INSIDE THE IRAQI RESISTANCE.

DRAFT--SECOND

INSIDE THE IRAQI RESISTANCE.

I just finished reading a two-part article by Himam (sp.) Hasan in http://www.daralhayat.net/, 2/25 and 26, 2006.

By way of headline, the article is titled, “Saddam was first to bring in Islamic organizations then he regretted [his decision]...Al-Qaeda armed the tribes at first...and the Faloujah battle [was] the spark that drove a wedge between al-Zarqawi and the Anbar.”

(Note: I’m not sure whether the author is male or female. Accordingly, I will refer to him/her by the family name, Hasan. I apologize for not putting in the effort to find out whether the first name belongs to a man or a woman.)

Hasan’s report was based on accounts by Arab Sunni informants (as in anthropology not as in police investigations.) The informants, I would think, would talk relatively freely to a (probably Sunni) reporter for a Saudi-financed newspaper. Hence the informative nature of the article.

The article, however, adds only some insight. The main reason: Either Hasan is covering up for regional countries or Hasan’s interlocutors are.


ARAB AND MUSLIM VOLUNTEERS

One source, for example, a former Iraqi intelligence officer, tells the author that “the drawing [into Iraq] of the Arab volunteers took place through regional intelligence services and religious organizations that were active in the Jihadi Salafi [movement] and which were a link to...”

As you may have noted, the former intelligence officer uses the plural to describe the sources of help. But specific he/she is not. From the press, we do know, for instance, that Syrian intelligence was one source of foreign Arab fighters. Was one of the many Iranian services another? Could it be that Iranian intelligence would inject into Iraq Salafis who are hateful of Shias? Not an impossibility since Iran should have an interest in failing the U.S. Iraq project, come what may. But then why aren’t the Arab Sunni “sources” saying it?

Could Sudan have been another source? Yemen?

One would think that a knowledgeable former intelligence officer would be specific about what intelligence services were involved. It couldn’t be the Saudi, since the Kingdom assisted (albeit passively) in the invasion. (Saudi Arabia provided the 'Ar'ar airport in the north to the U.S. and allowed U.S. Special Forces to conduct operations inside Iraq.) But was a Saudi religious network involved?

General media sources have told us that Saudis were active in the Iraqi resistance. Who got them there? We have to presume (a safe presumption) that their government knew about their travel to Iraq. Al-Hayat, Hasan’s employer, covered their news, after all. What network, Saudi or Arab, specifically eased their transport into Iraq? Hasan and Hasan’s sources don’t reveal much about this.

Could the Lebanese have helped? If so, it would only be that part of the Lebanese intelligence services that is beholden to Syria. The Egyptians, fully servile to the U.S. (and accused of having assisted in falsifying intelligence to justify the invasion of an Arab country), could not have been the ones. They woudn't dare. Their state (and possibly their people) would starve if American money and wheat were interrupted.

You get the point: High frustration. What a waste. Hasan already was inside the insurgency, yet missed out on the chance to be insightful. SaudiPolitics understands the constraints Hasan was under, since the sponsoring paper was Saudi-financed. Still, Al-Hayat is often used by Saudi intelligence in this or that campaign. Why couldn’t Hasan take advantage of that? Why could't Hasan talk about countries that Saudi Arabia wouldn't care that they be mentioned?

(A part of the answer could be that King Abdallah had put an end to the use by the Kingdom's pro-American wing of its foreign policy establishment of al-Hayat in tht wing's anti-Syrian campaign. The paper's editors could have done some self-censorship about other sources/countries.)

Hasan does a wonderful job categorizing the various Arab Sunni resistance groups and their progression in the period spanning the beginning of the invasion to the present. There must be somewhere a translation of the article for those who are interested in these details. (It's too much to do here.)


THE AMERICAN INVASION UNLEASHES THE IRAQI ISLAMISTS


One compelling result of the invasion–which bespeaks tons about the mediocrity of those advising the Bush Administration–was that it (the invasion) unleashed a tsunami of a Sunni Islamist torrent. This torrent had been bottled up, ready to burst; but it would not dare challenge the Hussein government. These Sunni fundamentalists replaced the government’s religious leader almost instantly after U.S. troops entered Iraq and its government collapsed: : “[T]he religious figures who hold Salafi beliefs stood at the forefront [of the resistance] bringing down the religious figures which owed their allegiance to the [Hussein] government.” Hamas in power, you could say, in yet another country.


DID SADDAM HUSSEIN PREPARE FOR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE?

One of Hasan’s sources insisted that the Hussein government had not prepared for the resistance/insurgency. That source cited as proof the alleged relative dearth of the funding for that insurgency. But fear not: Al-Qaeda soon arrived. It entered Iraq, the source said, with a system of organization that was superior, and with better funding.

We learn (indirectly) that Egypt lent the United States a hand in repressing the Iraqi Arab Sunni resistance/insurgency. What does Egypt care? What do any of them care? Let Empire hang itself. Its mandarins order the foreign Uncle Toms to do this or that to help mobilize the American public. The Uncle Toms are willing to accommodate, for a price. And Empire hangs itself.

The one piece of evidence which Hasan cites was the deportation back to Iraq, from Egypt, of a certain S. S[adh], one of Hussein’s closest escorts, who the U.S. imprisoned on his return. This man revealed that the former President was able to secure some financing for the early resistance. He gave the leaders of the resistance around $1 billion. Sadly for the insurgency, he reported, Hussein’s lieutenants took most of the money and ran to Syria.

Still: One billion dollars! That’s an amount that might indicate that the former President had in fact very possibly prepared for the war of resistance.


AL-QAEDA COMES UP WITH MONEY

At any rate, here again, al-Qaeda made up for the loss.

People who “are close to the Zarqawi organization,” Hasan tells us, have asserted that Zarqawi was able to use al-Qaeda’s network in the Gulf, North Africa, and Syria to finance his operations.

Once again, Hasan and his knowledgeable sources leave us hanging. These sources, so “close to al-Zarqawi,” and talking to Hasan, deny us the specifics of who in fact was providing the financing. As SaudiPolitics had asserted in earlier issues, an insurgency of the Iraqi magnitude is an expensive affair. (Remember the expensive U.S.-Saudi sponsorship of the Afghani resistance to the Soviets–now Russians?) So its financing couldn’t be in the millions. It had/has to be in the hundreds of millions, at the least.


COMPETITION TO ATTRACT FIGHTERS

The second Faloujah battle caused a rift between Zarqawi and what Hasan calls the “Islamic nationalists”–what this newsletter has referred to as the “Islamic Baath”–the new and younger Baath. This rift could’ve put an end to any rapport between the two but for the alleged ferocity of U.S. troops in their occupation of the city–what “one of the city’s sons called American ‘barbarism’.”

