SAUDI ARABIA IN IRAQ

(second rough draft)

It bothered me to no end that, in the last posting, I had made lazy guesses about the Saudi role in Iraq. I don’t want to be unfair to the Saudis ; but laziness got the best of me. While I don’t subscribe to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt-evidence theory in international relations, some evidence is necessary, if only to measure against a balance of power and an area study perspective.

So I headed back to my notes. What follows still is not as solid as I'd like. But it should give the reader a general perspective about the Saudi role in Iraq. I expect this role to become more prominent, especially once U.S. troops withdraw ("re-deploy"). (The recent visit by the Kuwait Emir to Washington could very well have been in preparation for an exit and the stationing of a good number of the troops in Kuwait.)

THE HARMFUL IDIOTS DE-STABILIZED THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER AND PROVED UNABLE TO RE-STABILIZE IT. THE SAUDI RULING ELITE WORRIES ABOUT THE RISE OF ARAB SHIITE NATIONALISM

The invasion and occupation ordered by the harmful idiots of a relatively stable Arab country has so disturbed the balance of power in the region, both as states and as sects, that it had become a cause of ample worry for the Saudis. On or about September 21 of last year, Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal in Washington, D.C., had expressed concern that the impending civil war in Iraq could spill over into the region. In addition, he talked about Iran’s interference in Iraqi affairs. As if to address the harmful idiots’ moronic and harmful schemes head on, he said that Turkey would not allow a Kurdish state.

The rise of Arab Shiite nationalism ideally should not be of concern to any Arab elite. But it is. Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, where most of the oil is found, is populated by Arab Shiites in the great majority. In the thinking of the Saudi Sunni ruling elite, Shiite Arab nationalism rising in Iraq is bound to spill over into the Eastern Province. That could beget a Wahhabi populist response, probably encouraged by the elite to control the Shiites. Turmoil should ensue–-not a good thing for stable Saudi Arabia, and certainly not a good thing for the harmful idiots, and for the world supply of oil.

Lucky for the Saudi elite, the harmful idiots’ venture into Iraq, to protect Israel (they said repeatedly, to gain a domestic constituency for a naked aggression and for the Republican Party) and bring further turmoil to the region, and their continued inability to stomach Iran, has enriched this Saudi elite so wildly that it could buy the allegiance of any and all, including its Shiites. In an environment of low interest rates, where capital had been searching for bigger returns, the insecurity surrounding oil supply, a condition created by the harmful idiots, proved to be a terrific magnet for that capital. Oil prices spiked as a result of the flood of speculative capital, resulting in an incredible transfer of wealth from the United States to the Arab Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s yearly income went from around $55 billion to around $200.

No danger of much dissent, so long as the money's flowing.


ARAB SHIITE NATIONALISM: THE MECHANICS OF THE SPILLOVER-- THE EXAMPLE OF LEBANON.

Country and sect interact both in Iraq and Lebanon, and cause a lot of heartburn for the Saudi ruling elite.

The recent Israeli massacre of 1300 defenseless Lebanese civilians–-the equivalent of 97,000 dead in the United States-- using American bombs, including cluster, had an impact on the Kingdom. It foretold what might happen should yet another wide confrontation pit the Shiite Mahdi Army against U.S. troops. Muqtadha as-Sadr is very popular even among the Arab Sunni, let alone the Arab Shiites, way more that Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah ever had been before his men so doggedly stood their ground against the harmful idiots’ bully.

SPILLOVER: PRESSURE FROM THE ARAB STREET

Early in the bully’s attack on Lebanon, it looked as if the Saudi ruling elite had signed on to the Israeli assault. Almost certainly it had.


(Saudi Arabia actually may have been paying off the Israelis through the arms deals with BAE Systems. Are these payments in exchange for military assaults in Lebanon? God help us if that's the case. Cluster bombs and bombs with spent uranium...)

...But the Saudi elite had not signed on to a massacre, albeit sterilized, done from the air and not by proxies, on the ground, as in Sabra and Shatila. It was a cold-blooded mass murder whichever way one looked at it. The pressure of the Arab Street mounted and the Saudi elite backtracked (wisely!) breathlessly. (Please refer to earlier article on the issue.) Why? For one, no one should under-estimate the patriotism (3asabiyyah) of this elite. True, it runs scared from the harmful idiots; but there’s a limit to the length it’s willing to run. The massacre of defenseless Arab and Muslim civilians, targeted by the Israelis to punish the supporters of Hezbollah, was too much to stomach for the Saudi ruling elite. It had assumed that the Israeli army was all-powerful and capable, and likely had been paying Israel through the arms contracts given to BAE Systems. (See previous article on subject.) But it found out that that army was useless; worse, it found out that that army had no moral qualms about massacring the innocent, especially if Arab--Muslim and Christian.


