LILY PADS MEET IRAQI POLITICAL DYNAMICS

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LILY PADS BLOSSOM IN THE HARMFUL IDIOTS’ OASIS

Recently, Sec. of Defense Robert Gates and Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno spoke about keeping U.S. troops in Iraq for the long haul, a la South Korea. It could be that both were pre-negotiating with Russian President Putin, before he meets with our fearless leader. It could be that they were sincere. On the off-chance that it’s the latter, it should be said that announcements about staying in Iraq are nothing new. They’re a version of the old policy of "lily pads."

The image of "lily pads" is quite telling. It recalls those platforms, the floating leaves of water lilies, which nature programs have shown us endless times. We’ve seen light-weight small animals (e.g., frogs) lie in wait on these platforms, to gather the sun’s heat or to hunt. But an elephant? I’ve never seen one use a like platform, lest she sinks in muddy waters, and be devoured by crocodiles. Where then did this image come from? The answer: likely from yet another harmful idiot, a Pentagon consultant from a place such as Rand. He likely had meant it to clear up his mind, in lieu of Ritalin, and to explain a policy, using his very own standard of the lowest-common-denominator-among-harmful-idiots.

Illusions and wishful thinking, forever...

Soon after the greatest victory over Iraq's well-equipped massive armies, we had learned that the U.S. had begun construction on four bases, isolated and self-sufficient islands in a sea of chaos. The less romantic name for these, the more harmful idiot-ish, one likely right out of a Pentagon manual: Contingency Operating Bases (COBs). We had learned that, along with these four large oasis of absurdity, ten others were being planned, called Enduring Bases (EBs).

We also learned from this newsletter (perhaps other places had reached the same conclusion, I don’t know) that one reason (only one) why the Iraqi resistance, mostly Sunni, had waged a bloody sectarian war was to disallow U.S. troops from withdrawing to these islands of serenity–to force them to stay among the conquered. Not only would the U.S. need to put a stop to the mass murder of civilians, to show success, but it would have to do it with a limited number of troops, surge or no surge. Most importantly, staying among the conquered keeps the cost of occupation high. Concomitantly, domestic pressure to withdraw would remain equally intense.

In other words, the harmful idiots would like to establish the lily pads, and move the troops into these, while using the surplus troops (the surge) and their Iraqi ancillary forces to subdue the country. But it’s not to be. The sectarian war in response should continue on, more as wars (Sunni v. Sunni, Shia v. Shia, Sunni v. Shia, Shia v. Sunni, Arab Shia v. Kurds, Kurds v. Arab Sunni, and so on.) These wars would be the means, at times conscious at times accidental, for placing hurdles in the way of the lily pads’ strategy–or the South Korea one. These wars, moreover, should keep the occupier worried about the fate of its collaborators--those manning the puppet government--further preventing it from seeking refuge in those lily pads.

Worse of all, the occupier's very strategy at times empties into that of the resistance. Consider, for instance, the policy by the harmful idiots to mobilize Sunni tribes, clans, and some members of the resistance ( e.g., the Islamic Army of Iraq) to contain the more revolutionary members of the Islamic State of Iraq (the sanctions’ generation) in the end empties into the pointed strategy of the anti-American resistance to keep the troops occupied away from their cherished lily pads. Get it?

IRAQI POLITICAL DYNAMICS

Along with one version or another of the lily pads strategy, the harmful idiots are seeking a new coalition of Iraqi political forces. They 're begging for the chance to stay on top of the oil fields, to consolidate Empire’s power, without having to raise taxes and (God forbid) strengthen the federal government.

The harmful idiots must’ve sent assurances to Muqtadha as-Sadr that they will refrain from assassinating him. And the White House counseled him to engage positively in the political life of the country. He, as a result, left his place of hiding, softened up on the U.S., and re-opened his arms wide towards his fellow Sunni–the non-takfiri Iraqis. (Update: softening towards the U.S. has lasted one second and a half!)

He does what he does at his own political peril–and ours.

Why? His meteoric rise in Iraqi politics (predicted by this newsletter) was intimately connected not so much to his family name. Sadr's meteoric rise was intimately connected to his opposition to, and confrontation with, the occupier--Israel's strategic ally.

(Seriously: the harmful idiots should stop thinking in terms of family name, such as believing that their Jordanian Prince Hasan the Hashemite carries credence just because he’s said to be related to the Prophet. So many make that claim; right or wrong, it really doesn’t matter. (The author of the book One Year in Casablanca makes that claim.) These are not the 1950s. We’re in the middle of an Islamic Revolution, spurred on by the invasion of Iraq. Family background means zilch in a hot places such as Iraq–and now Lebanon.)

Accordingly: Sadr eases up on the Americans should only mean that he will be out-maneuvered by people on his left: A new and yet younger generation of Arab Shia leaders should emerge. Their prominence would be directly related to their willingness to confront Israel’s ally. Sadr and his Mahdi Army as a consequence should become the past.

To illustrate: consider what became of Fatah. Didn’t it turn into Uncle Toms, awaiting crumbs from the harmful idiots, the Kuwaitis, and the Saudis–and not-so-implicitly allied to Israel, as if only such alliance would keep it alive as an organization? Hamas, as a result, took over. Hamas, in turn, became statesman-like, and is being outmaneuvered by younger Islamists, having failed to break the American embargo and obtain cargo for the Palestinians. (There’s a possibility that Hamas is spinning off these. This newsletter had predicted the spin-offs; but it could be that these new organizations are a hybrid: part spin-offs, part independent.)

( Note: The harmful idiots in this instance should've adopted the Saudi-mediated Mecca Accord. This would've created a new dynamics that likely would've been more conducive to Israeli-Palestinian peace--assuming flexibility on the part of the Israelis and less colonialist policies--huge assumptions, indeed. Now we're looking at the possible take-over of the Palestinian Street by factions which are supremely more radical than Hamas. Congrats to the harmful idiots. )

Sadr should therefore become another Fatah, should he ease up on Israel’s ally.

But Sadr isn’t this newsletter’s concern. The troops are, and our future and our pocket book. Viewed from this enlightened (yes!) angle, the future without Sadr as the freedom fighter will be one where new Muqtadhas will emerge and make life hell for for the troops, lily pads or no lily pads. They will be financed by many who don’t want us in Iraq.

Get it?