One phenomenon that strikes the reader of Hasan’s article is the competition for fighters among the many groups of the insurgency, what Hasan’s interlocutors refer to as ijtizab–“attraction of [fighters]” It reminded me of the principle that an organization needs continued small victories to keep and expand the membership.


THE U.S. NEGOTIATES WITH THE INSURGENTS

Hasan covers the negotiations between the U.S. and the resistance which took place through third parties and directly at the Abu Ghraib prison. These negotiations, for public policy purposes, belie an American strategic weakness: The U.S. will find it difficult, if not impossible, to meet the expectation of the three main constituents of Iraqi pluralism. As much as the American negotiators wanted to buddy up to the insurgent leaders (minus al-Qaeda’s), they could not deliver on some important issues because they had to please their two other allies: the Kurds and the Shias.

According to “Iraqi observers,” U.S. intelligence and representatives of the National Security Council in 2005 had adopted the idea of conciliation with the Iraqi resisters. They had engaged in talks with them at the prisons of Abu Ghraib and Boca (sp.)–and at such places as Cairo, Amman, Moscow, the UAE, and Beirut.

But Hasan hastens to note that not much can be said about these meetings except that at each site they involved different representatives/segments of the Arab Sunnis. But here Hasan adds some insight, albeit inadvertently: In meetings in Amman, for example, tribal leaders were America’s interlocutors; in Moscow: former officials of the Hussein government. In Beirut: Islamic and Baathist leaders who lived abroad. In Cairo and Sharm al-Sheikh, Hasan speculates, those closest to the insurgency met up with the Americans. The (inadvertent) insight: Could some of these countries be paying off the various segments (according to where its contacts are most active) of the insurgency? And that should include Jordan and Egypt which could have passed U.S. money on to insurgent groups to tame and/or divide the insurgency. But the money, of course, could have been used for other reasons, including operatioins against U.S. troops. No Congressional Budget Office to audit the mandarins’ check-writing.



WHERE'S THE MONEY COMING FROM?

Hasan’s article, though informative, doesn’t really help us understand one of the crucial aspects of the insurgency: its financing. We’re left to speculate: Is Russia passing money to the old Baathists? If it is, wouldn’t one expect a less Islamic insurgency? Maybe not. Are some of Saudi Arabia’s rich passing money on? If they are, can they dispatch hundreds of millions of dollars? Are others in the Gulf doing it? There’s no question in my mind that the entire Arab world–the public, that is, which includes the rich and the poor–would give and give generously to defend Iraq against what it sees as a naked act of aggression against an Arab and Muslim country. Still, can this public, independent of its oil-rich governments, come up with hundreds of millions of dollars?

Could Iran be passing money on to a part of the insurgency? Could it be supporting Shias and Sunni takfiris at the same time? We do know one thing for certain: Iran cannot afford to have Big Brother next door, however much the two negotiate in secret or through third parties. We also know that Iran is very popular among the Arab Sunni public, standing up as it is to Israel and its sponsor, Empire. (The Arab public has conveniently forgotten that Iran actively eased the U.S. invasion of Iraq.) Accordingly, it wouldn’t be farfetched that Iran would finance an arm of that public: the Salafi part of the Iraqi insurgency. I’m speculating.


THE FUTILITY OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY

Finally, a note of caution: This newsletter doesn’t believe in anything called counter-insurgency. Though it creates jobs that pay better than those at Target or Wal Mart, it tends to displace politics and keep minds closed. The Israelis have been at it for decades, to no use. And they will be at it for the next centuries. Do we want to be in the same predicament, running an idiotic and costly war among an ocean of people who mistrust us?

Though aching with curiosity about specifics in the financing of the insurgency, the fact is that it doesn’t really matter. Whoever is financing the insurgency, probably multiple sources awash with oil money, are not the ones to blame for this deadly adventure. They are pushing their interest as one would expect they would. The blame in the end for putting us at the receiving end of this trail of hostile money falls squarely on the planners of this invasion. And on Uncle-Tommish allies. The subpar intelligence of the invasion's planners has resulted in the unnecessary loss of life and treasure. Not to mention the unleashing of a force that would not be satisfied with any of the silly Bush Administration's charm offensives. The planners' mediocrity was tremendous. (The Algerian civil war was there for them to see.) Let’s hope their successors are smart, nimble, and flexible.

Let's dream on.

WHO DID IT?

DRAFT--THIRD


WHO DID IT?

The question-du-jour:

Who is the main suspect in the recent explosion of the Shia Askariyya shrine? In other words, what party benefitted/benefits the most–-or exclusively–-from violent strife between the Shia and Arab Sunni at this particular time?

A civil war in a region such as the Middle East, where foreign powers have terrific economic interests (oil, natural gas, and cash to recycle and create jobs in their economies), is rarely one war. It’s a series of wars where alliances are forever shifting, and where more than one war is taking place at any one time.

One of the wars that has been in evidence is that between two alliances:

1. The NO alliance:

Those saying no to total U.S. domination:

Iran
Syria
Hizbullah in Lebanon
Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestine section of Israel-Palestine.

2. The YES camp:

The United States, those on the U.S. payroll, and those who benefit from marshalling Empire’s resources into projects that are advantageous to them, but which they cannot achieve alone:

Britain
Israel
Kuwait
Jordan
Egypt
Saudi Arabia (the pro-American and the pro-British wings)
The Hariri-led part of the Lebanese body-politic
The current Iraqi government.

Most active within the YES camp should be Jordan, for four reasons:

(1) It’s an Arab country which shares borders with Iraq;
(2) It has a solid relationship with the U.S. (Empire);
(3) It had established relations with many among the Sunni and Shia members of the Iraqi Baath, those who once controlled important aspects of Iraqi politics;
(4) It could not afford not to play an active role because:

a. it now needs to “clean up” (so to speak) after the mess the Bush Administration created next door; and

b. Empire is paying it handsomely to assist.

The war between the NO and YES camps has been in evidence for a good while. The bombing of he Jordanian embassy, of the U.N. Headquarters, the assassination and kidnaping of diplomats from Arab and Muslim countries that are dependencies of empire, the kidnaping of Western journalists, the car bombs in Shia neighborhoods that are not directed at the new state police or national guard, the explosions in Iran’s Ahwaz, the hotel suicide bombings in Jordan...

Many of these acts were/are part and parcel of the war between the NO alliance and the YES camp.


EVENTS PRECIPITATING THE SHRINE’S BOMBING

One or more of three events (you guess) very possibly precipitated the shrine bombing, to intensify Sunni (Arab)-Shia civil strife to the hottest level yet:

Event 1:

Dr. Rice’s visit to the Middle East.

