MICRO-STRATEGIES AND THE SECURITY OF SAUDI ARABIA.

d r a f t

“I certainly don’t want my son to conquer Persia.”
Hyacinth Bucket (“Pronounced ‘Bouquet,’ dear.”)

MICRO-STRATEGIES:
IRAN, BRITAIN, AND THE SECURITY OF SAUDI ARABIA.

DOUBLE AGENTS NO MORE?

Various Iranian personalities and media outlets have held the United Kingdom responsible for the terror bombings in Iran’s Ahwaz province (on or around October 17, 2005, and on or about January 6, 2006.)

What do these terror bombings tell us about developments in Iraq?

The Iranians are pointing to southern Iraq as the location where British-trained Iranian expatriates have settled and from where they are running anti-Iranian terror campaigns. In addition, the Iranians are pointing the finger at the British embassy in Kuwait as the operational center for the Ahwaz bombings (Jumhuri Islami, on or about January 29, 2006) .

Iran’s agents (SCIRI, Bader Brigade, Dawa) control southern Iraq. These are the main constituents of the American puppet government. That said, it looks as if Iran’s agents are allowing Britain to use their territory to sponsor operations against their first master.

Which means that the United States and, by extension, Britain, have fully bought out Iran’s former agents. A success story, of sorts.

This American “success” (I don’t want you to hold your breath) might explain the recent visit by Muqtadha as-Sadr to Iran, his pro-Iran pronouncements, the Mahdi Army’s chronic clashes with Bader, Muqtadha’s pronouncements against federalism, and last but not least, his visit to Damascus. (Muqtadha is heir to the “vocal hawzah,” a religiophilosophical organization that competes with the “silent hawzah,” Sistani’s organization which provides guidance to SCIRI, its Bader Brigades, and Dawa.)

The Ahwaz terror bombings tell us that Iran’s former agents have turned their back on their benefactor. They’re not working against it. They can’t afford to. As organizations, they were born and reared in Iran and Iranian agents are aplenty within their ranks. More likely, they’re no longer actively representing its interests. That has forced Iran to side with these agents’ rival: Muqtadha.

It behooves all–-especially U.S. troops in Iraq--to know that Muqtadha and his Sadrists do best in competing with the “silent hawzah” when they do the following:

1. Confront the occupiers; and
2. Build on Iraqi nationalism, calling for the Shias to reject the idea of federalism.


SHOULD IRAN WORRY?

Should Iran worry that Muqtadha would draw closer to the old Baath? Or to the new generation of Islamic Baathists? If he does, wouldn’t that re-build the Iraqi state in an Arab nationalist-Islamic form, not in an Iran-inspired Islamic one?

It’s probably too early for Iran to worry. The Arab Sunni Islamists haven’t yet reached a point where they would evolve an ideology that would unite them with the Sadrists. Both parties should draw together, sooner or later. Kurdish secessionism, and what the Iraqis perceive as Kuwait’s complicity against their country, should draw them closer. But it’s too early for Iran to worry about an historic alliance of the two. For now, Iran should be expected to encourage–even sponsor– any united front against the United States in Iraq. Hence Muqtadha’s visit to Syria. There, he should be (probably) meeting with Iraqi Baathists. The beginning of a new front? One that has sputtered in the past?

Too, Iran through this visit aims to draw closer to the Arab Sunnis and offset America’s tilt towards that group. (See earlier article: "The Arab Street Moves Forward"). By so doing, Iran would hope to use the promise of a united and centrally-run Iraq against the United States which aims to keep it divided into cantons, and possessing an insignificant army. There’s the distinct possibility that Iran and Syria are trying to draw the closest relationship possible among their allies within Iraq. If they're able to pull it, the Sadrists, joined to the Baathists, should make for a formidable force–ideologically (they stand for a united Iraq with a strong central government and a regional mission) and militarily (they would be supplied with weapons from two frontiers.)

To our troops sent there: Be mindful that close alliances such as these require tests in the field. They demand agreements between both parties on operations where one can prove to the other that it is not "cheating," --that their dedication to the alliance is unquestionable.

(You want to know why the Syrians are behaving this way? It’s called: the Joulan. Repeat after me: G O L A N . The entire Lebanese civil war and the theft of the national purse by the current Lebanese leaders and their once Syrian masters could’ve been avoided had Syria regained these damned heights.)


WHAT ABOUT THE ARAB SUNNIS?

They should be relatively quiet, for three reasons:

First, and least important, they are on the defensive, engaged in a war with the U.S.-trained and armed men of the Bader Brigades and, to a lesser extent, Barazani’s and Talabani’s Kurdish militias–all donning government uniforms. These Bader men have formed death squads within the Ministry of the Interior, probably a part of the American obsession with “counter-insurgency.” But these death squads are not without political benefits to the Arab Sunnis: They should delay the onset of divisions within their ranks. (They're so beneficial that, had they not been in existence, the Arab Sunnis would’ve had to invent them.)

