THE SAUDI OPTION ISN’T

rough draft

[What I’m currently re-reading: Hawes, Annie, Extra-Virgin: A Young Woman Discovers the Italian Riviera , Where Every Month Is Enchanted. (2001)

DECLARATION OF (NO) CONFLICT

I don’t know Mr. Charles Freeman from Adam.

THE SYMBOLIC CHARLES FREEMAN AND HOW THE DIASPORA NATIONALISTS GAVE THE ARAB OPPOSITION AND IRAN A VICTORY

The recent withdrawal by Charles Freeman of his nomination to head the National Intelligence Council eliminates the idiots-reluctant’s lame attempt at (possibly) going Arab – Saudi really. For what it’s worth, the idiots-reluctant should know that Mr. Freeman’s nomination wouldn’t have made them anymore Arab than having me take over that post. But, in the medium to long-term, Mr. Freeman likely would’ve contributed to making U.S. foreign policy towards the Arab nation less biased. In short, he would’ve corrected a failed course of over eight years under the reign of Crusader and Bald Samson.

It seemed, just perhaps, that with Mr. Freeman the Obama Administration was in part trying to give Saudi Arabia some say in the foreign policy, defense, and intelligence establishment – a stake of sorts. The idea likely would’ve been to balance Israel’s extensive representation through the Diaspora nationalists in that establishment. No can do. Oddly, however, the withdrawal of the nomination can be said to have been a victory for Iran and the Arab opposition. The Diaspora nationalists blocked for them the appointment of an American who would’ve been a worthier foe to them (Iran and the Arab opposition) than any of those allied to the Diaspora nationalists, under Crusader and Bald Samson or within the Obama Administration.

Let us presume for a moment that Mr. Freeman’s appointment was in fact (in part) a concession to the Saudis. Having once criticized Israel’s colonialist expansion, he would’ve been more credible with many. Here’s a friend of Saudi Arabia in an important foreign and national security post who wasn’t beholden to the Diaspora nationalists. With a background of having criticized Israel’s colonialism, he would’ve been expected to correct a course that had failed miserably for the past eight years, under Crusader and Bald Samson. A course which cost a lot of lives and contributed significantly to our national bankruptcy. By correcting that course, he would’ve made U.S. foreign policy more credible to 300 million Arabs, and a wider Muslim world. Although the Diaspora nationalists had been in a precarious alliance in Washington, D.C. with the Saudi ruling elite (an alliance that likely, one would think, at a minimum, should've been going through strain following King Abdallah’s criticism of Israel at the Kuwait economic summit), those nationalists and Israel still could ill-afford to take a risk on Mr. Freeman’s appointment. Oddly, too, nor could the Arab opposition and Iran. After all, these wouldn't have wanted an American who would correct U.S. foreign policy, making it more even-handed. That would’ve threatened the use by Iran and by the Arab opposition of plum wedge issues in the region. In that sense Mr. Freeman’s withdrawal of his nomination, under pressure from the Diaspora nationalists, was a victory not only for the Diaspora nationalists but, too, for the Arab opposition and for Iran.


A STRUCTURAL NO MAN’S LAND

The problem is structural. And I’m not talking only about the balance of power in the PersArab Gulf region.

When the Diaspora nationalists, together with the Christian Right (Crusader) and the Cynical-Oil-Grabbers (Bald Samson) eliminated Arab Iraq, they did away with an Arab power which had balanced Iran. No big loss here since the U.S. can perform that function and militarily deter the hell out of Iran.

The more important imbalance , however, was in the elimination of a secular Arab state. (I’ve gone over these arguments before. I don’t need to do it again.) The Saudi ruling elite (Note: I didn’t say Saudi Arabia) cannot (repeat after me: CANNOT) fill in the void, neither as balancer of Iranian military power. Nor, more importantly, as champion of an Arab identity, or Islamic, or secular. Why? Because:

– The Arab public (that public does matter if only because the Arab opposition provides it with an alternative perspective) knows beyond a doubt that the crew which now rules the Kingdom had colluded with the harmful idiots in the elimination of an Arab country which (at least symbolically) had been Sunni-ruled. (It matters little why that crew colluded with the harmful idiots.)

– The Arab public, too, knows beyond a doubt that the Saudi crew had left the ranks of the Arabs when it hoorayed (basically, that’s what it did) the harmful idiots’ last-gasp armed offenses (via Israel) to coax the Arab nation into submission to their “American” will and that of the Diaspora nationalists A.K.A. Israel - -when:


i. The Saudi ruling crew had accepted that Israel bomb the defenseless civilians in south Lebanon in 2006, murdering a couple hundred children (and with cold blood slaughtering over a thousand defenseless civilians) while the September 11 Queen, one of the crew’s allies, clueless if ever I’ve seen any, dared lecture the Arab nation about the “New Middle East” being remade (only in her brain) with the blood and the charred bodies not of her children – and

ii. When recently the crew had accepted that Israel do the same to the Palestinian civilians and their children in Gaza. (It matters not that Iran supported Hamas. Killing civilians only meant that the Saudi ruling elite had been successfully placated as aider an abettor to murdering Arab civilians).

iii. All of this taking place at a time when all know, or should know, that the modern Arab identity is as much defined by the Palestinian Nakbah – by the loss of Palestine – as it is by language, literature, common ancestry, religion and culture.