This visit, part of the still-alive Greater Middle East project meant to secure once-and-for-all the vast reserves of petroleum and natural gas, seeks to achieve three goals:

a. Jump-start the regional confrontation/war with Iran (Absurd, really.)
b. Reverse Hamas’s electoral victory in the Palestine section of Israel/Palestine. (Mayyybe.)
c. Curtail, even eliminate, Iran and Syria’s influence in Lebanon, which mostly revolves around the idea of subduing Hizbullah. (Stalemate, if lucky; total destruction, devastation, and misery, if not.)


Event 2:

Iranian-Syrian intensified cooperation

The ongoing conference/meeting in Damascus of the Syro-Iranian Joint High Committee, co-chaired by the Syrian Prime Minister and the First Deputy to the Iranian President. This Committee is compelling evidence of a solid alliance between the two countries.


Event 3:

The initiation of a new Islamic front in Iraq

The visit to Syria and Lebanon of Muqtadha as-Sadr, coinciding with the convening of the above described Syro-Iranian conference.


IT’S IN THE DETAILS.

Amman snatched Sadr away from his Damascus visit, seemingly interrupting his trip to Beirut. The Jordanians must’ve had an important message from Empire. We don’t know what the message was; we do know that Sadr went on to Beirut (anyway?). We also know that the young Muqtadha didn’t seem to have reacted well to the message, making public statements in Amman that were assurances to Iran and Syria.

(My guess: America promised large sums of money and/or more American-financed projects for Sadr city. These promises would be meant to return Muqtadha to a neutral camp, at the very least, and to abort his visit to Beirut, Hizbullah’s redoubt. In addition, it’s unthinkable that the message did not contain a stick, a threat.)

Muqtadha must’ve turned down the offer and ignored the threat:

ooo Daringly, from Amman, the Middle Eastern capital that is the most reliable and useful for the United States, after his talks with the Jordanian Prime Minister, Sadr called on the United States to withdraw its troops from Iraq.

ooo After meeting with the Jordanian King, he declared his rejection of the U.S.-mediated Iraqi Constitution and the idea of federalism, so dear to the United-States and its Iraqi proxies.

ooo In addition, he declared his opposition to Arab troops in Iraq, another of the (desperate) ideas of the Bush administration to salvage something from its costly invasion and the shooting-of-self-in-the-foot by dismantling a “working” Arab country.

Why would the U.S. care about returning Muqtadha to a neutral camp? The answer:

Iran and Syria seem to be engaged in taking their alliance inside Iraq to new horizons: To develop an active Islamic front against the United States, made up of much of the old Baath, now mostly Islamic, the younger Islamic Baath, and the Sadrists of the Mahdi Army. (To accommodate Sadr, the alliance will have to starve the al-Qaeda types, financially and militarily.)

It’s an ambitious plan.

It’s more threatening to the American (exhausted) presence in Iraq and to President Bush’s promise of “victory” than any before it.

HAMAS v. EMPIRE: SPIN OFFS FOR A NEW INTIFADHA?

SECOND DRAFT

HAMAS v. EMPIRE: SPIN OFFS FOR A NEW INTIFADHA?

How does a group that had adopted nationalist grassroots-based unconventional warfare think? Practically speaking, how will Hamas respond to its financial suffocation by Israel and the Bush Administration? Will the Saudis break the financial siege? Will Russia? Will Iran?


THE DILEMMA

Following its electoral victory, having organized as a result of nearly four decades of Israeli occupation, Hamas has found itself in a quandary:

If it refuses to:

(1) recognize Israel’s right to exist, and
(2) renounce nationalist grassroots-based unconventional warfare,

Israel would choke it financially, as would the United States and (possibly but not fully) America’s Arab dependencies and protectorates.


HAMAS CANNOT FAIL

Hamas cannot afford to fail. It has promised a government free of corruption in a region where corruption is the norm, foremost among the leaders of empire’s dependencies and protectorates. Some world recognition of it is of little help. Money needs to flow in soon; otherwise Hamas will fail. Unless...


SOME BACKGROUND ON PLAYERS AND THEIR LEANINGS

Russia called on Hamas to send a delegation to Moscow; Turkey hosted one. The Turks gloated, leaking news that Khaled Mishaal had agreed to delay visiting Tehran. (They gloated too soon.) The Turks, concerned about their (fading) special relationship to Israel, pointed out that Mishaal in Ankara mentioned the word “peace;” he couldn’t have been referring to peace with Portugal, could he, they added.

The Arab League 's foreign ministers are expected to meet soon and activate the 2002 Arab summit commitment to send the Palestinian Authority (PA) $50 million per month. But Hamas cannot place its eggs in this one basket. The foreign ministers’ bosses--Kings, Princes, and Presidents--had in 2002 committed themselves to sending the PA $600 million per year. Of this they’ve sent $100 million.

And Mishaal is heading to Tehran, anyway. The Imperial mandarin-in-chief, Dr. Rice, had warned Tehran not to lend financial assistance to a Hamas government. Why wouldn't Tehran? It has little to lose, at this stage, as it already had opted to defy empire’s wishes. Too, It has opted to integrate away from the West. It will soon be signing a $100 billion energy agreement with China. Not to mention that it had integrated scientifically with Russia, the country which is building the Bushehr nuclear power plant. In short, Iran has chosen the air it wants to breathe, and it’s not that of the West.

That the Iranians like the West means in good part that they like to emigrate to where the business horizons are wider. Population growth in the Middle East, and in Iran, is such that the West (especially Europe) would need to create a hundred million jobs to keep the region quiet. On or about February 9, 2006, the President of the World Economic Forum, professor Klaus Schwab, warned of the coming “time bomb” of unemployment. He estimated that the Arab region will need 100 million jobs in the coming ten years.

Why should Iran heed Dr. Rice’s orders? Or cave in to the Europeans who are leaning hard on it. Iran can, can it not, live without the Europeans. These vacation-and-pension-minded tribes of Europe don’t have the troops to constitute a credible threat to the Islamic Republic. France is leaning hard on Iran; but French policy is an act. It’s motivated (as is the British) by the lure of promised Saudi defense contracts. Saudi Arabia seems to be putting together a coalition of Western countries that would balance nuclear Iran. But that really should have little practical impact on the balance of power in the region. In addition, sanctions (without the commitment of millions of troops for decades to come) should have little effect on the Islamic Republic. Iran is integrating fast (economically and scientifically) into another world, that of China and Russia.


WHAT WILL SAUDI ARABIA DO?

Saudi Arabia had made supportive statements of the democratic process that landed Hamas in government, and had lent the PA a financial hand before the elections. But will the Kingdom provide financial assistance to a Hamas government? Would the Kingdom heed Dr. Rice’s instructions to it not to assist a Hamas rule? The fact that France had sided with the Kingdom and recognized Hamas’s win says that the Kingdom is thinking seriously about disobeying empire and lending a financial hand (probably through the Arab League)to a Hamas-led government. Why would Saudi Arabia ignore empire’s instructions?

