THE STATE-WITHIN-THE-STATE: BUREAUCRATS V. POLITICIANS

reformulated second draft - - with ample clarifications in item 1

I’m pressed for time. I’ll make this brief with the hope to expand on it later. (You believe this, you believe anything.)

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ARAB NATION

For days now I’ve been mulling over reports in the Arab press that former Senator George Mitchell had said to the Israelis that peace in the region and, by extension, a two-state solution, were matters of U.S. national security.

That something - - anything - - would be labeled a matter of national security is very serious indeed. Senator Mitchell’s statement indicated to me that the American state (the bureaucrats) is aware that the mobilization value of the plight of the Palestinians is way-too-high, and that it needs to defuse it if it is to keep the real estate (especially Iraq) it now controls. Not to mention the mobilization value of that plight in the wider Muslim World, in particular in oil-rich Central Asian states which the idiots-reluctant think Turkey can manage for them.

With this statement in mind, one can explain a lot about the assumptions/myths/hopes the idiots reluctant hold. The following is by no means exhaustive. (And I’m not being exhaustive not because I’m lazy. I’m not.)

1. That the United States is in the Arab nation (especially in the new acquisition - - Iraq) to stay, militarily and otherwise.

That our CIA couldn’t but KNOW that the Islamists and the Old-Baath-tied-to-Jordanian-intelligence blow up the Shia civilians and the army/police recruits of the Shia state to ignite a civil war; that the intelligence services funding the Islamists (prime suspects: Saudi Arabia’s-allied-to-Israel’s, the U.A.E.’s) are doing so to force President Obama to re-formulate his plans about withdrawing from Iraq.

(Secretary of State Clinton's recent comment on the bombings tells me that the CIA had informed her of the goals of those behind these (see above-and-below) but that the U.S. government isn't about to go further and point the finger outrightly at those allied intelligence services that are invovled.)

That, in essence, though aware that the U.S. isn't planning full withdrawal - - never, as the secretly-harbored current thinking goes, anyway - - that the above-mentioned intelligence services, allied to our CIA, and a skeptic would say with the knowledge of our CIA, want the U.S. to remain in Iraq at the current extensive level. That these want the U.S., with the help of the Iraqi troops the U.S. is traning and over which it has sway, to get rid of the Maliki Shia state and install a civililan-military regime (e.g.: Allawi and the army) that would markedly be less Shia and would prep the way for the eventual war on Iran. That the current plan by President Obama would keep the Shia state intact, with U.S. military presence at a modest level - - which would mean that the United States (remaining in Iraq at such modest level) would have to make peace with the Islamic Republic. A no-no to the intelligence services. Worse of all, if Mr. Obama goes through with his plans, the Arab Sunni would likely have to make peace with the Shia state, having given up the hope that the United States would wage war on the Islamic Republic, and use them for that purpose - - a vehicle for them to return to power.

That the U.S. military at heart don’t want to withdraw, if only to have a say in the new Iraq, to balance Iranian power, and to use Iraq a base for the eventual assault on Iran (should these plans revive) if the Islamic government remains in power. (Please accept my representation that I have NO sources whatsoever, and that these conclusions are analysis-based, no more.)

2. That the United States - - the idiots-reluctant who likely are in ahoots with the allied intelligence services, that is, and, before them, the harmful idiots - - all believe the financial crisis and the de facto bankruptcy of the federal government aren’t of consequence to the plans to stay in Iraq. Or that they have given them no heed, since they’re bureaucrats and not political economists. That the national bankruptcy and the new economic model (as Nouriel Roubini describes it: no Concorde any longer, only the easy-to-maintain old subsonic planes) will not impact the continued presence of large chunks of the U.S. military within the Arab nation.

3. That in fact the U.S. can finance its expensive military presence in the Arab nation in part by using oil surplus money from the Arab Gulf countries.

4. That therefore the hope would be that oil prices would spike once again and allow for large surpluses in these countries’ budgets, indirect taxation on a tired American public, to, in turn, allow for funding in part of the military presence.

