IRAN TO SAUD AL-FAISAL: WE HEAR YOU, LOUD AND CLEAR.

IRAN TO SAUD AL-FAISAL:
WE HEAR YOU, LOUD AND CLEAR.

Saudi Arabia: Between the Islamic Republic and the Israel-Centric Entrepreneurs.

In his attempt to manage Saudi Arabia's security vis-a-vis Iran, Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal, recently expressed his opposition--politely and quite lamely--to Iran's nuclear program.

He said that should Iran fire nuclear warheads at Israel, Palestinians will die. If these missiles miss Israel, Arab countries will be hit.

The Saudi Foreign Minister, of course, couldn't be serious.


NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: M.A.D. AND THE SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY

Nuclear weapons, even the Iranian, aren't meant to be fired. An extensive literature exists on the subject, the result of the decades of nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. A balance of terror--or what became known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)--is what nuclear weapons are all about.

Israel and Iran would have to develop a second strike capability to qualify for a MAD-like status. That is likely to be worked out with the passage of time. But things should be most dangerous in the transition period as Israel might strike Iran first with nuclear weapons before the latter develops its own first strike capability.

In other words, the time lapse between now and the protagonists' development of a second strike capability (to assure the first launcher of total destruction after the attacked party is decimated by that first launcher) should be the most dangerous time. Hence the importance of submarine-based missiles, for example, for a second strike capability, as a way to assure the first launcher of certain decimation.

The dangerousness therefore of nuclear weapons should be in evidence during two time-periods:

1. Now: Israel might strike (with nuclear weapons) before Iran develops a first strike capability; and

2. Later: Either Israel or Iran (once Iran develops a first strike capability) might strike before the other develops a second-strike capability.


[NOTE: The recent export of German submarines to Israel (did it take place? I haven't kept up) could be meant for Israel to develop a second-strike capability. The region would be safest by going nuclear-free all the way. The second best option: that both parties should have a second-strike capability. If only one has it, it would be a prescription for possible disaster.]


PRINCE AL-FAISAL SHOULD WORRY THAT ISRAEL, TOO, MIGHT MISS ITS TARGET.

With this in mind, the question becomes: Shouldn't Prince al-Faisal be worried about Israeli missiles missing their Iranian target and falling onto the Kingdom? After all, it is more likely that Israel would fire first, as described in alternative "1" above. And it could possibly miss. And if it obtains a second-strike capability, it would yet become more likely to strike first, and possibly miss yet again. In both instances the missed Israeli nuclear payload may hit the kingdom.



IRAN IS NORMAL

Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is normal in view of the fact that Israel, the other conventional power in the region, has them. There's absolutely nothing strange about this, notwithstanding the blabber of an irritated Empire.

(The only strange thing is Iranian technological incompetence, having taken so long to develop and test a bomb. Which does cue us to their dangerousness to their own people, first, should a nuclear accident take place. Not to mention a nuclear spill in the Gulf itself from the Boushehr nuclear power plant.)

Power will be balanced, as would nuclear terror. Not to mention that owning nuclear missiles assures independence from sponsors. Ask France about its force de frappe, for instance. Could one be wiser than General de Gaulle?

To his credit, Prince al-Faisal did concede that Israel had begun this dangerous and insane arms race. But that's all he did in this instance that is deserving of credit.

Prince al-Faisal called on Iran to accept a nuclear-free Parabesian Gulf. (SPC will refer to the Gulf separating Iran from the Arabian Peninsula as the Parabesian Gulf, since it features Persia to the east and Arabia to the west.)


COME MR. FLYNT LEVERETT, OR HOW TO FLOAT AN IDEA.

Come Mr. Flynt Leverett, a former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council and a fellow at the Brooking's Institution Saban Center for Middle East Policy.

[NOTE: I'm not sure: but isn't a member of that center, a former CIA, an Israel-centric fellow who wanted badly--in effect--to crush Arab Sunnis in Iraq, and orphan their children? I believe (though I'm not certain) that he appeared at a conference sponsored by Georgetown's Center for Contemporary Arabic Studies before the Iraq invasion and spoke as an arrogant mandarin would. I doubt the man ever was subject to a bombing, any bombing. I doubt he ever sat in the hallway of an apartment, his stomach contracting from horrifying fear, while the missiles rained on his neighborhood, and the children coughed up blood. I doubt that he ever saw an entire family charred in their car, having received a near-direct hit by a missile. And yet he could with a nod set off the invasion of a much weaker country and orphan and kill countless Iraqi children and a good number of American. He did it with the standard liberal affected hesitations, of course. Don't you love blind Israel-centric ambitions?]