A priori, Let us not forget that Hamas is one and the same as the Muslim Brothers. And no un-dismantled-yet-by-empire Arab government likes the Brothers. But a lesson had been learned from the Iraq invasion: That empire can be mediocre in its policies and therefore satellites, protectorates, and dependencies should not always heed its orders. Especially not when a protectorate such as the Kingdom is swimming in oil income, oil capacity and supply to the world economy are at their limits, and the Bush Administration is becoming increasingly insignificant after its abject failure in Iraq.

More importantly: Suppose fighting erupts in Israel-Palestine, and Arab children die in Israeli bombings. These deaths would be shown on al-Jazeerah, and could awaken the Saudi public from its material wealth-induced-coma. Couldn’t it? And if the Saudi public does awaken from its wealth-induced stupor, could its government afford to ignore its outrage and not lend financial support to the Palestinian government--Hamas-led? I doubt it could.



WHAT ARE HAMAS’S STRATEGISTS THINKING?

If Hamas recognizes Israel’s right to exist and gives up its weapons, what’s to assure it that Israel would withdraw to pre-1967 borders? Hamas sees its win as a historic opportunity to lead, something which may not happen again for a good while. After all, the cargo-getter among the Palestinians is not Hamas. It is Fateh. And Hamas knows it. The next time around, Hamas fears, empire and its Israeli dependency would make sure that cargo flowed generously to the Palestinian public before an election.

Hamas has expressed its willingness to commit to a long-term truce to assuage Israel’s concerns. But that’s not enough for the US and Israel. Both are afraid a Hamas government would in fact succeed and be corruption-free, all while not having laid down its arms.

The problem is compounded by the fact that Dr. Rice is visiting the Gulf to officiate confrontation with Iran. (Absurd, really.) And Hamas has a close rapport with the Islamic Republic. Should Hamas read into Rice’s visit a definite dead end for its attempts to obtain recognition (and money)from empire and its satellites?


Here’s a likely course that Hamas could take:

1. Hamas will not declare its acceptance of Israel’s right to exist. That’s too precious a card to play. Not now, not until Israel proves serious about pulling out of all post-1967 territory, pays for any water it is taking, and settles the issue of the refugees.


2. Hamas will spin off a number of rejectionist resistance groups. These will wait for orders. Should Israel not release Palestinian funds, and should a Hamas government face failure, these unofficial franchises will start and intensify nationalist grassroots-based unconventional warfare in tandem with progress (or lack of) on the issue of financial aid to the PA.

These rejectionist groups would have to be spinned off fast before the Palestinian public loses confidence in Hamas.

A Hamas-less Intifadha, led by groups that trace their origin to (and are secretly financed by) Hamas should be a hedge against political failure.

In other words, if the financial situation is one where money is flowing but at such a slow rate that the Palestinian public will see in it a Hamas failure, the spin-off groups (and not Fateh) would restart military operations and would absorb that public’s frustration.

The spin-off groups would be a progeny of Hamas, through and through. Fateh would become even more irrelevant.

3. Hamas should receive some money from Iran and Russia, perhaps channeled through Syria. Why would Russia channel money to Hamas?

Direct intervention in Iraq and its failure have resulted in disarray in the Bush Administration. The administration is putting on a best face; but it is confused. The fact that its operatives would ask for and attend a lecture by an expert on revolutions (to understand Iran) is eminent proof that these men and women don’t know what to do. They had placed their trust in the simplistic and mediocre world view of right-wing Israel-centric entrepreneurs who are closest to them ideologically. But that perspective, in its mediocrity, proved deadly.

(They would like to take the blame for failure off of themselves and place it squarely on their Israel-centric entrepreneurs. Which would be unfair, of course, since they are as imperial and mediocre as their Israel-centric-entrepreneurs. Fortunately, they don’t dare.)

The best the Bush people can do (in their minds) is to calibrate better their world view, adding some intricacy to it, but not much. Accordingly, the Bush Administration has launched a policy of tolerance towards the Islamists in the Middle East. It hopes that this acceptance, coupled with pressure and money (carrot and stick), will cause them to moderate.

Russia read what the Bush administration was up to. It launched in response its own charm offensive towards the Islamists. It couldn’t sit idle while the United States reared the new rulers of the Arab and Islamic worlds. (The Bush Administrtion will not succeed, of course; but Russia can't afford paralysis, not after it lost its Iraq contracts.) Hence Russia's invitation to Hamas to send a delegation to Moscow and the possibility that it would channel money to the Hamas-led government.


FICTION...FICTION... AND MORE FICTION.

The United States and Israel can, of course, use fiction as a face-saving way out: Allow Mahmoud Abbas’ Fateh to participate in the Hamas government; insist on control of some of the key ministries; develop a blueprint for the absorption of Hamas and the other Islamists into a Palestinian army.

And, of course, make promises about a Palestinian state, ones which will be forgotten. Until a new intifadha flares up, waged by another (larger) Palestinian generation, one that will enter the world of politics...stateless.

Plus ca change...

FRANCE'S FORCE DE FRAPPE IN SAUDI ARABIA ?

Second Draft.

WILL FRANCE PROVIDE SAUDI ARABIA NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AGAINST IRAN?

AND

WILL FRANCE SOON BE CELEBRATING THE RISE OF A PRO-FRENCH WING WITHIN THE FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA?


BACKGROUND


Articles in SaudiPolitics (the latest: “Micro Strategies and the Security of Saudi Arabia” --Tuesday, February 7, 2006) have discussed the floating of the idea of a gargantuan defense contract between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Britain. The contract would cost $70 billion.

SaudiPolitics has speculated that the $70 billion contract will include the United States as the major beneficiary. It would go through British defense contractors to avoid a public outcry in the Kingdom. The United States, after all, is probably one of the least popular countries there, especially after it had dismantled an Arab country. Britain is more acceptable (maybe–there are really not that many choices) since its role in Iraq has been quite limited–though this is far from being a sure thing. Many months earlier, on or about July 27, 2005, on his way to Singapore, in answer to a reporter's question, Tony Blair referred to the Kingdom’s government as “regime.” Perhaps he was angry about the infiltration into Iraq of Saudi Sunnis rushing to assist their brethren against the imperial armies.

He in effect was blackmailing the Kingdom. Was that before oil prices soared and he, once again, needed the Kingdom’s money? It looks like it.

Actual contracts: one with Britain for $10 billion and one with the United States for $2 billion.

France was not mentioned, neither in the $70 billion floated idea nor in the actual two contracts.

President Jacques Chirac recently has sent two letters, separate, to Saudi King Abdullah. These were hand-delivered on or about February 11, 2006. In addition, the French President will visit Saudi Arabia in March.

What will his visit be about?