5. That the governments of these countries, in the absence of an ideology (e.g., Arab nationalism, secular; or Arab nationalism, Islamic), syphon-in U.S. military presence, and that the latter is drawn in without much consciousness of the limitations to such visible military. Not to mention the complications of de facto managing the affairs of countries that can’t manage their own (e.g., Saudi Arabia pre-September 11-and-oil-boom which allowed it to buy-out the opposition, Kuwait-and-its-fractious-polity, Bahrain-and-its-Shia-majority-governed-by-a-Sunni-minority, Yemen-and-and-its-militant-tribes-and-Islamic-Arab-nationalism-in-a-vacuum) - - the process being akin to osmosis where neither matter has any consciousness of its movement or the repercussions. And where the end-result would be an America defending the insane privileges of the few and their antiquated governments against the middle classes and those below them.

6. That, at some level, the countries in the Arab nation which importance likely, too, is defined in terms of national security interest - - that these countries would be trouble-free , where there’s sufficient surplus money available to their antiquated governments (pre-middle-class-military-regimes) to buy out all opposition - - as these in fact had done during the last oil bonanza (e.g., Saudi Arabia.)

7. That these countries, using the oil money, and having successfully co-opted the al-Qaeda generation by buying it out (e.g., the Muslim re-education campaign in Saudi Arabia which realistically had little to do with Islamic re-education and everything to do with putting the al-Qaeda generation on the payroll) - - that this generation will not be followed - - and only in a few years - - by one that’s not yet co-opted, and where the governments, in particular Yemen’s, Saudi Arabia’s, Bahrain’s, and possibly Oman’s - - may not have sufficient money to co-opt them, especially if the oil bonanza doesn’t re-ignite soon enough.

8. That the United States has accepted as task-and-burden to micro-manage the affairs of the Arab nation - - and Israeli affairs, if it can.

9. That to manage the latter (Israeli affairs), and have these not impede U.S. military presence in the Arab nation, the United States would have to rein in Israel’s extension in the United States: the Diaspora, its nationalists, and its cultural/political entrepreneurs - - and their influence in U.S. Congress. (Oh boy!)

10. That, in fact, the American state has been trying to do that - - rein in the Israel lobby . (Hence the title of this piece: Bureaucrats (the national security state) v. politicians (the Israel lobby) ) The effort at such, however, seems to lack a theoretical understanding of where this lobby draws its power. Here, I’m not talking about money. For all I know, Israel channels all the money it wants to the lobby through American Jewish businessmen. And, as prior posts have deduced: Saudi Arabia, too, channels the same to the Israel lobby. Nor am I talking about the level of organization-and-mobilization of the American Jewish community on behalf of Israel - - and it is organized and, you bet: super- highly mobilized.

I’m talking about the wider source of the Israel lobby’s power: the American social consensus.

The American social consensus seems to allow for self-defined and acute distinction for some ethnic groups, even cherish these groups and their self-defined distinction. This allowance likely finds its source in the fear the wider society has of its own self. Without these groups, the regimentation by the wider social consensus could be so stiff , so unwavering, that it could spill over into outright fascism, destroying the very state the wider social consensus wants and needs to protect against chaos and internal strife. Two groups are given a special allowance: the American Jewish community and the African-American community. The first is allowed to rally its troops (so to speak) around the reality of savagery of the Holocaust and the sacredness of Israel-as-a-rallying cry for the preservation-of-community. The second: around the history and savagery of slavery and around the current reality of racism. Both groups (and there may be others that come-in-and-out of that status) are allowed to expect not only empathy but, too, a level of allegiance to the group, and not only from the troops themselves, but from the wider society.

Consider Lebanon. During the civil war and at the height of killing-based-on-sect, and massacres, the members of the Lebanese Armenian community could drive between east (Christian) and west (Muslim) Beirut without much fear. Taxis during flare-ups therefore would become increasingly manned by Armenian drivers. You could say that the Armenian community in sectarian Lebanon, at a time when that sectarianism had gone bloody, played the role of the seafety valve. The Armenian community was (and is) cherished by the wider and fractious Lebanese society. Typically, you hear the Lebanese Christians talk about the Armenians not as fellow Christians but as hard-working people who contribute to the wealth of the country - - a higher order, saintly really. To the Muslims and Druze, the Armenians aren’t like the Maronites - - case closed. The Armenians-to-Lebanon, as the Jewish and African-American communities -to-the-U.S., are the “outsiders,” the “arbitrators,” - - the pet all the family loves and through whom the family members overcome intra-family frustrations.