The Saudi-owned Al-Hayat has been running a public relations propaganda campaign alleging that the Sunni tribes and clans in the Anbar are rounding up the Islamists. To speculate, this is meant in part for the American public’s consumption, part of the Bush Administration’s effort (through the pro-American wing of the Saudi foreign policy establishment) to persuade the U.S. public that “victory” is near. These articles in Al-Hayat strike me as nothing more than an effort by this pro-American wing to magnify a minor phenomenon and plant these stories in the Arab press in the hope that they would filter through into the American press. (They have.)

True, the Arab Sunnis are understandably fuming at Al-Qaeda’s bombing of Arab Sunni recruits. But I would think that it’s too early for them to turn on the Al-Qaeda people, not when Bader is executing their chidren, and not when the Al-Qaeda is able to send suicide bombers to funeral services attended by Bader leaders. If they are in fact turning on al-Qaeda, it's because the Iraqi leadership of the resistance has deemed it politically inexpedient at this stage to continue on with an active insurgency--and not because of bombings of Arab Sunni police and army recruits.

Second, and more importantly, the Arab Sunnis are waiting for what they see as a time coming for an intra-Shia civil war. This war should pit the Sadrists in one camp against the Bader Brigades and Dawa in the other--the vocal hawzah against the silent hawzah. Yet another reason to tone down the insurgency and perhaps rein in the al-Qaeda people, to let the Shia groups go at it, so to speak.

Related to the second reason is the third: To reduce the intensity of Arab Sunni military operations against U.S. troops so as to expose Iran. In other words, Iran is the foreign party which has the most interest in keeping the U.S. off-balance in Iraq--to use Iraq, for instance, as a pressure point in its effort to complete the development of its nuclear program. The Arab Sunni thinking: Now that the Arab Sunnis have proven themselves as a highly effective fighting force, let the Iranians and their agents bear some of the burden. Expose them. Let them unleash their agents against the Americans. And, by so doing, let the Arab Sunnis obtain concessions both from Iran (through Syria and especially through Muqtadha) and from the United States (through cash-rich Saudi Arabia and cash-rich (from the U.S.)Jordan.)

In other words, if the Arab Sunni insurgency quiets down, who would get the United States out of Iraq? What party would cause casualties within the ranks of U.S. troops and raise the war bill on the American taxpayer to motivate the United States to withdraw? It will have to be the Shias. But what Shias? If in fact the U.S. has bought out fully Iran's former agents, then there's only Muqtadha left. But Muqtadha strikes me as an Arab nationalist, a shia Arab nationalist but an Arab nationalist nonetheless. He could easily be co-opted by the United States, as would the Baathists. What stops him from doing that is one thing and one thing only: His competition with the people of the silent Hawzah. In this competition, he could become an Arab hero, extending his leadership from the couple of million Iraqis he represents to the couple of hundreds of millions of Arabs. (That was what lured Kamal Jumblatt in Lebanon in the 1970s.) If the Sadrists do become Arab heroes, they will sweep through most of the Shias in the south.

The Iraqi leaders of the insurgency might want to tone down the Arab Sunni resistance to force Iran to motivate its former agents--or lose out in its secret war with the United States, and have Empire next door, waiting for the right moment. For now, A lot depends on what happens in Damascus: If the leaders of the Arab Sunni insurgency (the natives--not al-Qaeda) hear the right words from Muqtadha, then the insurgency might flare up again, stronger than ever. Muqtadha would have to promise, for example, a Sadrist commitment for equal representation for Shias and Sunnis in the new state; staunch opposition to federalism; commitment to the Palestinians and an unceasing effort for the return of the Joulan. He will also have to get paid, both by Russia (probably) and by Iran (probably). (He needs to meet a payroll; they all do.)

Still, the Sunnis might stand to gain more by not agreeing with Muqtadha, and wait for an intra-Shia war. On the other hand, Muqtadha might draw closer to Bader and Dawa should the Arab Sunnis in Damascus prove difficult. Again, should an agreement be reached, it'll have to be tested. And the "rounding up" of al-Qaeda, for now, might be the Arab Sunnis's pre-payment to Muqtadha for joining hands.

AND WHAT’S GOING ON WITH THE SAUDIS?

King Abdullah has just completed an Asia tour. I haven’t had the time to keep up with the tour or review the results. ( I have reams of articles waiting to be read.) But it’s safe to see the trip as part of a (smart) Saudi policy to diversify the foreign sources of security for the Kingdom. China for one carries a lot of weight with Iran. Granting China contracts in the Kingdom and assuring it of oil supplies are ways to gain leverage against Iran. The Saudi hope is to discourage Iran (through China) from carrying out operations against (and inside) the Kingdom. Or to stoke the flames of Shia nationalism in the Kingdom’s Eastern Province.