SPILLOVER: PRESSURE FROM IRAN

The Arab Street and the ruling elite’s 3asabiyyah were not the only sources of pressure. More pressure came from the east.

The powerful president of the Iranian Overseers’ Council, former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, sent a letter to King Abdallah which talked about the attempt by some (he meant: the U.S., Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) to incite differences between Sunni and Shiites at a time when Israel was devastating Lebanon. Too, this came after an Israeli newspaper had alleged that four Arab countries (probably: Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait) had been coordinating with Israel in its assault on Lebanon. Rafsanjani reminded King Abdallah that the Lebanese and Palestinian people were part of the great Islamic nation. Oops, said the Saudi King.

Rafsanjani’s letter came after Saudi Wahhabi Da3iyah, Sheikh Abdallah bin Jabrain, a leading Saudi cleric, had issued a fatwa calling Hezbollah a “rafidhi,” (rafadha: to refuse) and, accordingly, that it should not be supported. That these “rafidhis” were treacherous towards the Sunni. Al-Jabrain could not have issued the fatwa without the approval of and coordination with the ruling elite. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and in Jordan ripped into al-Jabrain for his callousness towards the spilling of blood of fellow Muslims.

Yet more pressure came, this time from a domestic source. On or about August 2, 2006, the Saudi elite got a taste of what could happen should a widespread confrontation in Iraq result in the death of Shiites. Around 2000 Saudi Shiites demonstrated in the city of Qtaif in support of Hezbollah in Lebanon. They carried flags of that party and pictures of Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah. In view of the strict controls over public demonstrations in the Kingdom, the fact that 2000 people had dared to come out , risking beating and arrest, spoke a lot about the feelings of the Arab Shiites of the Eastern Province.

And, as true Muslims, the demonstrators shouted slogans that condemned sectarian divisions within Islam. “La Sinniyyah, La Shi3iyyah–Wi7dah, wi7dah, Islamiyyah.” (No Shii-sm, not Sunni-sm, [only] a united Islam.) You could say that this demonstration was a result of a hint from Mr. Rafsanjani. Then again, it could have been a spur of the moment happening.

A couple of days later, the Saudi police quelled yet another demonstration in the same city.

The Saudi ruling elite could now see how useful to Arab Shiite nationalism was the Israeli bully’s killing of defenseless civilians. Even in Iraq, where car bombs against Shiites had been the norm, on or about August 3, thousands braved death and demonstrated in support of Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

As stated earlier, the Sunni ruling elite made a U-turn. Wahhabi Da3iyah, Abdallah bin Jabrain (and , indirectly, the Saudi ruling elite) caved in to the pressure. The cleric issued a denial, saying that the above-mentioned anti-Shiite fatwa was not a recent one; that that fatwa was old and had been issued in 2002; that, in fact, Hezbollah fighters were muflihoun (fala7a: to toil hard; to till the land), and that if they brought victory to Islam in Lebanon, we should encourage them and pray to God to bring stability to them.


IRAQ AS A SAUDI STRATEGIC INTEREST

The clearest statement about Saudi interests in Iraq came on or about April 12. King Abdallah made sure a number of those in the state services were present at his meeting with the Iranian Secretary of the Higher Security Council, Ali Larijani. The head of Saudi General Intelligence, Muqrin Abdel-Aziz, was present, as were Saud al Faisal and Bandar bin Sultan.

Prior to the meeting, the Saudi government had leaked (I believe) a report written by a security advisor, Nawwaf Obeid. In that report, it was made clear that the Kingdom had an interest in the unity of the lands of Iraq and that it had an interest in caring for Iraq’s Sunni, especially that these now had become a minority and the Shiite the majority.

That report also made it clear that Saudi Arabia would be using its influence in Washington, D.C. to avoid an American pull-out from Iraq so as to avoid a major civil war.

The report also stressed that Saudi Arabia should make it clear to Iran that unless the Islamic Republic reduced its activism in Iraq, Saudi Arabia would have to revert to its own plans to balance those of that Republic. That, in effect, Iran had been taking advantage of the instability in Iraq to spread and strengthen political Shiism.