Mr. Leverett is writing a book about the future of Saudi Arabia.

In his op. ed. piece in the January 24 issue of the New York Times, Mr. Leverett gives quite a play to Prince al-Faisal's ideas, not seeing any affected naivete in them. (Preliminary conclusion: Leverett's book will be kind to the Saudis; the Kingdom can thank the fighting Arab Sunnis of Iraq for the swinging of the pendulum back towards it.) But he adds at least one twist which should please the Israel-centric entrepreneurs: In essence, he says that Prince al-Faisal is reversing a long-standing Arab policy of seeking the denuclearization of Israel as a first step in Middle Eastern arms control.
The Prince, Mr. Leverett tells us, is now seeking a nuclear-free Gulf first, and second, the denuclearization of Israel.

Put differently and bluntly: Prince al-Faisal wants to stop Iran from developing its nuclear warheads before he asks Israel to uninstall its arsenal of already-developed warheads.

Here's Leverett:

"While Prince Saud blamed Israel for starting a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, his implication that a nuclear-weapons-free Gulf might precede a regionwide nuclear-weapons-free zone is a nuanced departure from a longstanding Arab insistence that regional arms control cannot begin without Israel's denuclearization."

And here Mr. Leverett gives the Iranians food for thought:

"The United States and its partners should build on this idea and support the creation of a Gulf Security Council that would include Iran, Iraq [what's left of it], Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the Gulf, as well as the five members of the United Nations Security Council."


What's wrong with this picture?

Here we have a former NSC man, in the post-Israel-centric-neocon era, following the bleeding of our troops and our purse in Iraq, who is a fellow at an Israel-centric center (Saban) located within a liberal research institution (Brookings). This man is writing a book about the future of Saudi Arabia. This very man also is reading alleged nuances in Prince Saud's statements. This man, in the same paragraph where he reads the "nuanced departure" by Prince al-Faisal away from pressuring nuclear Israel, is adding something else: A proposal of his own (purportedly) to launch a "contain-Iran" Gulf Security Council.

The very fact that Mr. Leverett wants to exclude Israel out of the idea of de-commissioning all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East places him squarely in the camp of Israel-centric entrepreneurs. In other words, an Israel-centric entrepreneur will defy logic by allowing for one player to own dangerous weapons in a highly tense neighborhood, while asking another to not balance the power of its adversary.

(Forgive me for belaboring a rather asinine point. Mr. Leverett has led me down this path. Israel's huge nuclear arsenal doesn't even deserve the attention. It is an albatross--as would Iran's (for different reasons), should it test a bomb. Israel's torments are in part self-inflicted--unable to re-fashion its national consensus away from dependence on Empire, and towards accommodating its neighborhood--and in another related to the Palestinian population of Israel-Palestine--unable to see them as partners with whom it will have to work for the next centuries. In addition, there really isn't any regional nuclear power to balance. Though I labeled it asinine, this discussion is meaningful in only one important aspect: It reveals that to be an Israel-centric entrepreneur is to be in part an imperial who will not let the clients become part of their region, and will pay off their leaders to be good Uncle Toms--"assets." A client is a tool for total dominance, nothing less and nothing more.)



IRAN TO SAUD AL-FAISAL:

Viewing all of the above, would anyone be surprised that the Iranians would see this proposal from an Israel-centric man for a Gulf Security Council as an idea being floated by the Saudi Foreign Minister himself, and not by a putatively independent author of a book about the future of Saudi Arabia? That Prince Saud is in fact using this man to float a "contain-Iran" idea?

Please read carefully my translation of what the newspaper Iran ( @ Jan. 28, 2006) said about this matter. Notice that it places the idea of the contain-Iran Gulf Security Council squarely in Mr. al-Faisal's lap, saying nothing about the Saban Center or about Mr. Leverett:

"Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Foreign Minister, as reported by the newspaper The New York Times, has proposed a project that, if implemented, would result in the formation of a council which name would be "Council for the Security of the Persian Gulf," which would include the five permanent members of the Security Council, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the other countries of the Persian Gulf."