As for India and Pakistan: They possess a nuclear arsenal. The Kingdom wouldn’t mind having access to this arsenal should Iran develop nuclear weapons.

What is surprising is that, as of this writing, there has been (to SaudiPoltics.com’s knowledge) only one solid announcement of an arms deal between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. That announcement took place in late September-early October 2005, and was for a modest $2 billion. This is highly unusual. Multi-billion dollar arms deals are the Gulf countries’ way of paying off the United States for protection. Two billion dollars, in contrast, are pittance.

There has been one arms deal with the U.K for around $10 billion. There also has been talk of a huge deal with the U.K. for about $70 billion. It could be that, for Saudi domestic reasons (the "crusher" of Arab Sunnis in Iraq and Israel/Palestine, who dismantled an Arab state, is not appreciated in the Kingdom,) the United States is a behind-the-scene beneficiary of the yet-to-be signed $70 billion deal. After all, the United Kingdom doesn’t have the global reach or the troops to protect the Kingdom, and can hardly be expected to draw such a huge benefit in exchange for little. The talk of a $70 billion deal therefore is possibly an early floating of an idea and conceals the United States as beneficiary of a gargantuan arms deal, to assess Saudi domestic reaction.

The $70 billion deal, for now, is talk. What we have are a $10 billion deal with the U.K. and a meager $2 billion with the U.S. Even if the U.S. gets a share of the $10-billion deal, this share would still be far below the historic levels Saudi Arabia has paid for imperial protection. For now, there exists therefore the distinct possibility that the relative meagerness of the money being paid to the United States is a reflection of the Saudi policy to diversify its sources of security and not limit itself to the one country.

To diversify, Saudi Arabia seems to have kept a pro-American wing within its foreign policy establishment. . (See the earlier article, “Side-Stepping King Abdullah”.) But it probably now has added, or is adding, other wings–-a pro-Chinese , a pro- Indian. Why?

The post-September 11 backlash brought to the Pentagon right-wing Israel-centric entrepreneurs who the Bush Administration unleashed against the Kingdom and the Arab world. These right-wing entrepreneurs had an idea: Why not use the same Iraqi scheme against Saudi Arabia? In other words: Why not bank on the Shias? Why not build bridges to the Shias in the Eastern Province of the Kingdom and help (or threaten to) evolve a secessionist movement among them to form their own oil-rich state and, accordingly, weaken Arab Sunnis all over, especially in Israel-Palestine? These entrepreneurs, though out of the Pentagon, are still influential. Two of their members occupy powerful posts: That of Vice-President and that of Secretary of Defense. To the Saudis, the U.S. plan to favor the Shias is therefore only dormant. It can be re-floated any time the kingdom displeases Empire.

We now have witnessed how the favor-the-Shias scheme has backfired–-in Iraq, and not in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom was lucky: It so happened that soon after the American invasion of helpless Iraq, oil prices began to soar and the new affluence helped the Saudi government co-opt nearly all dissent. (I don’t mean to be harsh. Money is such a softer tool to co-opt the opposition than repressive alternatives. Isn't politics defined as who gets what... To their credit, the Saudis have allowed back into the country opposition figures and have released others from jail.)

In any way, the swiftness and effectiveness of the Arab Sunni resistance in Iraq surprised all, including President Bush and Vice President Cheney. The rest is history.

That very Iraqi resistance, and the flow into the Kingdom of an amazing amounts of oil income, have given the Saudis a new lease on life. But, had the Arab Sunnis in Iraq been defeated, the Saudis and other Arabs would have had to look at a life under the boot of right-wing Israel-centric entrepreneurs, to be herded about. In short, the Arab Sunni insurgency has saved the Saudis and the Arabs from that bleakest of fates.

Their new thinking: Never again. For one, the new King, Abdullah, has never been known to turn his back on his Arab origins. Accordingly, gaining a modicum of independence for the Kingdom (from the United States) in foreign policy should come natural to a person who is true to his identity. To gain that modicum of independence, the Kingdom is now diversifying its foreign sources of security.

But nothing is set in concrete. Here’s a wild idea: Should the Federal Reserve increase interest rates to a level that would allow for a recession, the American consumer would cease financing China’s industry. (A recession might occur, anyway, now that the American consumer has exhausted the pool of Mortgage Equity Withdrawals, which was the foundation of the last spending spree.) With the American consumer dampening her demand, China's industry (and need for oil) should cool down. As a result, China would need to use its huge dollar reserves to finance in part welfare payments to the new-unemployed to dodge domestic turmoil. Ditto for India. Oil demand should drop. And alliances would have to be re-drawn.