LINKAGE II: LEBANON-IRAQ. A SECOND LOOK.

(OR: DONA QUIXOTE’S ARAB WING AND THE HARMFUL IDIOTS).

Second draft : another take on the previous post.

BACKGROUND: JUMBLATT SETS OFF A CRISIS.

There are three stated reasons for the recent decision by Hizbollah to move militarily against the plantation government of Hariri/Siniora. Waleed Jumblatt, now referred to in the left press as al-Waleed bin-Kamal, a typically Saudi nomenclature, likely and analytically in reference in part to the money he’s receiving from Saudi intelligence, began the controversy that set off Hizbollah’s takeover of West Beirut. In a distribution of roles that is common in political coalitions and alliances (we see it played out in the U.S. most often in op. ed. articles), Jumblatt had been assigned mouthiness; accordingly, he had raised the following issues:

(1) The fact that Hizbollah has a land-based phone line of its own, meant to diminish the ability of the harmful idiots and their Israelis to listen in on its communications;

(2) The allegation that Hizbollah has set up cameras at the airport to monitor what agents of the harmful idiots, the Saudis, and the Israelis, in private jets, are landing in Beirut; and

(3) the dismissal of a high-ranking military officer assigned to the airport, one who’s deemed sympathetic to the Iranian cargo cult – Hisbollah and Amal.

What Jumblatt (and whoever is coordinating the moves of the harmful idiots/Saudi/Israeli cargo cult, likely the intelligence services of Saudi Arabia and that of the harmful idiots) didn’t account for was that the Arab wing of the Iranian cargo cult (Syria and Hizbollah) likely had been waiting for the proper moment to establish linkage between what the harmful idiots do in Iraq against their ally, Moqtada al-Sadr, and what they can in response do in Lebanon.

HIZBOLLAH’S PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE. NOT. IT IS. NOT.

Hizbollah and the Iranian cargo cult, which includes Syria, all on the payroll, analytically-speaking, had been patient with the Saudi-harmful idiot cargo cult in Lebanon. (The members of the second cult are (analytically) on the payroll, too, of Saudi intelligence and/or the intelligence services of the harmful idiots; they include Hariri/Siniora, Jumblatt, Geagea, Gemayyel.) There’s no question that Hizbollah could’ve a long time ago taught these proxies a military lesson. But it hasn’t. Hizbollah’s patience is due to the following:

(1) Iran and Syria would rather partner with Saudi Arabia, accepting the latter’s special relationship with the harmful idiots. After all, the Saudis have enough money to make life difficult for the Iranians and the Syrians. That money can reel in so much of Europe’s armies into the Gulf . Not that these armies can protect anyone. Frankly, they’re useless. But who needs the complications, especially with sanctions? Iran hasn’t forgotten that Saudi Arabia had succeeded for nearly two decades and a half (1979-2003) in containing Iran’s Islamic revolution; and in defeating Iran, using the former president of Arab Iraq. Logically, now that Bush/Cheney/Bandar had made it victorious, Iran would prefer not to go through this, yet again. But Saudi Arabia, in good part because of oodles of dollars coming it way, hasn’t yet come to terms with the extent of its defeat, a ton of bricks really; and so it hasn’t yet come to terms with the newregional reality. Hence in part the stalemate, especially in Lebanon.

In short, Iran and Syria would prefer to partner with the Saudis and to focus on Israel instead. But the Saudis have two binds that prevent them from doing that: (1) they run scared of the ability of Israel’s diaspora in the U.S. to complicate the Kingdom’s life and that of its princes (e.g., the activists within this diaspora can, in a Democratic administration, activate the Department of Justice’s investigation of the alleged $2 bn. payoff by BAE Systems to Bandar bin Sultan); and (2) they run scared that a true rapprochement with Iran could result in the political mobilization of the Saudi Shias, where Saudi Arabia would be conceding some form of tutelage to Iran over the Kingdom’s Shia population. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia can make life difficult for each other. For now, Iran stands victorious and it wants to use this moment to partner with Saudi Arabia – but not if that would mean conceding Iraq or Lebanon to the Saudis and the harmful idiots. As stated above, the Saudis have not yet reached the awareness that they should be reeling from the heavy blow dealt their country by the Bush/Cheney/Bandar team, and will need time to come to terms with the new regional and realpolitik reality – and that money alone, without troops, will not do it for the Kingdom.

