EXPOSING SAUDI ARABIA: JOHN BRADLEY INSIDE THE KINGDOM
Third Draft
(Coming Up: More Chance Encounters!)
CAUTIONARY NOTE:
The idea of dismantling yet another Arab country, Saudi Arabia, should nauseate all Arabs and Arab-Americans. After "googling" John Bradley, I discovered that he had accepted an invitation by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Which (possibly) puts his focus on the Hijaz and the Asir into perspective.
His focus on the Hijaz and the Asir as places that are different from the Najd, while culturally cute and liberating, could be used by the centric ideologues to marshal the West into dismantling yet another Arab country. Madhawi al-Rasheed, while well-meaning, had an article in Al-Quds al-Arabi (online) on May 1, 2006, in which she discussed secession as if it were an unavoidable though slow-moving reality.
This newsletter cordially would like to remind Madhawi al-Rasheed and Al-Quds al-Arabi (and this newsletter itself which has fallen for this act) that the very idea of highlighting the differences between Najd and other provinces plays into the hands of the Israel-centric entrepreneurs. True, the Saudi government colluded against a defenseless Arab country in an imperial grab of that country's oil fields by invading imperial forces. But it did it under the threat of its dismantling by Empire.
Hijazis, Asiris, Arabs of the Eastern Province, Madhawi al-Rasheed, and the Al-Quds al-Arabi--all should be aware that this is not a time for division. What may have looked like an idea that had been defeated by the insurgents in Iraq--the idea of dismantling Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries--is not yet dead. Centric entrepreneurs seem to have mobilized full force to keep it alive.
And it could be revived, couldn't it, when Empire decides to re-introduce forces into the Kingdom to confront Iran or, more likely, when it asks the Saudi government to pay for the confrontation by couching the payments into arms contracts with Britain, for example.
I beseech you not to play into their hands, especially Al-Quds Al-Arabi, which I respect and read religiously, as my brother 3Abdel-Bari 3Atwan and I think more-or-less alike. (I think he copies me, though I'm Maronite! My strongest protestation to brother Abdel-Bari is his reference to bin Laden as "Sheikh." In my book, he's a mass murderer. Sheikhs don't murder civilians.) Possibly, I've been had, unwittingly writing the review below. Thankfully, The last part of this review highlights the antidote to potential divisions within the Kingdom. Please read and re-read that part of the review.
I fell for the romantic travel-like account by John Bradley and wrote the review below before I had "googled" him. I'm keeping the review, intact. But, had I "googled" him earlier and discovered that he had accepted an invitation by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, I would've ignored the book
altogether.
He may have been well-meaning. Probably was. But Arabs and Arab Americans can ill-afford to see another Arab country dismantled. By the end of this Iraq fiasco, Arabs and Americans will have to gather the pieces and provide care for the orphans here and in Iraq who saw their fathers killed for dangerous ideas by hateful, greed-driven, and mediocre men and women.
Saudi Arabia would do well to activate its diplomacy to bring the United Nations into Iraq. It'd be doing a service for the majority of Americans who don't want our people to be there. I'm being naive since I should know better.
Enough said.
The Editor
Book review: John Bradley, SAUDI ARABIA EXPOSED, Inside the Kingdom in Crisis (New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2005.)
IN A WORD: A MUST READ.
ALONENESS: A DESERT ECHO?
There’s quite a lot of aloneness in John Bradley’s book. Never mind the title; never mind the words “exposed” and “crisis.” This is a book by (and about) an open-minded Westerner who worked in a foreign country, a trained reporter, who speaks that country’s language, and who observes. He is the stranger. There’s an echo to his thoughts, as if he needed badly to converse, but all he had around him were the subjects of his foray. He couldn’t seek in them the intellectual company he so badly needed; it would’ve been unfair. Many of them were his informants, anthropologically speaking, and he couldn’t ask them to go beyond that role. They would never have understood , anyway.
As Mr. Bradley discovered the Saudis, he seemed to go deeper into his aloneness, and converse with his own soul. Hence the echo. Hence the beauty of the book.
As I read it, I felt as if I was re-reading William Langewiesche, Sahara Unveiled, a book I delved into more than once. Not to mention that, since the first chapters in Bradley’s book read more like travel literature, I couldn’t avoid thinking of Wilfred Thesiger’s Arabian Sands, a book to which I return often. Thesiger, Langewiesche, and Bradley all traveled the desert. And I haven’t.
Optimistically perhaps, I don’t think the desert changes much, oil or no oil, wealth or no wealth. When the oil is exhausted, the desert will reclaim its identity, fully. Or so I hope, being a romantic.
As Mr. Bradley moves about the Kingdom, he takes us with him, and patiently describes what he sees. There are times where what he sees is painful, like poverty in slums that we would never have known existed, just as we (intently?) don’t want to see our own, having relegated their presence to the police, to superior court judges and lawyers.