FIRST SCENARIO:

FRANCE IS SEEKING KING ABDULLAH’S INTERVENTION TO INCLUDE IT IN ON THE $70 BILLION DEFENSE CONTRACT

President Chirac will ask the Saudi King to factor France into the arms contracts with the Kingdom. France opposed the invasion of Iraq, he would tell him. But in no way had it intended to stand in opposition to the Kingdom which had eased that invasion. Maybe, in retrospect, France was right, since the invasion has hardly made any country in the region more secure.

We do know one thing: Soaring oil prices after the invasion of Iraq made the Kingdom safer–not U.S. troops. In the long run, unless Iran or al-Qaeda make a big terror splash that would so mobilize the U.S. public as to dispatch more troops, Iran is on the winning streak, not the U.S. and not Britain. If anything, the Iraqi invasion made smaller Gulf countries with large Shia minorities less safe, since the Iraqi Arab Shias, now powerful and in control of Iraqi state institutions, could lend a voice (and a hand) to their Arab brethren within Gulf countries. It’s a matter of time.

France’s long-term problem has been that the Saudi foreign policy establishment probably has lacked a pro-French wing. We know that this establishment has a huge pro-American wing (See SPC’s earlier article, “Side-Stepping King Abdullah,”) and probably a decent-size pro-British. (The “wings”’ stand to make a lot of money on defense contracts in kickbacks--hidden contingency fees.) The U.S. and Britain, along with their “wings” within the Saudi foreign policy establishment, would not want to share the bounty with any other country, including France.

And that could explain France’s recent tilt towards Hamas, siding with Saudi Arabia (the non-American and non-British wings) and Russia. France is now possibly regretting the trust it had placed in the U.S. and Britain: That, if it sided with them all the way, they would give it a slice of the Saudi defense contracts. They’re haven’t.

France probably made the mistake earlier (and deeper) when it quit its role as the Western “bridge-to-the-Third World,” including the Arab, by siding all the way with the alliance of the United States and Britain. Even the U.S. should appreciate the role of France as a bridge to the Arab public. But the Bush people’s world view (“Either you’re with us or against us”) hardly gives them the ability to act intricately. And there’s a price to pay for a non-intricate world view. For instance, when France quit its historic role as bridge via-a-vis the Arab public, it opened the door wide for Russia to replace it. And China shouldn’t be far behind.

In short, the U.S.-U.K. alliance is on a losing course in Iraq, though winning defense contracts in Saudi Arabia. France wants a share of these contracts. It had weakened its position to obtain these contracts when it quit its role as bridge. No longer. Hence its corrective tilt in favor of world acceptance of Hamas. In effect, France is reverting to its traditional role, having discovered that the U.S. and Britain will not give it a share of Saudi defense contracts. President Chirac hopes King Abdullah will force France into the ranks of Saudi defense contract grabbers.

Would Saudi Arabia ignore France? Of course not. For one, Saudi Arabia probably has asked France to once again step on its pro-Arab foot more actively–to regain its role as a Western bridge to the Arab public, and should compensate it (and its Saudi-Lebanese--Hariri--wing) with a share of its defense contracts. Why? There’s a dire need for a European country to balance the truly awesome popularity the Islamic Republic. The hope would be that an “Arab France” would sway this public in a reasonable direction. (Arab governments have very limited sway over their own public–the Arab street--while Islamic Iran knows how to push each and every buttom to keep the Arab Street in awe of it.) . (See the earlier article “The Arab Street Marches Forward.”) The Kingdom should benefit from an “Arab France,” as should the United States and Britain


SECOND (AND COMPLEMENTARY?) SCENARIO:

PRESIDENT CHIRAC WILL INAUGURATE A HARIRI-FRENCH WING WITHIN THE SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT.


WILL THE KINGDOM HAVE A FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE DE FRAPPE ON ITS SOIL OR IN ITS WATERS?

In fact, France may already have changed course in coordination with the Kingdom.

It has tilted towards Hamas, as had the Kingdom; it has threatened to retaliate against Islamic Iran using nuclear weapons, a reflection of its willingness to join the contain-Iran choir, not an unpleasant occurrence to the Kingdom. (See earlier SPC article : “Iran to Saud al-Faisal: We Hear You Loud and Clear.”) And, possibly, it could have agreed to base nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the Kingdom, under French control, to provide it with a force de frappe to deter a nuclear Iran.

Earlier, France had drawn an association with the late Rafiq Hariri (and now with his son Saad.) The Hariris are Lebanon's Saudi connection, par excellence. (Prince Waleed bin Talal is the other. Equally par excellence. Sorry Prince Waleed; don't mean to place you second.) The French and the murdered Prime Minister worked together to force Syria out of Lebanon. Syria got out; not really; yes it did; no, it didn't. It doesn't matter, does it? By using the Lebanon connection, France found in the Hariris a key into the decision-making circles of Saudi Arabia. And who said Lebanon would not pay off for France?

France would thus have used its Hariri/Lebanon connection very skillfully to evolve a French wing within the Saudi foreign policy establishment, and break into the Saudi market for defense contracts.

President Chirac’s visit should (un-officially) inaugurate the launch of this wing. Expect a sizeable Saudi-French contract.

TO JILL CARROLL’S KIDNAPPERS: SHE’S YOUR AND OUR SISTER

TO JILL CARROLL’S KIDNAPPERS: SHE’S YOUR AND OUR SISTER

Here’s a snapshot of the people who read Jill Carroll’s reporting in The Christian Science Monitor (CSM):

When National Coordinator of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, we placed advertisements in various national newspapers, including Ms. Carroll’s paper.

We were pleasantly surprised to receive a good number of gratifying responses. These came almost exclusively from the readers of Jill Carroll’s newspaper. And many of them became paid members. They had concern for all, for Arabs and Muslims, for anyone in need. They hated no one.

And in no way would they ever have lent any support to the invasion of a country that meant us no harm or the annexation of Arab land for nearly four decades.

Jill’s employer, and other American publications, such as The Nation and Mother Jones, are principled outlets which never approved (and would have never) of the starving of Iraqi children and the destruction of an Arab or Muslim country, or any country.

I beseech you to be equally principled, at the very least.

Tony Khater
Publisher and Editor
Former National Coordinator of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee

MICRO-STRATEGIES AND THE SECURITY OF SAUDI ARABIA.

d r a f t

“I certainly don’t want my son to conquer Persia.”
Hyacinth Bucket (“Pronounced ‘Bouquet,’ dear.”)

MICRO-STRATEGIES:
IRAN, BRITAIN, AND THE SECURITY OF SAUDI ARABIA.

DOUBLE AGENTS NO MORE?

Various Iranian personalities and media outlets have held the United Kingdom responsible for the terror bombings in Iran’s Ahwaz province (on or around October 17, 2005, and on or about January 6, 2006.)

What do these terror bombings tell us about developments in Iraq?