Consider that leftists/seculars inside the Christian heartland ran away to hide with the Druze - - who were as sectarian as the Maronites. (These Christian leftists/seculars, too, hid with the Palestinian Resistance Movement.) But, in the end, the Jumblatts, father-and-son, as sectarian as they come (Kamal wasn’t as sectarian as his son), historically had provided the Christian leftists/seculars with the needed protection. The consensus within the Christian community during the war, and even before, had gone so insane that the Christian leftists/seculars, to avoid being killed, ran away to Jumblatt’s Shuf Mountain to hide with the Druze. (Even in West Beirut, those Christians who ran away had protection from Jumblatt and from the Palestinians.)

You find something similar here: American leftists/liberals rely extensively on the African-American community. They hide behind its lines, so to speak.

The American state, by moving to rein in the Israel lobby, to strengthen the American state’s tenure in the Arab nation and the Muslim World, without understanding the source of that lobby’s power - - the wider social consensus - - is naive at best. There would be another route for the national security bureaucrats to take: to martial the efforts of the one community which can stand in the face of that lobby - - the defense community - - those millions-and-millions of people who benefit from the defense budget and who would not stand losing defense contracts because of Israel’s influence. But here-as-anywhere else, the politicians/entrepreneurs were ahead of the bureaucrats: the Israel lobby has long penetrated this establishment when it had laboriously worked through an “Evangelist-Zionist” alliance. Who are the millions-and-millions who benefit from the defense establishment but “Christians” - - the Christian-Right itself, which Crusader and Bald Samson had mobilized, with the Jewish Right (the Israel Lobby) floating-and-pushing the idea, and with many Jewish liberal hooraying it - - the idea: to crush the Arabs, the Sunni Muslims in particular - - to control an oil-filled piece of real estate?

11. That to go after BAE Systems, as a way of going after (legitimacy-wise not legally) figures which are associated with high corruption (e.g., members of the Saudi royal family) - - to do that as a way of appealing to the Arab public. Oh dear: to think that this would in fact obtain the American military presence in the Arab nation the legitimacy it needs to make its tenure permanent, and to prepare for acquiring yet another piece of real estate (Iran) by changing its government, at a time when the grip on Iraq itself still is tenuous at best. (Thus viewed, the Department of Justice investigation likely is a sham, an act.)

12. That the Palestinians are beyond the state of national liberation, having leased this national task/duty to the idiots-reluctant - - to liberate for them what is left of Historic Palestine (the June 4, 1967, territory) - - that these Palestinians themselves have liberated nothing but a prison called Gaza. That these Palestinians will not be LET DOWN and express themselves accordingly - - but this time in outright civil war (what’s new? The harmful idiots had done the same in Lebanon and in Iraq) thanks to the idiots-reluctant - - when they come to realize that the idiots-reluctant, national- security-or-not, should prove unable to return to them the leftover of Historic Palestine - -


13. That the Palestinian refugees will need to be compensated, and that the money at this time of national bankruptcies and low oil prices, would be available to do that and to bail out bankrupt Lebanon.

14. That Iran-squeezed will be an Iran that should be expected sooner-or-later to encourage to re-formulation of Arab nationalism, Islamist, melding Sunni-and-Shia, the Palestinians included, to burn down the neighborhood from under the very feet of the idiots-reluctant. That they may not be successful; that they may. That all now should have become aware, Iran in particular, and Syria, that the idiots-reluctant will divide-to-conquer. If only oil prices would spike.

Hope (and illusions, and assumptions) do spring eternal, don’t they?

PINCER AND AIR-TIGHT BLOCKADE: EXPLAINING IRAN TO ARAB ANALYSTS

second (rough) draft - - substantial changes in bold.

MONEY BUYS

When one reads an Arab newspaper one can, too, tell about its source of government funding. A couple of months ago, for example, al-Malaf (an Iraqi e-newspaper which I suspect is funded by Jordanian intelligence, backed by our CIA - –and which rants against Iran, non-stop) featured an article about Abu Dhabi’s emir. I read on, and on, and on - - but there wasn’t much to the article. Only that the emir had granted an interview to some publication, which interview had been carried by many newspapers. So? I was missing the point. Was I wanting of caffeine? It finally occurred to me that, hey, the U.A.E.’s Ministry of Information (highly) likely had passed money on to al-Malaf - - to rant even more about Iran, and to publish an article about how many other publications had re-printed that greatest-of-all-press interviews given by Abu Dhabi's emir. And the newspapers which adapted the interview likely, too, were receiving payments from the same source.