So, you see, the Iranians are familiar with the concept of "floating" ideas. They hear you, my dear Prince al-Faisal, loud a clear.

IRAN v. ENGLAND--and it's not about soccer!

Against my better judgement, I will be writing short commentaries that could be predictive.

Here's one: Iran has accused the United Kingdom of the recent explosions by Arab secessionists in the Ahwaz province in western Iran.

Hours earlier, Tony Blair had called on Iran and Syria to stop supporting terror. I guess the Ahwaz bombings were his way of indicating that the U.K. will go on the offensive.

The Ahwaz explosions caused the cancellation of a trip there by the Iranian President. There's also the possibility that Rafsanjani had returned to Tehran for an important meeting. (He cut short a three-day visit to the city of Mashhed.)

In the meanwhile, sensing a stronger tilt by the U.S. in favor of the Arab Sunnis, and an attempt to divide them between Arab nationalists and Jihadists, Iran is now hosting Muqtadha as-Sadr. I guess it's planning on a Shia insurgency, should the Arab Sunni quiet down. By now, Muqtadha's men should have gotten the training they badly needed.

What does it all mean? For now, I think Iran wants to teach the U.K. a lesson. The Islamic Republic sees the U.K. as the American enforcer in the Gulf--outside of Iraq.

The question is: Where will the Islamic Republic strike back? In the south of Iraq, where British troops are still operating? Problem: Muqtadha's men are not as good as the Arab Sunni warriors.

Can it hit inside England? Doubtful, since the Brits have now raised their defenses after the train bombings.

In Saudi Arabia? Have to be careful about offending the Kingdom. Too many mutual agreements.

In fact, the Islamic Republic has to be cautious about disturbing the peace of any of the American Arab protectorates in the Gulf, lest they dig in deeper with the U.S.

And remember: The Kingdom's oil wealth has silenced the opposition. And many of the Saudi al-Qaeda members are busy in Iraq.

Come on, think with me: Where will the Islamic Republic hit next? Against Britain, that is, since the British intelligence services are now enjoying a good old colonial action revival--in Iran.

Southern Iraq seems to be the best place to hit back at the U.K. Or maybe Yemen. Any British tourists there? Or some place like Kenya?

The Islamic Republic can heighten the tension by hitting against British citizens in the Gulf countries. There are plenty of those.

The coming few days will show us how creative the Islamic Republic is.

(I know I'm letting you down; but I'll sleep on it and maybe by tomorrow morning I'll have a better idea where the Iranians have the least limitations, and where the Brits are most exposed.)

One question: Can the Brits really afford a secret war with Iran? I doubt that it's a war they can handle or win. Or one that scares the Islamic Republic. (The state has the money--April 2005 to March 2006: $45 billion in oil income.)

In the meanwhile: Have you noticed that we're still losing a fair number of troops (and helicopters) in the new liberal demcratic state of Iraq? But the press seems to act as if we're winning? Did G.W.'s offensive about staying the course in Iraq and victory put a lid on calls to withdraw?

Frankly, I think our troops in Iraq are still sitting ducks. I've tried repeatedly to see a scenario where they're not. Couldn't.

SAUDI ARABIA v. IRAN. . .IN LEBANON. NEXT STOP: YEMEN..

Updated: 1/14/06


Saudi Arabia, in close coordination with Empire’s mandarins, wants to ease America’s nightmare in Iraq. It's not a selfless act: The Kingdom needs U.S. troops for protection against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Experience has shown that American troops are not welcome on Saudi territory. Iraq therefore is the place of choice to house them. Kuwait (where the Islamists are quite influential) and Al-Adid (in Qatar) may not be hospitable or large enough.

As a consequence, a disjointed Saudi policy is evolving: Contain the Islamic Republic by buying out its presence in the Arab periphery.

One fringe benefit of this policy: The Israel lobby has eased its campaign against the Kingdom, a weapon it has used in the United States. After all, by standing up to Iran, the Kingdom finds itself in Israel's camp. One therefore wouldn't expect the Israel lobby to keep up its financing of books and publications against Saudi Arabia, would it?

With an income that has about quadrupled in the past couple of years, the Kingdom is now the train that can. Or it thinks it can.

(The Kingdom, Russia, Iran, and China can thank the Greenspan-Bush dollar glut for their increased wealth and concomitant power. Refer to the earlier article, “An Imperial Blind Spot..”)

