IRAN TO SAUD AL-FAISAL: WE HEAR YOU, LOUD AND CLEAR.

IRAN TO SAUD AL-FAISAL:
WE HEAR YOU, LOUD AND CLEAR.

Saudi Arabia: Between the Islamic Republic and the Israel-Centric Entrepreneurs.

In his attempt to manage Saudi Arabia's security vis-a-vis Iran, Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal, recently expressed his opposition--politely and quite lamely--to Iran's nuclear program.

He said that should Iran fire nuclear warheads at Israel, Palestinians will die. If these missiles miss Israel, Arab countries will be hit.

The Saudi Foreign Minister, of course, couldn't be serious.


NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: M.A.D. AND THE SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY

Nuclear weapons, even the Iranian, aren't meant to be fired. An extensive literature exists on the subject, the result of the decades of nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. A balance of terror--or what became known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)--is what nuclear weapons are all about.

Israel and Iran would have to develop a second strike capability to qualify for a MAD-like status. That is likely to be worked out with the passage of time. But things should be most dangerous in the transition period as Israel might strike Iran first with nuclear weapons before the latter develops its own first strike capability.

In other words, the time lapse between now and the protagonists' development of a second strike capability (to assure the first launcher of total destruction after the attacked party is decimated by that first launcher) should be the most dangerous time. Hence the importance of submarine-based missiles, for example, for a second strike capability, as a way to assure the first launcher of certain decimation.

The dangerousness therefore of nuclear weapons should be in evidence during two time-periods:

1. Now: Israel might strike (with nuclear weapons) before Iran develops a first strike capability; and

2. Later: Either Israel or Iran (once Iran develops a first strike capability) might strike before the other develops a second-strike capability.


[NOTE: The recent export of German submarines to Israel (did it take place? I haven't kept up) could be meant for Israel to develop a second-strike capability. The region would be safest by going nuclear-free all the way. The second best option: that both parties should have a second-strike capability. If only one has it, it would be a prescription for possible disaster.]


PRINCE AL-FAISAL SHOULD WORRY THAT ISRAEL, TOO, MIGHT MISS ITS TARGET.

With this in mind, the question becomes: Shouldn't Prince al-Faisal be worried about Israeli missiles missing their Iranian target and falling onto the Kingdom? After all, it is more likely that Israel would fire first, as described in alternative "1" above. And it could possibly miss. And if it obtains a second-strike capability, it would yet become more likely to strike first, and possibly miss yet again. In both instances the missed Israeli nuclear payload may hit the kingdom.



IRAN IS NORMAL

Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is normal in view of the fact that Israel, the other conventional power in the region, has them. There's absolutely nothing strange about this, notwithstanding the blabber of an irritated Empire.

(The only strange thing is Iranian technological incompetence, having taken so long to develop and test a bomb. Which does cue us to their dangerousness to their own people, first, should a nuclear accident take place. Not to mention a nuclear spill in the Gulf itself from the Boushehr nuclear power plant.)

Power will be balanced, as would nuclear terror. Not to mention that owning nuclear missiles assures independence from sponsors. Ask France about its force de frappe, for instance. Could one be wiser than General de Gaulle?

To his credit, Prince al-Faisal did concede that Israel had begun this dangerous and insane arms race. But that's all he did in this instance that is deserving of credit.

Prince al-Faisal called on Iran to accept a nuclear-free Parabesian Gulf. (SPC will refer to the Gulf separating Iran from the Arabian Peninsula as the Parabesian Gulf, since it features Persia to the east and Arabia to the west.)


COME MR. FLYNT LEVERETT, OR HOW TO FLOAT AN IDEA.

Come Mr. Flynt Leverett, a former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council and a fellow at the Brooking's Institution Saban Center for Middle East Policy.

[NOTE: I'm not sure: but isn't a member of that center, a former CIA, an Israel-centric fellow who wanted badly--in effect--to crush Arab Sunnis in Iraq, and orphan their children? I believe (though I'm not certain) that he appeared at a conference sponsored by Georgetown's Center for Contemporary Arabic Studies before the Iraq invasion and spoke as an arrogant mandarin would. I doubt the man ever was subject to a bombing, any bombing. I doubt he ever sat in the hallway of an apartment, his stomach contracting from horrifying fear, while the missiles rained on his neighborhood, and the children coughed up blood. I doubt that he ever saw an entire family charred in their car, having received a near-direct hit by a missile. And yet he could with a nod set off the invasion of a much weaker country and orphan and kill countless Iraqi children and a good number of American. He did it with the standard liberal affected hesitations, of course. Don't you love blind Israel-centric ambitions?]

