SUCCESSION CRISIS IN KUWAIT

UPDATE: 1/23/06

(Draft)

SUCCESSION CRISIS IN KUWAIT--PART II (THE UPDATE) (You might want to read Part-I first--below.)

The Kuwaiti Speaker of the Council of the Motherland, Jassem al-Khurafi, seems to have caved in to Emir Saad's pressure to convene the Council so that Saad can be sworn into office as de jure Emir of Kuwait.

The session is scheduled to convene Tuesday at 6:00 PM, Kuwait time.

Accordingly, sources have said that the Prime Minister, Shaikh Sabah, is closer to asking the Council of the Motherland under Article 3 of the Constitution (see Part-I below) to consider whether Saad is fit to serve as Emir. (See Part-I-below.)

[NOTE: It's unclear from press reports whether Article 3 refers to a constitutional article or to a public law.]

There seems to be agreement that should Saad prove able to recite the oath in its entirety, the Artcile 3 controversy would be refuted to the satisfaction of most. Al-Khurafi is said to have asked Shaikh Sabah to hold off on making an offcial Article 3 request to the Council until the Speaker finishes negotiations with Saad.

There is concern that the constitutional crisis might be heading from bad to worse. There is a possibility, for example, that the de facto Emir (Saad) might issue an edict dissolving the cabinet, which is headed by his challenger, the dean of the Aal Ahmad/Jaber, the Prime Minister Sabah al-Ahmad.

The de facto Emir could also dissolve the Council of the Motherland.

The constitutional plot thickens: According to the AL-Khaleej daily, Kuwaiti legal scholars said that Article 3 (of a statute or Constitution) gives the Council of the Motherland the power to "transfer the authority" to the Crown Prince, in case the Emir falls ill. But this language implies two hurdles: (1) Ill health can be determined only by an impartial medical committee--which hasn't yet taken place; and (2) For now, until after an Emir is sworn in, there's no Crown Prince to whom the authority can be transferred.

In other words, it seems that the weakness of Kuwait's system of succession lies in the fact that, for all practical purposes, a Crown Prince becomes Emir before he is sworn in by the Council of the Motherland. If he is not displaced when Crown Prince, then it is unlikely he would be easily displaced as de facto Emir. All challengers would have to wait until he is sworn in or, in other words, until he becomes de Jure Emir.

What gives?

It seems that the two clans of the Sabah extended family (the Aal Ahmad/Jaber and the Aal Salem) are gunning for a confrontation that conceals raw ambitions which have little to do with the national interest of Kuwait. After all, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (next door) was ill for years, and the affairs of that Kingdom were run in a normal fashion by then Crown Prince Abdallah.

Not that there was no succession crisis in the Saudi Kingdom; there was. That crisis lasted for years: It's said that Crown Prince Abdallah delayed becoming King so as to delay the accession of Defense Minister Sultan to the post of Crown Prince. In other words, since Crown Prince Abdallah held the powers of the sick king, he was in no hurry to become King himself. By becoming King, he would vacate the post of Crown Prince to Prince Sultan to occupy. Why give Sultan more power before it becomes absolutely unavoidable?

Which begs the observation: Constitution (Kuwait) or no constitution (Saudi Arabia), could it be that royal rule based on extended family and inner clans is a harbinger for succession crises? Maybe. Except that the transfer of power which had recently taken place in the the United Arab Emirates and the Emirate of Dubai went smoothly.

Someone might thus want to look into these examples and find out what makes some family-run countries change power smoothly and what makes others not.

Obviously, at the risk of offending the Arab and Muslim-hating and self-appointed American Aristotles and Platos at the imperial Washington Post and New York Times --: It's not the presence or non-presence of a constitution.

Don't tell anyone!




(DRAFT)

SUCCESSION CRISIS IN KUWAIT-I

The death of Kuwait's Emir Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah has set in motion a succession crisis.

This crisis reflects elements of inter-clan politics within the ruling Sabah extended family and two Articles in Kuwait's Constitution (Article 3 and Article 60. It's unclear whether reference to Article 3 relates to the Constitution or to a Public Law.)


A CRISIS WITHIN THE RULING FAMILY

First the two clans:

(1) The Aal Ahmad/Aal Jaber . The Prime Minister, Sabah al-Ahmad, leads this clan.

(Note: "Aal" is different from "al" in Arabic. "Aal" refers to a closer family connection that distinguishes its members from the larger--say--Sabah extended family.) And

(2) The Aal Salem . Shaikh Salem al-Ali, who commands the National Guard, leads this clan.


SUCCESSION

After the Emir's death, the emirate went to Shaikh Saad al-Abdallah Aal Salem al-Sabah. (Heretofore, Saad.) As his name indicates, he belongs to the Aal Salem--the clan of Salem.

The problem: The current Emir (not sworn-in yet) is very ill.

[Culture Note: In Arab culture, people are reluctant to mention the word "cancer." They say, "he has 'the disease'." Doctors in Lebanon, at an advanced hospital with mostly French-trained physicians, never told a friend's mother that she was dying of cancer. I visited with her and she seemed to play along. That same summer, the Head of the Higher Islamic Shia Council of Lebanon was dying; but no newspaper ever mentioned that he had cancer. He headed to France for treatment. Oddly (by Western cultural standards), when he returned to Lebanon, the Lebanese would not let the poor man die in peace. He had to stand on his feet and welcome an endless stream of well-wishers. Soon after, he passed away. No privacy in death; no privacy in life.]

Saad's illness motivated the Aal Jaber/Ahmad to call for the Prime Minister, Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad, to take Saad's place. It seems that some (a small minority) in the Aal Salem agreed with that proposition.



A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

Both clans ("Aals") are relying in their fight on constitutional provisions to back their respective positions.

The very ill Saad, the current de facto Emir, invoking Article 60 of Kuwait's Constitution, has asked the Speaker of the Majlis al-Ummah (Council of the Motherland--the Parliament) to convene a special and private session of the assembly/council. The objective: To swear in Saad, which would make him the Emir(Prince) de jure.

In response, the Aal Ahmad/Jaber have floated the idea of invoking Article 3 of the Constitution or of a Public Law. This Article mandates ("must") that the Council of the Motherland vote by a 2/3 majority on whether the current Emir should in fact remain in his post, or be forced to resign due to his illness. (I've translated the Article--but it's too much to include here. I'm simplifying.)

Also in response, the Aal Ahmad/Jaber have floated the idea that members of the Council of the Motherland would insist that Saad complete in full the recitation of his oath of office, since they know that he is so ill that he couldn't complete the task.

It seems that the Speaker of the Council of the Motherland, Jassem al-Khurafi, has taken the position that the two wings of the family should resolve matters between themselves and not involve the Council of the Motherland in a constitutional quagmire.

In addition, it seems that the Speaker has taken the position that Saad's illness is so serious that his "coronation" would be a mistake. Sources told the Arabic AL-Khaleej daily that the Speaker had informed Saad that his very request to convene a swear-in parliamentary session is itself unconstituional, since he is so ill. (ThE Speaker later caved in--see above Part-I.)

Accordingly, the Speaker (looks like a heck of a politician) has suspended Parliamentary sessions for three days.

(There's no reference to any Constitutional provision that empowers him to do so. It's possible that he is relying on Article 3, the same Article which the Aal-Ahmad/Jaber are bringing up. It's also possible that he could be relying on internal rules of the Council of the Motherland. If you know the answer, please email me.)

The end.