INTO THE HIJAZ
We accompany Bradley into the Hijaz, as he plays current observations against historical background, which he does throughout his book. You’re never bored. And you can tell that Bradley liked the Hijazis, as he did the Asiris. I think the very presence of these, and their vocalization of a belief system that is not in tandem with the Wahhabi of the Najd, surprised him, pleasantly. He liked the fact (as the reader would) that Saudi Arabia is not a one-dimensional country. As if he has walked in on the Basques, or the Corsicans.
Hijazis took Bradley into their confidence to a point that I became concerned about him and his Hijazi “informants”–that the state would discover these liberal Hijazis and would retaliate against them. But neither Bradley nor his Hijazi friends were worried. His forays continued. The wonderful thing about Mr. Bradley was his ability to befriend the young and the old, to develop “informants” of all ages and both gender. Young men took Bradley the anthropologist with them on a picnic in the desert and he was privy to their thoughts about September 11. As if that wasn’t sufficient. Bradley gives us (over and over) the inside look that is usually is the domain of the political officer at a foreign Embassy: “There is also the problem of a general ignorance in the West about the history of a Hijazi family like the bin Ladens, and its essentially troubled contemporary relationship with the branch of the Al-Saud family–the Al-Sudairis–that now wield all the power in Saudi Arabia.” (At 34.)
AL-JOUF
In his second chapter, Mr. Bradley takes us with him to Al-Jouf where “[f]or thousands of years, some of the finest olives and dates in the world have been grown,” where some Europeans had recorded their visits, one as far back as 1845, and where “[a] large number of Roman coins have [..]been unearthed, indicating the neighboring limit of the Roman Empire and the commercial activity for which the city [Dumat Al-Jandal] was famous when it stood astride trade routes from Syria and Iraq to Yemen.” (At 46- 48.)
The book at times is the product of a scout sent by one culture to investigate another. In this case, Mr. Bradley, when the opportunity arises, re-traces the steps of the man who murdered 3000 American civilians. It therefore doesn’t escape him that Al-Jouf is close to Osama bin Laden’s heart, as bin Laden himself had lived in al-Jouf in the late 1960s, and had mentioned it in one of his post-September 11 speeches.
That the people of Al-Jouf are diehard Arab nationalists was shown when the Saudi government colluded with the United States in the invasion of an Arab country, having relinquished control to American troops of the airport in the nearby town of Arar. Bradley:
“This was deeply resented by most Saudis, but especially by Al-Jouf’s residents. They have historic links not only with Syria but also to Iraqis immediately across the border. Many local officers in the Saudi Army resigned at the time in protest [...] Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Saudis have sneaked into Iraq via Al-Jouf and other northern regions to join the resistance there to U.S.-led occupation forces.” (At 53.)
ASIR AND THE FLOWER MEN
How about these men from Asir with flowers in their hair? You want to know more? Too bad; you’d have to read the third chapter. Once again, the flower men have shown Bradley and his readers that Saudi Arabia was far from being one-dimensional, however much the Wahhabis and the West want to believe otherwise.
Many of the 15 Saudis involved in the September 11 hijacking had come from the underdeveloped, highly tribal parts of Hijaz and Asir. So Bradley takes us to Asir: “Moving deeper into the Asir region, the landscape began to change. Large hillocks of gray-brown rock gradually became hills, and then sharply defined escarpments [...] Immediately it became obvious how different the people of the Asir region are in both character and style to those of the rest of Saudi Arabia. In a word, you feel that you are in Yemen.” (At 81-82.)
Once again, consciously or not, Bradley is trying to understand the world of Osama bin Laden, perhaps to fulfill his function as his culture’s scout, an acute observer of that other culture that reared the cult that attacked the United States. So many of Al-Qaeda’s operatives came from one Asir tribe, the million-strong Al-Ghamdi. “When bin Laden wrote a poem praising the tribes of Asir, he made special mention of the Al-Ghamdis.” (At 70.)
THE EXPATRIATES
In Part II of the book, Mr. Bradley leaves the travel writer behind dimming significantly the existential echo. He now takes us into more of an urban setting. Once there, he portrays for our benefit expatriate life in the Kingdom, an important subject since expatriates are no small part of life and work in Saudi Arabia. He focuses on al-Qaeda’s operations against the expatriate community. He divulges the possibility, real and ominous, that these operatives had quite a lot of sympathy among the religious and other police. (At 114 and 115.)
He writes quite a lot about the Third World, mostly Asian, workers. Though he is critical of the treatment given these workers by the authorities and the Saudi people, he’s nonetheless fair. He sees some similarities with the status of undocumented workers in the United States.