The Iranians are pointing to southern Iraq as the location where British-trained Iranian expatriates have settled and from where they are running anti-Iranian terror campaigns. In addition, the Iranians are pointing the finger at the British embassy in Kuwait as the operational center for the Ahwaz bombings (Jumhuri Islami, on or about January 29, 2006) .

Iran’s agents (SCIRI, Bader Brigade, Dawa) control southern Iraq. These are the main constituents of the American puppet government. That said, it looks as if Iran’s agents are allowing Britain to use their territory to sponsor operations against their first master.

Which means that the United States and, by extension, Britain, have fully bought out Iran’s former agents. A success story, of sorts.

This American “success” (I don’t want you to hold your breath) might explain the recent visit by Muqtadha as-Sadr to Iran, his pro-Iran pronouncements, the Mahdi Army’s chronic clashes with Bader, Muqtadha’s pronouncements against federalism, and last but not least, his visit to Damascus. (Muqtadha is heir to the “vocal hawzah,” a religiophilosophical organization that competes with the “silent hawzah,” Sistani’s organization which provides guidance to SCIRI, its Bader Brigades, and Dawa.)

The Ahwaz terror bombings tell us that Iran’s former agents have turned their back on their benefactor. They’re not working against it. They can’t afford to. As organizations, they were born and reared in Iran and Iranian agents are aplenty within their ranks. More likely, they’re no longer actively representing its interests. That has forced Iran to side with these agents’ rival: Muqtadha.

It behooves all–-especially U.S. troops in Iraq--to know that Muqtadha and his Sadrists do best in competing with the “silent hawzah” when they do the following:

1. Confront the occupiers; and
2. Build on Iraqi nationalism, calling for the Shias to reject the idea of federalism.


SHOULD IRAN WORRY?

Should Iran worry that Muqtadha would draw closer to the old Baath? Or to the new generation of Islamic Baathists? If he does, wouldn’t that re-build the Iraqi state in an Arab nationalist-Islamic form, not in an Iran-inspired Islamic one?

It’s probably too early for Iran to worry. The Arab Sunni Islamists haven’t yet reached a point where they would evolve an ideology that would unite them with the Sadrists. Both parties should draw together, sooner or later. Kurdish secessionism, and what the Iraqis perceive as Kuwait’s complicity against their country, should draw them closer. But it’s too early for Iran to worry about an historic alliance of the two. For now, Iran should be expected to encourage–even sponsor– any united front against the United States in Iraq. Hence Muqtadha’s visit to Syria. There, he should be (probably) meeting with Iraqi Baathists. The beginning of a new front? One that has sputtered in the past?

Too, Iran through this visit aims to draw closer to the Arab Sunnis and offset America’s tilt towards that group. (See earlier article: "The Arab Street Moves Forward"). By so doing, Iran would hope to use the promise of a united and centrally-run Iraq against the United States which aims to keep it divided into cantons, and possessing an insignificant army. There’s the distinct possibility that Iran and Syria are trying to draw the closest relationship possible among their allies within Iraq. If they're able to pull it, the Sadrists, joined to the Baathists, should make for a formidable force–ideologically (they stand for a united Iraq with a strong central government and a regional mission) and militarily (they would be supplied with weapons from two frontiers.)

To our troops sent there: Be mindful that close alliances such as these require tests in the field. They demand agreements between both parties on operations where one can prove to the other that it is not "cheating," --that their dedication to the alliance is unquestionable.

(You want to know why the Syrians are behaving this way? It’s called: the Joulan. Repeat after me: G O L A N . The entire Lebanese civil war and the theft of the national purse by the current Lebanese leaders and their once Syrian masters could’ve been avoided had Syria regained these damned heights.)


WHAT ABOUT THE ARAB SUNNIS?

They should be relatively quiet, for three reasons:

First, and least important, they are on the defensive, engaged in a war with the U.S.-trained and armed men of the Bader Brigades and, to a lesser extent, Barazani’s and Talabani’s Kurdish militias–all donning government uniforms. These Bader men have formed death squads within the Ministry of the Interior, probably a part of the American obsession with “counter-insurgency.” But these death squads are not without political benefits to the Arab Sunnis: They should delay the onset of divisions within their ranks. (They're so beneficial that, had they not been in existence, the Arab Sunnis would’ve had to invent them.)

The Saudi-owned Al-Hayat has been running a public relations propaganda campaign alleging that the Sunni tribes and clans in the Anbar are rounding up the Islamists. To speculate, this is meant in part for the American public’s consumption, part of the Bush Administration’s effort (through the pro-American wing of the Saudi foreign policy establishment) to persuade the U.S. public that “victory” is near. These articles in Al-Hayat strike me as nothing more than an effort by this pro-American wing to magnify a minor phenomenon and plant these stories in the Arab press in the hope that they would filter through into the American press. (They have.)

True, the Arab Sunnis are understandably fuming at Al-Qaeda’s bombing of Arab Sunni recruits. But I would think that it’s too early for them to turn on the Al-Qaeda people, not when Bader is executing their chidren, and not when the Al-Qaeda is able to send suicide bombers to funeral services attended by Bader leaders. If they are in fact turning on al-Qaeda, it's because the Iraqi leadership of the resistance has deemed it politically inexpedient at this stage to continue on with an active insurgency--and not because of bombings of Arab Sunni police and army recruits.

Second, and more importantly, the Arab Sunnis are waiting for what they see as a time coming for an intra-Shia civil war. This war should pit the Sadrists in one camp against the Bader Brigades and Dawa in the other--the vocal hawzah against the silent hawzah. Yet another reason to tone down the insurgency and perhaps rein in the al-Qaeda people, to let the Shia groups go at it, so to speak.

Related to the second reason is the third: To reduce the intensity of Arab Sunni military operations against U.S. troops so as to expose Iran. In other words, Iran is the foreign party which has the most interest in keeping the U.S. off-balance in Iraq--to use Iraq, for instance, as a pressure point in its effort to complete the development of its nuclear program. The Arab Sunni thinking: Now that the Arab Sunnis have proven themselves as a highly effective fighting force, let the Iranians and their agents bear some of the burden. Expose them. Let them unleash their agents against the Americans. And, by so doing, let the Arab Sunnis obtain concessions both from Iran (through Syria and especially through Muqtadha) and from the United States (through cash-rich Saudi Arabia and cash-rich (from the U.S.)Jordan.)

In other words, if the Arab Sunni insurgency quiets down, who would get the United States out of Iraq? What party would cause casualties within the ranks of U.S. troops and raise the war bill on the American taxpayer to motivate the United States to withdraw? It will have to be the Shias. But what Shias? If in fact the U.S. has bought out fully Iran's former agents, then there's only Muqtadha left. But Muqtadha strikes me as an Arab nationalist, a shia Arab nationalist but an Arab nationalist nonetheless. He could easily be co-opted by the United States, as would the Baathists. What stops him from doing that is one thing and one thing only: His competition with the people of the silent Hawzah. In this competition, he could become an Arab hero, extending his leadership from the couple of million Iraqis he represents to the couple of hundreds of millions of Arabs. (That was what lured Kamal Jumblatt in Lebanon in the 1970s.) If the Sadrists do become Arab heroes, they will sweep through most of the Shias in the south.