The report also mentioned the need for Saudi Arabia to forgive Iraq its $32 billion debt to show that country that it cared about all of its people, not only the Sunni.

In exchange for Iranian cooperation in Iraq, Saudi Arabia would diminish its opposition to Iran’s nuclear program. One report from AFP said that in fact Bandar bin Sultan had visited Moscow and had asked it to exercise its influence to avoid a Security Council Resolution that woul lay the groundwork for an American attack on Iranian nuclear sites.

A carrot and a stick?

A SAUDI CARROT AND A STICK TO IRAN:


THE CARROT:

The carrot: no opposition to Iran’s nuclear program and active intervention to avoid an American attack on Iran’s nuclear sites. The stick? That Saudi Arabia had its own plans to which it would revert should Iran not cooperate in Iraq. What were these plans?

Saudi Arabia does have the money. So the plans may have something to do with its ability to finance something. What is it?


THE STICK:

The answer I believe came in on or about August 25, 2006. Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal spoke at seeming length about the state of the Arab world. In essence, he was threatening to revive Arab nationalism.

He said that the Kingdom was studying the “tragic Arab situation.” He referred in particular, implicitly, to the division within the ranks of the Arab states, where Syria was allied to non-Arab Iran. Even more vaguely, he referred to what he called the state of confusion within the Arab World. Likely he was referring to the excitement of the Arab Street about Hezbollah’s stunning achievement in facing off with Israel, something that, but for Egypt’s 1973 crossing of the Suez Canal, no Arab government had been able to achieve. The Arab Street in fact was euphoric, and that feeling must’ve sent shivers up the spine of all ruling elite, especially those who had coordinated with Israel to wage the attack on Lebanon.

(AN ANTHROPOLIGICAL NOTE: One mechanic who was dispatched to fix my flat tire in Washington, D.C., happened to be an Egyptian, a Sunni. On learning that I was Lebanese, he started hugging me and tried incessantly to refuse payment for his services. He reported that he couldn’t split from al-Jazeerah television he was so awed by the fighting men of Hezbollah.)

Key to al-Faisal’s statement was his warning that the Arabs were possibly losing their identity–-that one could see an Iranian Middle East and an American Middle East, but no Arab one.

In short, expect a revival (or an attempt at) of Arab nationalism.

Not that that nationalism really ever had died out. (If you hadn’t noticed, this American blog has its origins in secular Arab nationalism.) But here the Saudi elite will have a problem. Saudi Arabia had in the past been the most terrified of Arab nationalism and had worked hard to replace it with Islamic solidarity. Iran stole the latter and ran with it, proving to be its unquestioned leader in the Muslim and Arab Streets. Worse, excepting the Saudi King, who is old, Arab nationalists now are nowhere to be found within the ruling elite of the Kingdom. These nationalists had been pushed out a long time ago by the allies of the harmful idiots. It’ll take a lot to re-create them, let alone give them real power.

OTHER SAUDI STICKS

The Saudis have paid off the United States, Britain, and likely Israel handsomely by granting a contracts to BAE Systems worth up to $70 billion. (See previous article on the subject.) But, truth be said, the best protection for the Kingdom (or any country) is a solid and united home front, one where the Shiites are represented in the power structure. (The Saudis should be careful not to make the mistake the Arab Maronites of Lebanon made, or to place too much trust in the harmful idiots or the Israelis.) Conventionally, only the U.S. can be of help. Britain is rather useless, and Israel is supremely harmful.

The British, knowing they are useless, have been trying hard to show their worth to the Saudis by sponsoring explosions in the Ahwaz region of Iran, where an Arab minority is in the majority in that region. My assessment is that these explosions are useless if the goal is to tame Iran or deter it. The Saudis could be in on these, since they seem to work closely with the rather useless British.

Yet another stick has shown its face (or its length?) in the Balushistan region , on the border between Pakistan and Iran, where guerrillas have attacked Iranian troops and kidnaped some this and last year. Again, the internal front in Iran is such that these attacks hardly make a dent. It seems to me that the British repeatedly have paid a price in southern Iraq for their machinations. Anything for arms contracts, I guess.

