its effectiveness in fighting off the occupation should draw yet more money into its coffers.

Put differently: The dollar glut that Bush/Greenspan have created, along with an insistent policy on the part of those who took over the Republican Party to weaken the federal government, has enriched foreign rivals (Russia, Iran, and China) and the states. Enriching rivals kills U.S. troops; enriching the states doesn’t help in the success of imperial projects.

Only if the Pentagon does a volte face and allies itself fully with the Islamic Baath would the latter accept (maybe) an American role in the future of Iraq and split away from Iran. True, the Baath, even the Islamic one, is and should be concerned about Iran’s increasing role in Iraqi politics. This concern should provide incentive to continued opening towards the US. But Iran brought in Mishaal in part to assuage that concern. It is playing for an Islamic front that includes and expands the Islamic Baath. Exciting times are ahead where, for the first time ever, Islamism might spread across the universe from Mr. Bush’s non-secular Iraq!

If the U.S. withdraws, it’s doubtful that Iran would be able to control all its proxies from waging war against each other. The U.S., sitting in al-Adeed, can watch and will probably have to intervene to help the Baath. Go figure.

All said, there really is no clear exit for any of the players. Certainly not for the U.S.--expecially in view of the dearth of troops.



THE PENTAGON DOES PUBLIC RELATIONS


Public relations will not work, not when the U.S. is physically in the region, is sponsoring Israeli settlements, and Israel has not cooperated fast in a plan to defuse the tension in its dealings withe the Palestinians and Syrians.

Take the case if the U.S. ambassador to Iraq. The talking heads have made hay of the fact that he is Muslim and understands the culture, blah blah blah. But an ambassador hardly makes a difference when parties are calculating strategies. And the rivals–Russia, Iran, Syria, and China–are masters of power politics and realism. The concern is that the Pentagon will fall for its own spin. It had after all done it in the recent past. If the Iraq Project actually were public relations, truth be told, all parties probably would agree that John Negroponte as Ambassador, a non-Muslim, would have signaled more seriousness on the part of this administration towards Iraq than having a fellow Muslim in that post.


Too, the use of Ahmad Jarabi as go-between the U.S. and Iran is a sign of abject intelligence and diplomatic failure . Better use a retired foreign diplomat with no baggage than someone who holds a part of the blame for the death of over 2100 U.S. troops, the maiming of over 15,000, the killing of anywhere between 30,000 and 100,000 helpless Iraqis, and the waste of up to $300 billion, and counting.

In other words, it would behoove the Pentagon to see this as a strategic face-off, factoring in the Arab street as a powerful player with identifiable signposts, than a public relations campaign. Additionally, it would behoove it to shed completely any and all who planned the sadistic, mediocre, incompetent, and senseless (have I made my point?) adventure that killed Casey Sheehan.


NO EXIT

Will the Pentagon be able to neutralize the Arab street? Can it defuse the rallying issues so dear to that street? Now that it has gained the mistrust of all Arab Sunni masses by destroying an Arab country, can it correct its course? Now that it has no proxy troops to check Iranian power, and its own are stretched thin, will it able to hop on its political leg, so to speak, and be effective in defusing the rallying issues of that powerful player, the Arab street, so beholden to Iran?


Now that the Arab street has seen it fail in Iraq, and found out that, like its Israeli protectorate, it cannot fight an unconventional war, can it find a way to protect the oil and dollar-rich Gulf countries from the Islamic front in Iraq if ever that front looks for confidence-building terror acts in those countries? If Islamic flames are continually stoked (e.g., the Mishaal Tehran visit, Israeli settlements and theft of water, tit-for-tat attacks and chaos in the West Bank and Gaza ), is the Pentagon cognizant that there will be no checkpoint in the Arab world, manned by government troops, that would not allow armed Islamists to pass through, not even in that good old reliable Jordanian protectorate? What’s the Pentagon going to do about all of this?


What a disaster!