(2) The Arab wing of the Iranian cargo cult is aware that the (sophomoric) strategy of the harmful idiots, AKA Eliott Abrams (See prior post: Saudi Arabia’s Bind .. .) is to ignite civil strife in Lebanon to busy Hizbollah away from Israel. Hence Hizbollah’s limited military backlash, stopping short of a full war or victory.

(3) The Arab wing of the Iranian cargo cult isn’t talking. But that wing has had it with mouthy Jumblatt, especially that, soon after the assassination of Imad Mughniyah, a Syrian e-newspaper made the allegation that Jumblatt’s chief of intelligence (!) had traveled to Israel. During that visit, Prime Minister Olmert is said to have granted the Druze members of the Israeli armed forces benefits that resemble those given to the Jewish soldiers. This smacked of a payoff for something, possibly assistance by Jumblatt’s Druze, those in Lebanon and those in Syria, in the Mughniyah assassination.

Syria and Hizbollah could easily have had Jumblatt assassinated. But they haven’t. The main reason is that the greater majority of Syrian citizens in the occupied Joulan are Syrian Druze. (I believe they all are.) Since Jumblatt has aligned himself with Israel, directly and with Saudi Arabia’s blessing via the Saudi secret government (intelligence service), he’s now competing with Syria over the allegiance of the Joulan Druze. Syria isn’t about to create a martyr out of him and anger the Joulan Druze. That can lead to a backlash and to a split within that community between those who don’t want to return to Syria and those who do. The better approach for Syria and Hizbollah would be to arm and fund Lebanese antagonists of Jumblatt, Druze and others.

But patience has its limits, and these limits may explode among the Christians. Allegations circulating about say that US military copters during the crisis were supplying weapons to the Lebanese Forces, shuttling between Israel and US ships and Mount Lebanon. If true, you can expect Syria/Hizbollah to retaliate by increasing the arming and training of opposing Christian forces, especially the Marada in the north and the partly-Christian SSNP. Neither of these two political parties has enough fighters – but neither do the Lebanese Forces. Going out on a guessing limb, I would say no more than 100 fighters each for the Marada and the SSNP. (For the Lebanese Forces, in the same range, since the Christians are now divided among Aoun, Gemayyel, Geagea, Franjieh, the SSNP; and they mostly hate each other. Too, be mindful that the Christians have all but evaporated. Their presence in Lebanon is more or less a fiction, kept alive by the Shias and the Sunnis; they miss them.) But as Syria had done during the civil war, when it uniformed up Palestinian fighters as Jumblati, it can do the same for the Marada and the SSNP. Better yet, Hizbolla fighters – with Lebanese accents – can do that. I don’t think Aoun will partake in this mostly intra-Christian civil war. But I’m missing facts. I’m basing my observations on logic. Hizbollah is too smart to drain Aoun politically by having him fight other Christians. Already, Aoun’s Christian adversaries and Hariri have succeeded in portraying him as the main reason for Lebanon’s economic woes. If Hizbollah keeps him out of it, so to speak, he would run a better chance at scoring big wins in parliamentary elections. Geagea, in contrast, doesn’t have much to lose; nor does Franjieh (the Marada) nor the SSNP. In short, those who engage in intra-Christian fighting will not do well electorally among those Christians left in Lebanon. They will be penalized.

(3) Hizbollah is in south Lebanon as part of a larger Iranian strategy to keep up such a balance of terror to deter Israel or its sponsor, the harmful idiots, from striking Iran’s nuclear facilities. Thousands of missiles should fly onto Israeli cities should either attack Iran. There should be no question whatsoever that for the Iranians there exists a linkage between an attack by one on Iran to retaliation against another by Iran or Hizbollah. Hence Hizbollah’s long-term perspective; Israel is its target not the other Lebanese. And Hizbollah is more capable at igniting fires for Eliott Abrams’ proxies than these are for Hizbollah.


LINKAGE, OH LINKAGE, AND I’M NOT TALKING ABOUT SAUSAGES.

What may have triggered the military reaction by Hizbollah is the vicious campaign against the Mahdi Army in Iraq. Moqtada is dear to Syria and to Hizbollah, both Arab; I would say dearer to them than to Iran. After all, Iran owns the Hakims, SCIRI/Badr, and Dawa. It owns the current Shia government in Iraq, lock, stock and barrel. (The wishful thinking/delusional harmful idiots are but a gofer.) Why would Iran want to disturb a government it owns?