(Note: The Gulf Arabs are now reluctant to re-cycle their petrodollars in the United States for fear that the U.S. government would freeze their accounts. As a result, military deals have become yet more important to the West to recycle the petrodollars. Which means that the Western powers will keep on poking about in the Middle East to show their usefulness to the local states and have them sign on for this or that weapons system--protection money that recycles the oil bounty. But Hezbollah's terrific performance in south Lebanon, its second, has shown that two years of religious education, secrecy, services to the poor, courage, and some weapons beat fancy systems any day--and murder less civilians.)

SAUDI ARABIA INSIDE THE SUNNI RESISTANCE?

POINTS ABOUT STRATEGY

For any observer of Saudi Arabia, it would be unthinkable that the Kingdom would not have been involved in beefing up the Sunni resistance, especially that that resistance would be the real stick the Kingdom could wave against Iran, not Arab nationalism per see. But the Kingdom’s hands are tied by a number of considerations.

Theoretically, Saudi support of the resistance–if any--becomes very complex when one considers the following elements:

1. That its hands are tied, since the resistance would unavoidably be conducting operations against U.S. troops–the allies of Saudi Arabia. No one would be able to convince the resistance otherwise, since the harmful idiots had sent an army, seemingly on a made-in-Israel plan, to emasculate the Arab Sunni once and for all.

2. That the Kingdom was systematic in easing the invasion ordered by the harmful idiots of Iraq, and therefore is likely mistrusted by the Arab Sunni of Iraq;

3. That the Kingdom’s second collusion with the United States against the Arab Sunni of Iraq took place when its income had been a paltry $55 billion (or so) and therefore it could not stand up to the threat from the American Jewish Right (Paul Wolfowitz, Thomas Friedman, Douglas Feith, Brookings’ Saban Center, the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs, and allies in academia--to mention a few) which led a Christian Evangelist crusade to splinter the Kingdom into a number of countries.

4. That the money which flowed hugely into the Kingdom’s coffers and the pockets of its thousands of princes and merchants, thanks in good part to the harmful idiots’ charge against Iraq, would one way or another find its way to the Sunni resistance. A function of nationalism, pure and simple.

5. Especially that Iraq was the main venue for the Saudis to defeat the ideas advanced by the American Jewish Right , using its Christian Evangelist army, to eventually break apart the Kingdom. (That's how it looked to the great majority of Arabs and Muslims. Doesn't help to avoid a reality take on how others view American politics. To Arab intellectuals, just as there exists a Christian Right, there also exists a Jewish Right, and the Republican Party had used that Right to spin the Jewish community and include it in on an imperial adventure, portraying the quest for control of oil as good for Israel. I think a majority in that community fell for it.)

(Please note that I have no evidence of any active financing by the Kingdom of resistance groups in Iraq, which financing , if it had occurred (see below re. what the Americans are saying), would have been meant to defeat U.S. troops and the Jewish Right’s ideas of breaking up the Kingdom. I’m proceeding logically: Had I been a prince or a merchant with an immense fortune, I would not have been reluctant for a second to dispatch ample money to the Sunni resistance. It’s called nationalism.)

That said, it is also important to note that the presumed Saudi involvement in financing the Sunni in Iraq (insurgency or not), probably has mutated. To make the point, again, if I were a patriotic Saudi prince or merchant, I would be financing the Iraqi Sunni first to defeat the Jewish Right’s attempt to splinter the Arab nation, in particular the Saudi Kingdom; then, after defeating that Right, (a defeat that already had taken place ), I would be financing the Sunni to fight off the U.S., balance out Iran’s increasing power inside Iraq, and oppose what is perceived as a Kurdish-Israeli alliance in the north. (That's for some princes; the government doesn't seem to mind Israel.)

Iran’s influence in Iraq, especially in the south, is clearly established. Accordingly, it would be unthinkable that Saudi Arabia would not adopt those Sunni groups which are perceived as anti-Iranian. Are there? Did the Saudis adopt any such group?

Saudi activities in Sunni Iraq are bound to be coordinated with the harmful idiots, come what may. One therefore can safely conclude that whatever the American occupier does in Iraq is coordinated with the Saudis or, at the very least, has been communicated to the Saudis. For example, the American attempt to split the Sunni resistance by negotiating with the native part of it, or by seeking out the assistance of the tribes and clans, has had Saudi support. (See below.)