Mr. Leverett is writing a book about the future of Saudi Arabia.

In his op. ed. piece in the January 24 issue of the New York Times, Mr. Leverett gives quite a play to Prince al-Faisal's ideas, not seeing any affected naivete in them. (Preliminary conclusion: Leverett's book will be kind to the Saudis; the Kingdom can thank the fighting Arab Sunnis of Iraq for the swinging of the pendulum back towards it.) But he adds at least one twist which should please the Israel-centric entrepreneurs: In essence, he says that Prince al-Faisal is reversing a long-standing Arab policy of seeking the denuclearization of Israel as a first step in Middle Eastern arms control.
The Prince, Mr. Leverett tells us, is now seeking a nuclear-free Gulf first, and second, the denuclearization of Israel.

Put differently and bluntly: Prince al-Faisal wants to stop Iran from developing its nuclear warheads before he asks Israel to uninstall its arsenal of already-developed warheads.

Here's Leverett:

"While Prince Saud blamed Israel for starting a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, his implication that a nuclear-weapons-free Gulf might precede a regionwide nuclear-weapons-free zone is a nuanced departure from a longstanding Arab insistence that regional arms control cannot begin without Israel's denuclearization."

And here Mr. Leverett gives the Iranians food for thought:

"The United States and its partners should build on this idea and support the creation of a Gulf Security Council that would include Iran, Iraq [what's left of it], Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the Gulf, as well as the five members of the United Nations Security Council."


What's wrong with this picture?

Here we have a former NSC man, in the post-Israel-centric-neocon era, following the bleeding of our troops and our purse in Iraq, who is a fellow at an Israel-centric center (Saban) located within a liberal research institution (Brookings). This man is writing a book about the future of Saudi Arabia. This very man also is reading alleged nuances in Prince Saud's statements. This man, in the same paragraph where he reads the "nuanced departure" by Prince al-Faisal away from pressuring nuclear Israel, is adding something else: A proposal of his own (purportedly) to launch a "contain-Iran" Gulf Security Council.

The very fact that Mr. Leverett wants to exclude Israel out of the idea of de-commissioning all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East places him squarely in the camp of Israel-centric entrepreneurs. In other words, an Israel-centric entrepreneur will defy logic by allowing for one player to own dangerous weapons in a highly tense neighborhood, while asking another to not balance the power of its adversary.

(Forgive me for belaboring a rather asinine point. Mr. Leverett has led me down this path. Israel's huge nuclear arsenal doesn't even deserve the attention. It is an albatross--as would Iran's (for different reasons), should it test a bomb. Israel's torments are in part self-inflicted--unable to re-fashion its national consensus away from dependence on Empire, and towards accommodating its neighborhood--and in another related to the Palestinian population of Israel-Palestine--unable to see them as partners with whom it will have to work for the next centuries. In addition, there really isn't any regional nuclear power to balance. Though I labeled it asinine, this discussion is meaningful in only one important aspect: It reveals that to be an Israel-centric entrepreneur is to be in part an imperial who will not let the clients become part of their region, and will pay off their leaders to be good Uncle Toms--"assets." A client is a tool for total dominance, nothing less and nothing more.)



IRAN TO SAUD AL-FAISAL:

Viewing all of the above, would anyone be surprised that the Iranians would see this proposal from an Israel-centric man for a Gulf Security Council as an idea being floated by the Saudi Foreign Minister himself, and not by a putatively independent author of a book about the future of Saudi Arabia? That Prince Saud is in fact using this man to float a "contain-Iran" idea?

Please read carefully my translation of what the newspaper Iran ( @ Jan. 28, 2006) said about this matter. Notice that it places the idea of the contain-Iran Gulf Security Council squarely in Mr. al-Faisal's lap, saying nothing about the Saban Center or about Mr. Leverett:

"Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Foreign Minister, as reported by the newspaper The New York Times, has proposed a project that, if implemented, would result in the formation of a council which name would be "Council for the Security of the Persian Gulf," which would include the five permanent members of the Security Council, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the other countries of the Persian Gulf."


So, you see, the Iranians are familiar with the concept of "floating" ideas. They hear you, my dear Prince al-Faisal, loud a clear.