“The sad fact is that there is hardly anything right about labor conditions for Asians in Saudi Arabia.” (At 124.) If you want to know the details, small and large print, you’d have to read the chapter. It’s thorough.
DEEPER YET
Crime, segregation of the sexes, and censorship are the subjects that finish John Bradley’s journey into Saudi Arabia. In the three areas, John Bradley the reporter comes through. One can’t avoid feeling that Bradley in these chapters had become all too familiar with Saudi society, politics, and certainly journalism. The observing scout dispatched by the Western culture has now become so seasoned he could address any and all Saudi topics. He is no longer surprised.
The chapter on the segregation of the sexes is nearly pornographic in uncovering a “secret.” It has so much about gays and lesbians dominating the social scene in the cities. Here Bradley could’ve made use of some anthropology. The prevalence of gay life in the Kingdom could have less to do with the unavailability of the other sex (the predominant view) than with a society whose population is bursting at the seams. In other words, had Saudi society, so traditional, wanted to put an end to the prevalence of homosexual life, it could’ve and it would’ve. But it has chosen to ignore this prevalence as the social consensus, that hidden and powerful force, probably is worried more about a population explosion than about Saudi men and women choosing an alternative path in their personal life. Here in the U.S. we send them to college to practice as much non-reproductive sex as their hormones dictate; there, the system is set up in such a way that they close their eyes to an expansive non-reproductive (by definition) homosexual life. Both systems aim for non-reproduction.
By the last one third of his book, Bradley had completely shed his aloneness. He’s no longer in search of Osama bin Laden’s world and the inner depths of his own soul. Instead, he’s entered the forever complex, shadowy, sleazy, and crime-ridden world of the city. He deals with this new reality as a reporter.
ARE THE SAUDIS SUNK?
In the last chapter, “Are the Saudis Sunk?,” Bradley gives the future a shot. As if to answer the many hostile voices in the West, he tries to explain the political ways of the Saudi royals. I read the chapter twice. Frankly, I don’t really think there’s a way of predicting the future. One can outline possibilities; there’s no law against that. John Bradley would’ve done well avoiding the topic altogether.
WHERE FROM HERE?
But I won’t.
After reading the book, I became convinced that Saudi Arabia, if it were to stay united and minimize the possibility of rebellions, would have to stay true to its Arab and Islamic identity. And I don’t mean empty talk. Should its leaders turn their back on their identity, they’ll face trouble that is certain. For instance, can Saudi Arabia ignore Arab Syria’s quest for its Joulan and expect to draw the support of the Asiris? Or the Shiites? Or the Najdis? Doubtful. The Saudi leadership’s fate would be similar to that of the Egyptian. Money in higher oil prices (thanks in no small part to the mediocrity of the Bush Administration’s strategists) has bought the Saudi leaders time, after they had colluded with the United States, (its not-so-hidden ally, Israel), and Iran against an Arab country. But I doubt that they could take another like chance, especially if income from oil diminishes, or that Empire burdens them by having them pay for its confrontation with Iran.
The late President Sadat turned his back on Egypt’s Arab identity, and made Egypt fully into a vassal of the United States and Israel. As a result, the current Egyptian leadership is eminently insignificant, in Egypt, in the Arab world, and internationally. Egyptian society lost its sense of mission: To be always ready to assist other Arab countries. When it lost its sense of mission, it crumpled onto itself. Muslims and Copts, though having the same background, became strangers to each other. How could it be otherwise?
When Lebanon was on fire in the late 1970s, the late President Sadat stood watching, feigning confusion. The United States mandarins along with their Jordanian and Israeli allies and the Lebanese Deuxieme Bureau (Army intelligence) had unleashed the civil war in an attempt to finish the Palestinian resistance movement, once an for all. Their plans backfired. They lost control of the course of the war. Lebanon was destroyed. Still is. Sadat stood watching. He didn’t understand that no one (I mean no one) would have dared start the Lebanese civil war had Arab (not Uncle Tom) Egypt still been involved in the Arab world and had come to Lebanon’s help, even militarily. Instead of forcing Empire to deal with the necessity of sponsoring a Palestinian state, of forcing Israel to withdraw to pre-1967 borders, of returning the Joulan in full to Syria, Egypt stood castrated, its leadership (I dare say) savoring its helplessness and the agony of a sister Arab country.
(Sadly for Lebanon, Empire seems to be pursuing the same failed strategy in Lebanon, yet again.)
As with Egypt, so it is with Saudis Arabia. It ignores its Arab mission to its detriment. Its people need that sense of mission to bind together. They need to rush to aid the Palestinians form their state; to help Syrians regain their Joulan, and so on. If the government doesn’t do it, the Saudi people will, and there’s no say what methods they will use. It’s terror today; it will be something altogether new tomorrow.