(Al-Malaf 's website is currently acting weird. I’m suspecting Iranian intelligence has done them in.)

So, on or about April 16, I read Arab analysts, including Palestinians who are appreciative of Iran’s assistance to the Palestinian National Movement, rant (uneasily) against Iran. Al-Quds al-Arabi, for instance, featured on that day a piece titled, “Fighting Words by Iran.” Oops, I thought. Was Mr. Atwan, the editor-in-chief, changing lanes? Has someone passed money on to his newspaper to influence its coverage? To go anti-Iranian?

Not, it turns out. Only that Mr. Atwan (and others) were stunned by assertions made by Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hasan Qashqawi, to the effect that the three islands contested between Iran and the U.A.E., belong to Iran, now and forever. As does the Gulf. So said Mr. Qashqawi.

Al-Quds reminded Iran that the islands were in fact Arab and that the Gulf really belonged to both - - Iranians and Arabs. Why was Mr. Qashqawi making such fighting statements at a time when the Arab agents of the United States and its Arabian protectorates are busy trying to divide the Arabs between Shia and Sunni to damn Iran - - at a time when the idiots-reluctant and their Saintly Beloved are of a mind to attack Iran, sooner-or-later? Has Iran gone mad?

NO

No. Iran hasn’t gone mad. Iran is reacting because it can. Because there are upcoming elections in Iran and statements such as Mr. Qashqawi's help Nejad gain votes. And because Iran is becoming all-too-aware that the idiots-reluctant and their Arab dwarfs are pushing more-and-more towards a total and air-tight squeeze on the Islamic Republic. And that Iran better go on the offensive - - if only mostly verbally - - since nothing else has worked. The idiots-reluctant, after all, with the help of Arabian oil surplus money (see prior posts), have encircled it in a seemingly (only seemingly) air-tight pincer-like fashion - -

- - From the west (al-Adid in Qatar, the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, 50,000 combat troops to remain in Iraq and likely around 25,000 in Kuwait).

- - From Turkey - - the idiots-reluctant are replacing Turkey-for-Israel in what matters about oil, the Muslim World, and the Arab nation - - having discovered (surprise!) that Israel and its Diaspora Nationalists hurt America’s plans immensely in those two worlds; (The Palestinian Arabs, it turns out, have way more power that they ever had thought.) Turkey is to become the new Overseer of Iraq for the idiots-reluctant and be prepared to dispatch its troops against Iran should the U.S. need assistance. Give that nuisance-of-a-beloved weapons and let it butt head with the local ones. So long as it doesn't claim any special ability to do America's business in the Arab nation and the wider Islamic World.

- - As if the recruitment of Turkey weren’t enough, the idiots-reluctant are adding troops in Afghanistan - - to tighten the noose around Iran's neck.

The military pincer and the de facto blockade couldn’t be tighter.

RUSSIA JOINS IN

To make things even worse for Iran, the idiots-reluctant likely have struck some sort of partnership with Russia (see the post before last) The fruit of that partnership are beginning to show their color: Maliki, likely on instruction by the idiots-reluctant, recently headed to Moscow. From there he announced that the “principle” of returning to Russia the oil contracts Russia had with the pre-invasion Arab Iraq - - that the Iraqi government will respect that “principle.” (The tortured use of “principle of contracts,” instead of an outright “come back to your contracts," likely has to do with (1) the idiots-reluctant wanting to make sure that Russia remains committed to torpedoing its nuclear program; and (2) Iraq wanting to bargain-and-negotiate about these contracts.)

So, with Russia being paid off, the pincer and the de facto blockade are yet even tighter.

To Iran, it must seem that the entire foreign policy of the United States is zooming in on the Islamic Republic. To the point where the idiots-reluctant are willing to give concessions on something for which American blood had been spilt - - control of Iraqi oil - - to the Russians to secure their support against that Republic.

REALITY CHECK

So, yes, the Islamic Republic will go on a war footing (a verbal spat, really) with the U.A.E. and the Arabian countries on the Western shores of the Gulf. For one, the Arab people - - I mean the people not the fattened elite - - of those countries don’t give a hoot about the U.A.E.’s islands. Why don't they give a hoot?