THE REGIONAL POLITICAL BATTLEFIELD

We know that the Saudi ruling elite (the crew) caters to every whim of each and every administration. It catered to the harmful idiots in the elimination of Arab Iraq. Maybe its excuse then was that the Diaspora nationalists, who inspired the Bush harmful idiots and had taken over the Pentagon, would act on their threat to dismantle Saudi Arabia.

But now that Nayef has reined in the bin Laden network in the Kingdom – he really has, and I hope I don’t eat my words too soon – why is the Saudi ruling elite tying its hopes on the adoption by new the administration, Mr. Obama’s, of a Saudi option that is so hazy, so uncertain, so full with traps (see below), that it seems as if it couldn’t exist but in the mind of desperate men on the verge of a nervous breakdown – the Saudi ruling elite? Especially that the Obama administration is as Diaspora-oriented as the one that preceded it? And therefore is unlikely to adopt a Saudi option/plan if it weren’t approved by Israel via the Diaspora nationalists.

In other words, the idiots-reluctant can no longer practice the type of blackmail the harmful idiots once could against the Saudi ruling elite - to dismantle the Kingdom. Iraq has humbled them, what with national bankruptcy and doubtful benefits in oil or bases. Yet the Saudi ruling elite continues to bark up the wrong tree. It refuses to conclude that its efforts to capture the attention, independent of the Diaspora nationalists, of the Obama Administration are to naught, and Mr. Freeman’s withdrawal of his nomination proves it. Logically, one would think that this elite would now change course: cease trying to persuade this or that administration (unavoidably full of Diaspora nationalists) to adopt its point of view and instead force the issue with its protector. To force the issue, the Saudi ruling elite would have to use the region where Saudi Arabia is located as a political battlefield, not between it and Syria and Iran, but between it and Israel. And not so much to influence Israel – but to force the issue of Saudi Arabia’s place and status in Washington, D.C. – the capital of its protector. (The Diaspora nationalists need not worry: it doesn’t seem that this elite is capable of this feat .)

Seemingly simple: the Saudi ruling elite has the ability to meet the Diaspora nationalists on the political battlefield in the region, so to speak. As a result of its ability to maneuver there it should be able to change its status as beggar in Washington, D.C., having to go through the Diaspora nationalists for everything. But that elite is proving incapable of pursuing the political battlefield option in the region. Why? I think that the Saudi ruling elite is stuck with such a stiff Saudi royal structure (current King, Crown Prince, and Allegiance Council) where the smart part of the elite knows it would hit a wall if it were to present the following proposal:

To do away with the current ruling crew, which is open to blackmail, and install a King who is not, and who is of Faisal’s caliber. (I’m not talking necessarily procreation-wise.) That King and his team should be able to chart for the Kingdom an exclusively Arab course, supporting the Palestinians, the Lebanese, the Syrians, the Sudanese – and all fellow Arabs – and using these as bridge to Iran in a series of confidence-building steps. The Arab nation needs an Arab Saudi Arabia, badly. And Saudi Arabia needs its Arab nation. Enough with begging; enough with the stupid so-called Arab initiative. The Israelis treated that initiative as one would toilet paper.

An Arab Saudi Arabia playing the regional field (as Arab not as a frustrated power scared of its own shadow and allied to the equally scared Kuwait and Jordan, and to the ineffectual Egypt) , not a desperate Saudi Arabia, would be useful even to the Americans. From there – from the region – the Arab Saudis can change the dynamics in Washington, D.C.

But seriously, what are the chances? Not that good if my sense about the movements and statements of Turki al-Faisal is correct. At any rate, the Saudis should better be moving fast. As common sense dictates, this country should be going through a thorough re-assessment of its defense and security alliances, with the Iraq and Afghanistan fiascos and the resulting national bankruptcy in mind. There likely should be a return to the Saddam Hussein prototype where that can be found -–to achieve goals without footing the bill in money and American lives.

I watch Turki al-Faisal jump up-and-down, issuing not-so-veiled threats which are obviously borne out of desperation. I know he’s got nowhere to go (and the Diaspora nationalists within the Obama Administration likely know it, too) since he is facing such a stiff royal succession and bureaucratic and extended family structure that is unlikely to show flexibility any time soon. And he knows it, too. So he sways between threatening the political battlefield option (see above) and the working-on-the-inside option – to persuade the Obama Administration to adopt what I would call the “Saudi option.” But that option (see below) is so ill-defined and so fraught with traps even for the United States that, in the end, it doesn’t amount to much. To reiterate: the elite Turki al-Faisal represents therefore ends up swaying between a battlefield option that their own system of government would not allow and an ill-defined Saudi option marketed to the Obama Administration as a way of begging for a Saudi role in Washington, D.C.