In Israel/Palestine, Saudi King Abdallah has recently lent a financial hand to the Palestinian Authority, the alternative to the Iranian-funded Islamists. But here, the possibilities for success are minimal since the Israelis will need 2000 more years to come to terms with the fact that they have to work with--not against--some Palestinian leader(s). Logically, better work with even Hamas than wait for a new and larger generation that is even less compromising. But logic has never been the hallmark of any state's national consensus.

Currently, the most revealing aspects of the Kingdom’s invigorated foreign policy , by far, are the Kingdom’s initiatives in Lebanon.

And therein, my dear Watson, lies the possibility–maybe even probability–of a bloodbath.

Three Lebanese personalities are currently in the Kingdom, invited there by its government:

--The Sunni Prime Minister, Fuad al-Saniora;

–-the Sunni Deputy to Parliament, Saad al-Hariri; he is Mr. Saniora’s political boss; and

–-the Shia Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri.

Mr. Saniora and Mr. Hariri control the (Saudi) money. Mr. Berri controls armed Shia Amal, a para-military organization that competes with armed Shia Hizbollah.

What’s Hizbollah?

It’s a political party with a solid popular base among the Lebanese Shias. Its men and women had defeated the Israeli army in South Lebanon, forcing it to withdraw back to Israel. (They used the same weapons the Iraqis are using against U.S. troops.) It's also built around the provision of needed services and doesn't suffer from extreme corruption--somewhat of an Arab specialty.

Is that all? A local political party?

No, that’s not all. Hizbollah is also an extension of the regional strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its junior ally, Syria.

Do Amal and Hizbollah get along?

Yes, though not always. But, you see, when the United States began to tilt towards the Arab Sunnis in Iraq and the region [Refer to the earlier article, “The Arab Street Marches Forward”] Hizbollah and Amal closed ranks. Their objective: To balance in Lebanon the pro-American block that is headed by Saad al-Hariri.

Iran and Syria probably had much to do with the two Lebanese Shia organizations coming closer. Iran pays them, and Syria and Iran supply them with weapons.

But what are the three Lebanese leaders doing in Saudi Arabia? They’re Lebanese, right; so shouldn’t they be negotiating at some hotel on the shores of that great blue sea?

You’re right; they should. But there’s no money on the shores of that great blue and old sea--and hardly any fish, either. In sharp contrast, there’s plenty of money on the shores of the Persian Gulf. For as long as the kingdom’s income from oil is huge, you can expect all Lebanese leaders to be Saudi at heart.

Who would you say is the most important of the three leaders?

Mr. Berri. He is the Kingdom’s most important Lebanese guest. Why? Not only does Mr. Berri head the para-military Amal; he also carries a lot of weight within the ranks of the Lebanese armed forces whose recruits are predominately Shia. They owe him their secure jobs!

I don’t understand: Why would that make Mr. Berri’s Saudi Arabia’s most important Lebanese guest?

The answer: If they can persuade (pay) Mr. Berri to contain Hizbollah, they would diminish Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon. Right?

I see your point. Out of curiosity, what would you say Mr. Berri’s price tag is?

It’s got to be high since a virtual bloodbath is certain to ensue should Mr. Berri’s Amal move against Hizbollah. Not to mention that the Palestinian refugees will come to Hizbollah’s aid. Rumor has it that Iran spends around $100 million per year in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia will have to spend a few hundreds of millions if it is to make a dent.

But isn’t there an easier way to do all of this--to dislodge Iran and Syria from Lebanon?

Yes there is. There exists a blood-less option. But you'd need Israel's cooperation. You’d need Israel to strike a deal with Syria and withdraw from the Golan–all the way to pre-June 5, 1967 lines. The Saudis and Empire’s mandarins are helpless on that.

So you're telling me that what they are doing will not help much? Why are they doing it then?


They need to place pressure on Iran so that the Islamic Republic will take it easy on U.S. troops in Iraq. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries have never been known for the excellence of their armies. Iraq in the past had provided deterrence against Iran. Now they only have U.S. troops to protect them. They dread the thought of being left alone to face the Islamic Republic.


The Saudis and the imperial mandarins of course would do much better if they can get Israel to strike a deal with Syria and return the entire Golan back. But that's not going to happen--not without the historic necessity of a war of liberation, something similar to what Hizbollah did in south Lebanon, and to what the Islamists are doing in Gaza and on the West Bank. Syria is doing this through Lebanon. Countries simply don't withdraw because they are wise. They're not. They're built around a stiff national consensus which lacks flexibility, and is only altered after defeats.