This tactic has faced abject failure: I have not seen a single report of fighting among the Sunni groups. The Arab Sunni resistance is tightly knit. Of equal importance. The Iraqi Sunni resistance, if it remains united, should be able to play off Iran against the United States. In that sense it has a lot of power. It can divide up the roles: some within it would remain close to Iran and others to Syria, while yet others to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Until such time when they all can unite their effort with Muqtadha as-Sadr (probably) to recreate Iraq as an independent and proud Arab Islamic state.

IS AN ISLAMIC STATE AN IRANIAN IDEA?

Jalal Talabani seemed to have been behind one effort to bring together the native Sunni resistance and the Americans, an attempt by the U.S. and their Saudi helpers to splinter the Sunni resistance. The groups which allegedly met with the Americans were:

The Islamic Army in Iraq
The Phalanges of the Revolution of the Twentieth
The Army of the Mujahideen
The Anbar Revolutionaries

But both the Islamic Army in Iraq and the Phalanges of the Revolution of the Twentieth on or about April 13, asserted that they had nothing to do with the Baath. The Islamic Army went on to say that it stood for foreign troops to leave Iraq and to form an Islamic state. Why the need?

This need by the two groups to assert that they were not associated with the Baath, and for one of them to divulge that it stood for the formation of an Islamic state, could very well reflect their wish not to alienate their allies and possibly their financiers. An Islamic state could very well be a reflection that the financiers of the group were themselves Islamist; it could also be that these groups received money from Iran. Why else stress that they had nothing to do with the Baath? Or that one of them would be working for an Islamic state? Accordingly it is unlikely that either of the two groups receive Saudi money. As to the others, we have no statements from them and no evidence whatsoever.

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE U.S. SEEK OUT THE TRIBES

Also around the same time, we started hearing about a said rift between the native Iraqis and the non-Iraqi Arabs in the insurgency. In this instance, it looked as if either the U.S. or the Saudis, or probably both, were financing the Sunni clans as a way of reining in both the Sunni Islamists and the foreign Jihadis. One reason why I suspect Saudi involvement in trying to drive a wedge between the clans/native resistance and the non-Iraqi Jihadis was the fact that the entire affair was so drummed up (repeatedly) on the pages of al-Hayat, an excellent newspaper but one that at times is a flagrant tool of Saudi intelligence.


THE WALL OF DISTRUST TO SAUDI INFLUENCE IN IRAQ

The problem for the Saudis in influencing the Iraqi Sunni is that there probably is a lot of Iraqi Sunni distrust of the Kingdom. After all, Saudi Arabia had twice offered its territory as launchpad for attacks against Iraq. In that sense, the Arab Sunni of Iraq are similar to the Arab Christians of Lebanon, many among whom mistrust the United States and Israel, after the two sets of harmful idiots had allowed Syria to conquer Mount Lebanon. Ditto for the Arab Shiites of Iraq, who were told by the harmful idiots to rebel in 1991, then were left to bear the leaden hand of the Saddam Hussein government, while the troops of the harmful idiots stood by watching in Kuwait.

This distrust of the United States (and, by extension, its Saudi ally) probably is made all the more acute by the fact that a great majority of the Iraqis believe that the American occupier is behind quite a number of the sectarian bombingss. These sectarian bombings, it is alleged by a majority of the Iraqis, are meant by the occupier and its allied Arab intelligence services to widen the rift between Sunni and Shiites and trump the possibility of the formation of a united Sunni-Shiite Islamic front. Such, the Sunni (and Shiites) believe, was/is the Americans’ way of keeping the country off-balance, therefore allowing the Americans to stay in Iraq–a Saudi policy goal (see above). (John Abizeid on or about March 13, declared that the U.S. wanted to keep troops in Iraq to protect oil fields and balance Iran’s influence.)

The bombing of the Shiite Shrine in Samarra had brought the widest range of inter-faith condemnation and all pointed the finger at the occupier as being behind it, to blow up any attempt at the formation of the Sunni-Shiite anti-American front. Iran’s condemnation was similar. In addition, on or about March 1, 2006, around eight days after the Samarra bombing, Jordan declared that it had foiled a suicide attack in that country. A retaliation to the Samarra bombing,? Jordan being closely allied to the U.S., both of whom are said to be trying to drive a wedge between Sunni and Shiites? (Refer to earlier article, “WHO DID IT?”)