The Iraqi leaders of the insurgency might want to tone down the Arab Sunni resistance to force Iran to motivate its former agents--or lose out in its secret war with the United States, and have Empire next door, waiting for the right moment. For now, A lot depends on what happens in Damascus: If the leaders of the Arab Sunni insurgency (the natives--not al-Qaeda) hear the right words from Muqtadha, then the insurgency might flare up again, stronger than ever. Muqtadha would have to promise, for example, a Sadrist commitment for equal representation for Shias and Sunnis in the new state; staunch opposition to federalism; commitment to the Palestinians and an unceasing effort for the return of the Joulan. He will also have to get paid, both by Russia (probably) and by Iran (probably). (He needs to meet a payroll; they all do.)

Still, the Sunnis might stand to gain more by not agreeing with Muqtadha, and wait for an intra-Shia war. On the other hand, Muqtadha might draw closer to Bader and Dawa should the Arab Sunnis in Damascus prove difficult. Again, should an agreement be reached, it'll have to be tested. And the "rounding up" of al-Qaeda, for now, might be the Arab Sunnis's pre-payment to Muqtadha for joining hands.

AND WHAT’S GOING ON WITH THE SAUDIS?

King Abdullah has just completed an Asia tour. I haven’t had the time to keep up with the tour or review the results. ( I have reams of articles waiting to be read.) But it’s safe to see the trip as part of a (smart) Saudi policy to diversify the foreign sources of security for the Kingdom. China for one carries a lot of weight with Iran. Granting China contracts in the Kingdom and assuring it of oil supplies are ways to gain leverage against Iran. The Saudi hope is to discourage Iran (through China) from carrying out operations against (and inside) the Kingdom. Or to stoke the flames of Shia nationalism in the Kingdom’s Eastern Province.

As for India and Pakistan: They possess a nuclear arsenal. The Kingdom wouldn’t mind having access to this arsenal should Iran develop nuclear weapons.

What is surprising is that, as of this writing, there has been (to SaudiPoltics.com’s knowledge) only one solid announcement of an arms deal between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. That announcement took place in late September-early October 2005, and was for a modest $2 billion. This is highly unusual. Multi-billion dollar arms deals are the Gulf countries’ way of paying off the United States for protection. Two billion dollars, in contrast, are pittance.

There has been one arms deal with the U.K for around $10 billion. There also has been talk of a huge deal with the U.K. for about $70 billion. It could be that, for Saudi domestic reasons (the "crusher" of Arab Sunnis in Iraq and Israel/Palestine, who dismantled an Arab state, is not appreciated in the Kingdom,) the United States is a behind-the-scene beneficiary of the yet-to-be signed $70 billion deal. After all, the United Kingdom doesn’t have the global reach or the troops to protect the Kingdom, and can hardly be expected to draw such a huge benefit in exchange for little. The talk of a $70 billion deal therefore is possibly an early floating of an idea and conceals the United States as beneficiary of a gargantuan arms deal, to assess Saudi domestic reaction.

The $70 billion deal, for now, is talk. What we have are a $10 billion deal with the U.K. and a meager $2 billion with the U.S. Even if the U.S. gets a share of the $10-billion deal, this share would still be far below the historic levels Saudi Arabia has paid for imperial protection. For now, there exists therefore the distinct possibility that the relative meagerness of the money being paid to the United States is a reflection of the Saudi policy to diversify its sources of security and not limit itself to the one country.

To diversify, Saudi Arabia seems to have kept a pro-American wing within its foreign policy establishment. . (See the earlier article, “Side-Stepping King Abdullah”.) But it probably now has added, or is adding, other wings–-a pro-Chinese , a pro- Indian. Why?

The post-September 11 backlash brought to the Pentagon right-wing Israel-centric entrepreneurs who the Bush Administration unleashed against the Kingdom and the Arab world. These right-wing entrepreneurs had an idea: Why not use the same Iraqi scheme against Saudi Arabia? In other words: Why not bank on the Shias? Why not build bridges to the Shias in the Eastern Province of the Kingdom and help (or threaten to) evolve a secessionist movement among them to form their own oil-rich state and, accordingly, weaken Arab Sunnis all over, especially in Israel-Palestine? These entrepreneurs, though out of the Pentagon, are still influential. Two of their members occupy powerful posts: That of Vice-President and that of Secretary of Defense. To the Saudis, the U.S. plan to favor the Shias is therefore only dormant. It can be re-floated any time the kingdom displeases Empire.

We now have witnessed how the favor-the-Shias scheme has backfired–-in Iraq, and not in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom was lucky: It so happened that soon after the American invasion of helpless Iraq, oil prices began to soar and the new affluence helped the Saudi government co-opt nearly all dissent. (I don’t mean to be harsh. Money is such a softer tool to co-opt the opposition than repressive alternatives. Isn't politics defined as who gets what... To their credit, the Saudis have allowed back into the country opposition figures and have released others from jail.)

In any way, the swiftness and effectiveness of the Arab Sunni resistance in Iraq surprised all, including President Bush and Vice President Cheney. The rest is history.

That very Iraqi resistance, and the flow into the Kingdom of an amazing amounts of oil income, have given the Saudis a new lease on life. But, had the Arab Sunnis in Iraq been defeated, the Saudis and other Arabs would have had to look at a life under the boot of right-wing Israel-centric entrepreneurs, to be herded about. In short, the Arab Sunni insurgency has saved the Saudis and the Arabs from that bleakest of fates.

Their new thinking: Never again. For one, the new King, Abdullah, has never been known to turn his back on his Arab origins. Accordingly, gaining a modicum of independence for the Kingdom (from the United States) in foreign policy should come natural to a person who is true to his identity. To gain that modicum of independence, the Kingdom is now diversifying its foreign sources of security.

But nothing is set in concrete. Here’s a wild idea: Should the Federal Reserve increase interest rates to a level that would allow for a recession, the American consumer would cease financing China’s industry. (A recession might occur, anyway, now that the American consumer has exhausted the pool of Mortgage Equity Withdrawals, which was the foundation of the last spending spree.) With the American consumer dampening her demand, China's industry (and need for oil) should cool down. As a result, China would need to use its huge dollar reserves to finance in part welfare payments to the new-unemployed to dodge domestic turmoil. Ditto for India. Oil demand should drop. And alliances would have to be re-drawn.