(There's a glimmer of hope--but only a glimmer. Israel has recently announced that it would allow the Palestinians of occupied East Jerusalem to vote in the planned --though unlikely to take place on time--future Palestinian elections.)


You see, the Saudis and the Americans can't sit idle just because they cannot do something correctly. These are men with jobs (to quote George Castanza) and they have to justify these jobs. So they bring in Speaker Berri and try and divide Shia ranks in Lebanon--the next best thing to having Israel give back the Golan. If blood is spilt, it'll be (cheap) Shia Lebanese blood.

But isn’t Mr. Berri worried about the bloodbath you described?

You bet he is. Mr. Berri, as we write, is probably describing the bloodbath to his Saudi hosts. “I can’t do it,” he’s telling them. “we’ll be murdering each other. It’s happened before and it wasn’t pretty.”

The Saudi hosts’ retort: “We’d be glad to buy Hizbollah. What’s its price?”

Mr. Berri: “You don’t understand; this can’t be done in one stroke. The price will be high, but will have to be paid over an extended period of time."

He explains: "This will be a slow process where you send me money, and I buy allegiance from local Hizbollah lieutenants. My hope is that, little by little, I can wean away from Hizbollah its most effective junior commanders. Sure, there’ll be assassinations and kidnaping, since Iran will be increasing its counter-financing of Hizbollah. But that would beat an outright intra-Shia civil war.”

He sighs, “I can’t really deal with another civil war. I’d rather go back to Detroit and run my gas stations than live through another civil war.”

He takes a sip of his cardamon-scented Saudi coffee, sighs yet again, and takes a stab at raising the price tag: He reminds his hosts of a somber probability: “Hizbollah and Iran will try to assassinate me.”

(The Syrian president just returned home from a Saudi visit. His men will take a break for a while, in exchange for a stop to the Saudi anti-Syrian campaign and Saudi statements asserting the Arab identity of the Golan. The men and women of Hizbollah and Iran will take over for the time being.)

An American mandarin who speaks Arabic like a retard (and is proud of it) jumps in; his government has always had good relations with Mr. Berri--hence the fact that it never froze his assets. “We’ll raise the price, and get you the best American security firm to protect you,” he says. The Saudis smile at him; they know his Arabic sounds Arabic-like; but he is a mandarin, after all, and they now understand his logic, if not his Arabic. Mr. Berri is bewildered by what he heard: something that sounded like Arabic, but wasn't. The Saudis, seeing his bewilderment, hastily interpret into actual Arabic what the mandarin said. (In fact their Ministry of Information had provided the mandarin with an Arabic-Arabic inerpreter.)

Mr. Berri thinks to himself: How naive can these people be? He takes another sip of the aromatic coffee and thinks about the late Mr. Hariri and about the best security firm protecting him. He thinks about Iranian TNT exploding heavily-armored American tanks in Iraq.

But the lure of creating yet more jobs for the Shia, using Saudi money, now that he and the late Mr. Hariri had bankrupted the Lebanese state, is too powerful.

“Let’s start,” he says. “We’ll see where we go from here.” He continues: "Have you arranged the 'roles' each of us will play?"

(UPDATE: 1/14/06: The three Lebanese leaders are claiming that no agreement has been reached; that, in other words, the meeting in the Kingdom was a failure. That is to be expected. They wouldn't claim that an agreement has been reached to contain Hizbollah, would they? Then again, they could be telling the truth. Rest assured: Hizbollah, Iran, and Syria will be monitoring every move by Mr. Berri.)


++++++++++++++++++++++++++


Your task, should you want to pass this exam, is to discuss among yourselves the following issues:

What’s the Islamic Republic thinking about? Will it accept the clipping of its wings in Lebanon? Will it retaliate against Saudi Arabia? If so, where and how? Will it give Mr. Berri breathing room to explain himself before it pops him? Or has the Islamic Republic accepted a tacit agreement to limit its activity to the prize Mr. Bush had handed it–Iraq--and accept in exchange the spread of Saudi influence in non-oil rich places like Lebanon? But why would it? It needs Lebanon badly to deter Israel from bombing its nuclear sites. It already owns the Iraqi piece of real estate–or at least the part that matters. What kind of a deal is this anyway?