IRAN AND THE SUNNI

Within the insurgency, there are those who believe that Iran finances at least one group, Ansar al-Sunna. It’s not improbable since , as Ansar al-Islam, that group had once been based in the north, near the Iranian border area. But Ansar al-Sunna was/is an ally of al-Qaeda, according to Azifah Azzam, the son of Bin Laden’s once spiritual guide, Abdallah Azzam. Could the money sent to Ansar-al-Sunna find its way to al-Qaeda in Iraq or to other Sunni Islamic groups allied to it?

(Other groups allied to al-Qaeda in Iraq:

The Army of the Mujahideen
The Islamic Army to Liberate Iraq
The Grouping of Tawheed and Jihad
The Phalanges of the Revolution of the Twentieth.


If Iran was in fact financing Ansar al-Sunna, not unlikely, then Iran practically was passing money on indirectly to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, an ally of Ansar al-Sunna. Which could explain the punishing retaliatory bombings by Al-Qaeda of the hotels in Jordan, a party many believed was supporting activities (e.g. , sectarian bombings) in Iraq to drive a wedge between Sunni and Shiites and fail the formation of the anti-American Islamic front of Sunni and Shiites.

Note that the Phalanges of the Revolution of the Twentieth were allied to al-Qaeda in Iraq–which could explain that group’s assertion (see above) that it had no association with the Baath. Note, too, that it was part of the same alliance as Ansar al-Sunna.

WHAT’S THE U.S. SAYING?

What does the American government know about Saudi influence in Iraq? The only glimpse we got on this was when Stewart Levy, U.S. Treasury’s Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, testified before Congress on or about April 3, 2006. While he congratulated the Saudi government for the excellent job it was doing in fighting terror inside the Kingdom, he did express concern that there were within the Kingdom large givers to organizations which are misusing humanitarian aid to finance extremists.

Undoubtedly, he said, some of that money was going to Iraq.

A LITTLE TILT

Another area of possible Saudi influence in Iraq came in the form of the American tilt towards the Sunni. For instance, in a patent effort to endear them to the Sunni, on or about April 8, 2006, U.S. officials were quoted as saying that the greater threat in Iraq were the Shiite militias who had gone on a rampage of killing Sunni.

THE ISLAMIC FRONT IS THERE–-ONLY NOT UNITED, NOT YET

The Islamic front which the U.S. and Jordan had been trying to abort throughout this year seemed to be evident in the field, and became evident to me only on reviewing my notes. In mid April 2006, for example, two U.S. soldiers were killed in Anbar–a Sunni stronghold–, then four others, A tad earlier, four British soldiers were wounded in a bomb in Basra, a Shiite stronghold. While the U.S. was continuously involved in an undeclared war with the Shiite Mahdi Army, there were widespread Sunni attacks on U.S. observation posts in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar, and battles in Baghdad’s Sunni Azamiyyah district between the Sunni and the Americans. Later, on or about May 6, 2006, a British copter was downed in Basra, and four crew members were killed.

In other words: the fight against the occupier has for a good while now involved both Sunni and Shiites; the Islamic front therefore has been in evidence, only that there are no indications that it’s in any way united under one command.

(The best ammunition for the Islamic Front comes from the harmful idiots themselves. When the chief harmful idiot in Iraq, the U.S. Ambassador, flies to attend a session in the Kurdish Parliament, he does a huge service for the Islamic Front. True, the American occupation would be truly unbearable (for the occupier) without the help of the Kurdish militias. But the occupation is untenable. So shouldn’t the harmful idiots start thinking about how not to push the Kurds’s alienation from Iraqi Arab society too far along, if only to protect them? What am I saying? Someone who is harmful wouldn’t give a hoot about the pain a friend would suffer; and since he/she is an idiot, he should be lacking the intelligent conscience and empathy necessary to even appreciate his meting out of such pain.)


SAUDI ARABIA AMONG THE IRAQI SUNNI

On or about May 28, 2006, the Islamic Ulamas (scholars) criticized the visit to Iraq of Iran’s Foreign Minister. They seemed to be swimming against the tide, trying to curtail Iran’s influence among the Iraqis, possibly the Sunni Islamists in particular, the most potent fighting force for the Sunni. They reminded the Sunni (they couldn’t be reminding the Shiites, since these had welcomed the invasion and Iran’s collusion) that Iran had colluded with the U.S. in the invasion of Iraq. But, as if to remain true to their young Sunni nationalists–the fighting backbone-- they did balance this by telling a more complete story: that Arab countries also had colluded with the United States against their beloved country. Noteworthy, however, was that the Ulamas did not name these countries. It could be because, at that stage, they realized that the Iraqi Sunni needed these treasonous brother countries; too, it could be because the ulamas were receiving money from one or more of them, likely Saudi Arabia.