THE SAUDI OPTION

Though ill-defined, here’s a rough outline of what I think is perceived as the Saudi option, together with the risks it carries:

1. At a time when we have no assurance whatsoever that Israel would withdraw from all of what’s left of Historic Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) and the Arab Joulan.

2. If anything: all indication is that Israel will NOT.

3. Knowing that Palestine was, is, and remains one of the essential backbones of Arab solidarity and identity, certainly at the level of the public and non-ruling alternative elite.

4. Knowing that there no longer is a substantial Arab power that is not allied to Iran, yet Palestine-oriented, as had been Arab Iraq, to pull the Arab nation behind it.

5. knowing that the Turkey-Barazani route (Turkey to appeal to the Arab Sunni, especially inside Iraq; and Barazani to threaten the Iraqi Shia state with yet more turmoil should it not cater to the idiots-reluctant’s Sunni Arab assets) is a non-starter since:

(a) for one, Barazani and Turkey (structurally) hate each other’s guts and any strengthening of Barazani will happen at Turkey’s expense and should threaten its ethnic stability;

(b) for another, Turkey will have to do more for Palestine than offended;

(c) for a third, neither Turkey nor a majority of Barazani’s fiefdom are Arabic-speaking – not the most important factor ;

(d) for a fourth, the Arab nation’s elite has serious doubts about whether Turkey isn’t in fact still allied to Israel (at the security-defense level), good acting by its leaders notwithstanding;

(e) for a fifth, that public and its alternative elite know that Barazani is Israeli to the bone. (On his recent visit to Kuwait, he lost it when Arab reporters zeroed in on his intimate relationship with Israel).

6. Knowing that Arab Syria, if it leaves dependable Iran and Russia, who both need it, to the camp of Saudi Arabia and adopt the ill-defined Saudi option:
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a) would face a fate (at a minimum) of total and abject irrelevance as the Egyptian ruling elite had after Camp David – and still does – but possibly a deadly fate. (Egypt is much easier to govern than Syria).

(b) In the absence of a structural framework (e.g., an Arab common market), there’s no assurance whatsoever that Gulf oil money (and not broken promises) would flow to Syria.

(c) Arab Syria, with a Sunni majority, cannot afford to leave the Palestinians behind. (Asad recently called on them to coordinate with Syria on peace negotiations, though Syria knows that Abbas/Fayyad should love to leave Syria behind, but only if both would want to risk assassination by Arab nationalists/or/Islamists who would revive at the cry of the umma consensus at the first Israeli massacre of children on the West Bank, especially if the idiot-reluctant money dries up.) Hamas is Syria’s leverage against a separate peace agreement.

(d) Arab Syria knows that the only way to actually reclaim the Arab Joulan and what’s left over from Historic Palestine is by balancing Israeli power, an absolute must.

7. Knowing that the financial meltdown and the unpredictability of results of a war with Iran have (and increasingly will) prevent the Diaspora’s idiots-reluctant from waging war on the Islamic Republic, with the possibility that social turmoil in the land of the idiots-reluctant might just force yet more withdrawal of troops even from Afghanistan. (Everyone is running scared about their livelihood; people are working practically only to fund their health insurance premiums. People cannot afford even the deductible on their insurance and are delaying seeing a physician. I never ever thought this could happen in the United States. It seems as if all have a collective memory of the Great Depression, albeit not having themselves lived through it. From affluence to the bread line? Strange and scary. The fear by all who don’t have a government job runs very deep. If this continues long enough, there will be a need to retrench yet further militarily.)

8. Knowing that in these scary times, which the Saudis don’t have if only because they have a tighter family, clan, and tribal structure – that the entire Obama Administration would be focused on the economic disaster and possible repeat of a Great Depression, and not on the Middle East – that in those times, the Diaspora nationalists can run free with American foreign policy towards the Arab nation until such time when the defense/intelligence/foreign policy establishment had re-assessed its world priorities .It’ll be years.

Meanwhile:

All signs point to the Saudi ruling elite adopting delay tactics, playing for time, pursuing a tract seemingly (and only seemingly) in-between the regional battlefield option (e.g., King Abdallah’s statements at the Kuwait Summit and opening to Syria) and the Saudi option -- the latter running quite parallel to the Obama Administration/A.K.A./Diaspora nationalists’ tract (e.g., to put to use Turkey and Barazani.)

The question: aware as it certainly should be that the Axis of Conquest and New Colonialism is on a course of retreat and relative disarray, and that its opening to forces allied to Iran (e.g., U.K. and Hezbollah) is very likely tactical, to play for time until the financical meltdown is cleared -- will Iran be able to consolidate any of its gains before the Axis revives -- especially in Iraq?

Most importantly: Will Iran be able, or want to, extend a credible bridge, independently and through Arab Syria, to the Iraqi Arab Sunni, enough to dislodge Saudi and idiots-reluctant money? Can it? What would be the basis of agreement? Aware that this community, which the harmful idiots and the Israelis (via the Diaspora nationalists mostly, but somewhat directly, too), had conquered is key to opening the Saudi-influenced part of the Arab nation wide open to Iran? Can the Iraqi experience for Iran be less restrictive than the Lebanese?