ARAB AND MUSLIM TROOPS TO IRAQ

DRAFT DRAFT


ARAB AND MUSLIM TROOPS TO IRAQ
OR
OF SHEEP DOGS AND WOLVES

Facing a dearth of U.S. troops, a bottomless pit-like-drain on the federal budget, and a populist rejection of occupation among the Iraqis, the Bush Administration has given a fair amount of deliberation to dispatching Arab and Muslim troops to Iraq.

While the Sunni Arabs are becoming a tad more open towards the United States, the young and populist Muqtadha as-Sadr is taking on the baton of armed resistance. His meteoric rise has correlated with the increasing irrelevance of Ayatollah Sistani and his “silent Hawza,” and with the diminishing relevance of Iran’s agents (SCIRI, Bader Brigade, Dawa), re-minted as America’s.

Muqtadha’s opposition to federalism–to Shia autonomy in the south and Kurdish in the north--and to the occupiers (who support federalism) has (and should) assure him and his followers an increasingly larger role in re-building a united and Arab Iraq.


ARAB/MUSLIM TROOPS: WHAT ARE THEY GOOD FOR?

Facing these bleak prospects, the Bush Administration has been studying the idea of dispatching Arab and Muslim troops to Iraq. The hope is:

–That these troops would form a buffer between the insurgents and American troops.

–That the Gulf states (especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) would finance the U.S. war in Iraq. One logical alternative–to impose a tax on oil consumption which would finance the war and reduce the transfer of wealth from the U.S. to the oil countries–is an unthinkable option for the Bush Administration.

–That the Arab and Muslim troops would take on the insurgency in the cities, allowing U.S. troops to re-locate to fortified garrisons in the countryside.


CAN (MUSLIM) TURKEY COME TO THE RESCUE?

Starting late last year and into early January of this year, U.S. officials paid numerous visits to Muslim Turkey. The Bush Administration was looking for help.

But the Turks have their limitations: In no way would they want to upset cash-and-oil-rich Russia; and Iran can teach them a lesson or two about dependence on Iranian natural gas. Consider how, in mid-to-late December of last year, in ice-cold weather, a “technical glitch” caused the flow of 24 million cubic meters of Iranian natural gas into Turkey to diminish to around 4 million. Lesson learned?

Turkey faces another difficulty in intervening on behalf of the U.S. in Iraq: The Kurds. The deposed President of Iraq had played a vital role in controlling Kurdish nationalism. No more. And Turkey shouldn’t be expected to do anything that would ease the way for that nationalism to spill into Turkey’s Kurdish population. For instance, moving against the Arab Sunni insurgency would strengthen the Kurds, not weaken them.

Still, if Arab and Muslim troops are assembled for Iraq, it wouldn’t surprise SPC if the Turks join in. Why? Contracts, for one; for another: Closer monitoring of the Kurds. And it would make for interesting times to see skirmishes between Turks and Kurds in Iraq turn into outright war.


IF NOT TURKISH TROOPS...

If Turkey proves unwilling, and limits its cooperation with Empire...which it has:

Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, Deputy-Director of Operation for the U.S. Army in Iraq is said to have told Arab reporters in London recently that the proposal for dispatching Arab and Muslim troops to Iraq is actively under consideration.

We should expect stiff opposition from Muqtadha as-Sadr to these troops; we should also expect mixed feelings by the Arab Sunni resistance, but mostly opposition. And the puppet state that the U.S. has built of Iran’s agents and the Kurds would be paid handsomely to support the idea, but would nonetheless feel extreme unease about it. After all, most of these imported troops would be Sunni, and America’s agents are mostly Shia, or non-Arab Kurds.

Obvious obstacles notwithstanding, will this idea work?


OF SHEEP, SHEEP DOGS, AND WOLVES

My grandfather, the late Ibrahim Khater, had been a shepherd before he became a grower of fruit trees. He used to recount stories about sheep dogs and wolves, and remind me and himself that he couldn’t protect his sheep from wolves without the help of his sheep dogs. Here’s what I remember: For effective protection, Ibrahim made sure that he always had with him a male dog and a female dog. If he didn’t, a female wolf would lure the male away from the herd giving the other members of the wolf pack an easier meal.

The story of sheep dogs and wolves should shed light on what will happen should Muslim and Arab troops converge on Iraq. Insurgent women will infiltrate these Muslim troops. Their movements and those of the Americans will be revealed to the insurgents. You can expect Muslim soldiers to go AWOL and marry into the insurgency and join it. Their fighting effectiveness would be unquestionable as they would have a communication bridge to their former colleagues. If the insurgents can protect Arab fighters, they can certainly protect Egyptian, Pakistani, and Indonesian deserters.

Worse: The Muslim troops don’t have an incentive to protect American troops. Why should they? They listen to the word on the street and know that the U.S. has dismantled an Arab country with brute force, a defenseless country, one that didn’t really hurt the United States. That, in effect, the United States and Europe hate Muslims and want them defeated. True or not, that is what is shared on the streets of the Arab and Muslim World. And the soldiers come from that background. Read the political map. Do you have any doubt that Hamas’s electoral win in Israel-Palestine is in good part related to the American dismantling of a Arab Sunni-led state? Do you really think that the majority of Saudis–including many in non-decision-making posts–are not bitter at the American dismantling of that state? (The Saudi decision-makers had eased the invasion under the Pentagon promise to break up the Kingdom.) The majority of Syrians? Of Jordanians? Of Egyptians? That, had it not been for the Arab Sunni insurgency, American Israel-centric entrepreneurs would be herding these Arab and Muslim Uncle Toms about,like sheep?



WHAT TO DO:

SPC’s advice:

1. Start thinking about dispatching a fighting corps of U.N. troops, with international legitimacy and support. Reach an agreement with the permanent members of the Security Council on the make-up of those troops and their agenda. Re-include Russia into contracts in Iraq.

2. Tax domestic oil consumption so that any administration would have the money to finance these troops, lest the oil countries rebel against financing their mission.

(One way or another we are paying this tax; we either pay it to the oil-producing countries or to the federal government. Pick and chose. Saudi King Abdullah has completed a tour of Asian countries, in part to diversify the sources of security for his Kingdom. And both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, I suspect, are falsifying the extent of their income. Their goal: Lower U.S. expectations of huge rebates in the form of financing the Bush Administration’s mediocre foreign policies.).

3. Defuse the Syrian-Israeli tension, return the Golan, pay for its water, support a Palestinian state on all pre-1967 Arab lands, leaving not one iota of territory or water that would justify populist mobilization, and gather up all the unemployed into a national army a la Lebanon–where you know where they are, at all times.

4. Ask France to re-step on its pro-Arab foot, so you will have at least one European country that can compete with the Islamic Republic, while reining in American politicians who might seek a popular backlash against French products. If not France, then Spain.

5. And, of course, strengthen the United Nations. It’s not any more corrupt than Mr. Jack Abramoff’s U.S. Congress.