Yeah, yeah, yeah: Iran needs Mahdi to harass the US; but it can do it without Mahdi. Just as the harmful idiots can retain mercenaries (e.g., Blackwater), so can the Iranians. And just as Americans and others from across the globe are willing to be hired as mercenaries in the age of de-industrializing America and replacing heavy industry with cheap money – “the financial sector” – so are many of the poorer Iraqi Shia. (In 1960, manufacturing made up 26.9 percent of US Gross Domestic Product, and financial services 13.6%; in 2005, manufacturing made up 12.9% of GDP; financial services: 20.4%.) With one difference: the Iraqi Shia-for-hire are hardly mercenaries coming from 6000 miles away. They have a patriotic reason to fight. At any rate, Iran doesn’t mind Moqtada but likely, in the end, Iran would be hesitant about him since the Sadrists are at heart Arab nationalists. But under pressure of the Arab wing within the Iranian alliance, Iran has no choice but to protect him. There’s another advantage for Iran: the Sadrists are akin to saints in the Catholic religion. They can produce a lot of martyrs, and Iran would be foolish to allow that martyrdom to be directed at it. It’d prefer that it be directed at the harmful idiots. Most importantly, whoever wins the Sadrists, so to speak, wins a terrific source of legitimacy and acceptance among the Arab Street. Syria knows that; so does Iran. Only the harmful idiots are clueless. (The Arab Street will forget the sectarian massacres committed by Mahdi as soon as they hear a name of a Mahdi fighter dying in the next war with Israel.)

In short, the retaliation in Lebanon for the assault on Mahdi in Iraq is likely a concession by Iran to the Arab wing within its camp.

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(NOTE ABOUT BEING SCREWED. The harmful idiots are confused, very. They don’t have the flexibility to pack and go lest the American right wing – the alliance of the Jewish Right, its liberals, and the Christian Right – blame the Republicans for risking Israel’s security and for “losing Iraq,” and punish them by deserting the party. Strategically, however, our military tenure in Iraq is a waste.

Even if we talk to Iran, which we should, we no longer have a country to rely on to contain Iran. And we, the Jewish-Christian nation we are, always concerned about Israel and never about the misfortune that became the Palestinians, can’t do it. Nor can Saudi Arabia, which has no army to speak of – though it does have a lot of protection money military contracts ! – and which has lost its bully – Arab Iraq. And which is secretly in a working relationship with the Israelis. No can do.

Nor can we ourselves become an Arab nationalist power, or sponsor a non-existing one, since the Jewish sector of our elite wouldn’t tolerate that. (Can Yemen come to the rescue? I’m toying with you. I really wanted to visit Yemen, but my security-minded self said no.) So we’re screwed. Attacking Iran in full, or engaging it with limited attacks, should bring on likely worse repercussions than those which were obtained from invading Iraq. Think, at the limit, chaos. Think planned disintegration of the state. (See prior posts.)

Even symbolically we’re screwed. We pumped so much cheap money into buying up the Arab opposition elite (including Communists!) directly or through Saudi intelligence/ Hariri, that these had lost all credibility. The establishment of the Jewish Right and its liberals complemented this by handing out US government jobs to the Arab-American elite; and by so benefitting, that elite ended up becoming useless to the United States as a credible Arab cover. We have no one left to be a bridge which could be trusted by the Arab Street. I tell a lie. We do. We have Arab-American and Muslim comedians. We’re screwed.)

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SUMMARY

Hizbollah’s use of Jumblatt’s tirades and raves about the not-so-secret Hizbollah land-line and airport cameras seem to have been an excuse to link the assault on Moqtada to revenge in Lebanon. The possibility (conclusive perhaps to the Syrians) that Druzes in the employ of Jumblatt have played a role in the assassination of Imad Mughiyah, likely is the straw that broke the camel’s back. (The weakness in this argument revolves around the fact that one would have expected Hizbollah, to establish linkage, to have moved against Jumblatt and Hariri earlier – during he bombing of and assault against Sadr City. Was Iran hesitant in allowing Syria and Hizbollah a free hand in Lebanon, not convinced about establishing such linkage for a man (Sadr) who the Iranians have mixed feelings about? Or had the opportunity –such as Jumblatt has provided with the private land-line controversy – not been available?)

The Arab wing of the Iranian-Syrian alliance had been waiting for the moment to do the tit-for-tat: You screw around with Moqtada and we screw around with your hollow and passe proxies in plantation Lebanon. Delusional proxies – like their masters – who don’t know their own limitations.