On or about June 13, 2006, we got another glimpse of possible Saudi involvement in Iraq. In an al-Hayat article, that paper’s reporter was trying to investigate the raging civil war, the reporter heard statements from Sunni leaders that the civil war–the mass massacres against the Shiite-- was useful to the Sunni. That, one Sunni leader asserted, should convince the Shiite not to rely too much on their majority status. In other words, that leader was saying that the Sunni carried the power of a veto over the formation and stability of an Iraqi state, any Iraqi state, where their voice wasn’t given an appropriate weight.


When the reporter brought up the specter of a full-fledged civil war, that leader answered that he was not worried as regional countries had promised them to place all their assets at their disposal.


Who were these countries? Off hand, I would say they included Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE–it misses Saddam Hussein the most since when he was around it could stay in the contested islands), Jordan, and Egypt. And the “assets” would include not only money and weapons. The “assets” could include the active help and assistance of U.S. troops.

Put differently, the nature of the civil war which the Sunni establishment had begun, in reaction to the American assault on its country, has changed. It’s no longer one that has been meant chiefly to defeat the Americans, to one that is meant to defeat mainly the Iranians. Here, the Saudis, Jordanians, Kuwaitis, and Egyptians are confident that they can put to service American troops to defeat Iran in Iraq. Frankly, they couldn’t do this without the willingness of the harmful idiots to lend American troops as mercenaries. They did it first allegedly for the Jewish Right and Israel, and now they’re doing it for their Arab protectorates (they say.)

Anything to control those oil fields.

SAUDI MONEY

Another glimpse into likely Saudi involvement in Iraq came when, on or about June 28, groups within the Sunni resistance offered a cease-fire with the Americans, if these committed to withdraw within two years. The groups were:

Phalanges of the Revolution of the Twentieth
The Heroes of Iraq
Grouping of Nine April
Phalange of al-Fateh
Phalanges of al-Mukhtar
Jaysh al-Mujahideen
Phalanges of Salah al-Din
Phalanges of the General Command of the Armed Forces

Of particular note was the fact that these groups had placed as one condition (out of many) that observers from the Arab League, Saudi Arabia, and the Association of Islamic Scholars (Ulamas) supervise the agreement.

(Also of note was that the Majlis Shura al -Mujahideen, made up mainly of al-Qaeda, the Islamic Army in Iraq, and the Army of Muhammad, had not joined in the two-year moratorium offer.)

When a body asked that the Saudis be included in the supervision of an agreement, it would be fair to conclude that possibly they were receiving money from the Saudis. Were the Saudis trying to snatch away some of the resistance from Syria and Iran?

A day later, a spokesman for the Association of Islamic Ulamas (al-Dhari) asserted that the most important resistance groups were the al-Qaeda-led Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen and the Phalanges of the Revolution of the Twentieth. Could al-Dhari have been advertising to the Saudis who to support–that in fact they had little choice, since, as government, they would not support an al-Qaeda-associated outfit. The only one left: the Phalange of the Revolution of the Twentieth.

MORE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ABOUT SAUDI INFLUENCE AMONG THE SUNNI

On or about July 2, 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki started an Arab tour to garner support for his program for national reconciliation. The countries he would visit should tell the observer about who carried weight within the Iraqi Sunni community and its resistance movement. These were: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait.

LAST BUT NOT LEAST: MUQTADHA

Could Saudi Arabia have given money to Muqtadha as-Sadr? My guess is that they did. Here’s why:

On or about November 11, 2005, Muqtadha as-Sadr started a petition drive to collect eight million signatures calling on the Saudi government to allow the building of tombs for Shiite Imams who had died in Saudi Arabia. Other related demands were made in sermons by sheikhs associated with Muqtadha.

Now that was playing Saudi politics, wasn’t it? In early January, on or about January 10, 2006, King Abdallah met with Muqtadha, and I stopped hearing about the petition.

If in fact the Saudis have passed money on to Muqtadha, it would be because he knew how to play Saudi politics, so to speak. It’s my judgement that, looking beyond the current phase, should Arab nationalism be revived, Muqtadha would be a prime candidate to integrate Shiite and Sunnis within the fold of this nationalism.