Next stop for the Iranian-Saudi clash-by-proxies: Yemen.

SIDE-STEPPING KING ABDALLAH:

SIDE-STEPPING KING ABDALLAH::

ARE THE PRO-AMERICAN ELEMENTS IN THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT RUNNING THEIR OWN FOREIGN POLICY ?

A recent news story in a (partly and probably) Qatari-financed London Arabic daily reported recently that the Saudi Ministry of Information, the financier of a huge Arabic news empire, had ordered its outlets to cease and desist from propagating Abdel Halim Khaddam’s pronouncements against the Syrian government.

These Saudi-financed media outlets earlier had made hay of Abdel-Halim Khaddam’s defection. (Refer to article below.)

Those familiar with the war taking place between the coalition of Russia, Iran, and Syria and that of the U.S.,Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel can reasonably conclude (without hesitation) that the Saudi Kingdom itself had sponsored the defection of the former Syrian Vice-President.

Since the defection, there had occurred one phone conference between the Syrian President and the Saudi King. ( A visit is expected soon.)

In that conference, Mr. Asad reportedly complained to the King about the campaign by the Saudi-financed media against Syria’s government and about the play these media outlets were giving Abdel Halim Khaddam’s pronouncements against his colleagues in Syria. In short, he informed King Abdallah that the Kingdom he ruled was waging a campaign to unseat Mr. Asad from the presidency of Syria.

The gag order to the Saudi outlets followed soon after the phone conference. This order could be a tactical and therefore temporary move. But it could be also an indication of a “coup” against the King. It is after all quite striking that a campaign of this magnitude would be launched without even a hint of a statement about the Golan. In other words, knowing King Abdallah’s background, it strikes SaudiPolitics as unlikely that he would have approved of an anti-Syrian campaign without balancing this campaign with a demand for concrete Israeli steps to withdraw from the Golan Heights.

Accordingly, there exists a distinct possibility that pro-American elements in the Saudi foreign policy establishment had launched the anti-Syrian campaign without first seeking approval from the King. To reiterate: It’s not beyond Saudi Arabia to launch an anti-Syrian campaign. It is, however, beyond the logic of a rule by King Abdallah to launch this campaign without balancing it with a demand that Israel withdraw from the Syrian Arab lands–even if it were only lip service.

That the campaign should stop soon after the phone conference between the Syrian President and the Saudi King adds weight to the above interpretation: The Syrian President must’ve described a Saudi anti-Syrian campaign about which magnitude the King was not informed. (I doubt that he sits by CNN, the Saudi-financed al-3arabiyyah, or the Qatari-financed al-Jazirah.)

That the King would not have approved of an anti-Syrian campaign (without balancing it with a demand that Israel withdraw from the Arab Golan) is borne out by the King’s recent history. When Crown Prince, King Abdallah had made a generous and just offer to Israel, which the Israelis had ignored at a time when the Bush Administration was at the height of arrogance and delusion in preparing to invade a small and defenseless Arab country. Israel, on orders from the Bush Administration, gave CP Abdallah’s plan the cold treatment. It therefore doesn’t make sense that the same person, now King, would bless Israel’s occupation of Arab land, directly or indirectly, after Israel had rejected his rather courageous offer.

Which leads us to the observation that there exists a high likelihood that elements within the Saudi foreign policy establishment were running (and may still) their own foreign policy show. In so doing, they feel fully protected, since they are assisting (they think) the Kingdom’s most important ally. This has become more acceptable now that Empire had promoted out of the Pentagon the pro-Likud neocons who wanted to break up the Kingdom.

But is that what Empire really needs?

Words to the wise: Empire needs to lose less of its children in the quagmire called Iraq, and not co-sponsor an insignificant defection. Accordingly, Empire needs honest advice from friends who know the region.

Those who know the region, and who are not ideological, also know that the Israeli occupation of Arab lands links U.S. troops in Iraq to that of Israeli troops occupying the West Bank, the Arab Golan, East Jerusalem, and (de facto) Gaza.

Defections and campaigns against a regime which is eyeing its occupied land doesn’t help in saving the life of U.S. troops in Iraq. Perhaps it’s time to reinvigorate CP Abdallah’s peace plan, not pursue self-defeating policies a la Iraq invasion.

Perhaps not.