(a) because they know that the anti-Iran campaign originates with the United States, if only in effect, Israel’s sponsor - - that robber of Arab land and water and killer of Arab civilians in Lebanon and Gaza;

(b) because of Iran’s support for the vanguard of the new Arab nationalism, Hezbollah, and for Hamas and Hezbollah, the non-corrupt Arab entities - - non-corruption being what the Arab people, including in the Gulf countries, long for; and

c) because the people of the U.A.E., Qatar, and Kuwait are way too comfortable to care about islands or to want to make war.

Not to mention the other Arabs - - the public, that is, not the government officials who pocket money from the Gulf intelligence services and the idiots-reluctant. Even the drunkard British get better treatment and salaries in the U.A.E. than any Arab of limited means. I can almost hear the Egyptian and Moroccan masses voice solidarity with Iran on the islands. What have they gotten from the Saudi ruling elite, or the Emirati, or the Kuwaiti - - but the few dollars for low-paying jobs and for offering their daughters as prostitutes to that flatulent elite? What Arab common market has that elite pushed? What institutions has it molded to assure the unity of the Arab nation and the fair distribution of its wealth?

Iran runs minimal risk with statements such as those by Mr. Qashqawi. Who, after all, is going come to the help of the Palestinian National Movement or Hezbollah-the-vanguard-of-Arab-nationalism but Iran - - and to Syria’s? That Mr. Atwan and all the Arab analysts would jump up-and-down, so offended by Mr. Qashqawi’s statements! They should know better. They likely do. But they don’t want to be embarrassed, for Iran is their friend, and Mr. Qashqawi has done that - - embarrassed them before the ruling elite of the Arabian Peninsula. So they’re playing oblivious about the fact that elections are coming up in Iran and that Nejad, too, needs to mobilize the Iranian electorate - - just as any politician. The U.A.E., the islands, and the Gulf are symbolic enough to be superbly useful to mobilize but minimally harmful to the relations between the Islamic Republic and the Arab public - - not the Arabian elite.

Listen. I’m not gonna mince words: it doesn’t matter what government in Iran. The U.A.E. will never see these islands again. Listen harder: the Gulf is Persian because on one side is Persia, where real men live as once had in Arab Iraq - - albeit the Arab Iraqi men were stupid enough to fight an eight-year war with the Islamic Republic to protect the flatulent elite of the Arabian Gulf - - the ones who turned on them. (Do you blame Syria for not trusting them?) On the other: an elite that’s flatulent, corrupt - - non-men who think of their farting as music - - weasels, spoiled-by-an-abundance-of-money - - treacherous Judases who had helped entrap Arab Iraq (i.e. Kuwait) (their very defender) and then turned it in to the Diaspora Nationalists. It is of these Diaspora Nationalists that the Saudi elite runs scared. That Arabian Gulf elite, especially the Saudi, did it all to pleasure their partners-in-oil-and-obscene-corruption - - the Texas Cronies.

(Will the Arab Sunni of Iraq learn that the Arabian Peninsula farts will screw you the moment they can? That they run scared of the Diaspora Nationalists and would lick their balls to beg them not to start campaigns in the United States that question their royal privileges? Will the Arab analysts? Will they learn that with Arab nationalism having no oil money to back it, Iran -- even squeezed and blockaded - - is the only game in town? Not Turkey, and certainly not the idiots-reluctant?

WHO’S BEHIND THE BOMBS IN BAGHDAD?

UPDATED on 4/15/09: important changes in bold print.

ROUGH DRAFT - - notes I had jotted down but am late in posting.


AN ELEPHANT-OF-A-TRIP-WIRE HARDLY VITIATES DESPERATION

Even though the idiots-reluctant are leaving behind an elephant of a trip-wire in Iraq and the region, there are those who seem to want them to stay, in full. That is: at the current level, and even higher. These had hoped to make a come-back using their expertise at fighting Iran.

These, I suspect, were behind the spree of recent bombings directed at Shia civilians in Baghdad. Their main goal was to influence the decision-making of the Obama Administration - - to scare the idiots-reluctant into staying. But other goals were sought after, too. These likely are:

(1) to prove that the Shia State, in its current form , is incapable of protecting civilians - - and therefore is a failed state; as corollaries:

a. that, at a minimum, a new formulation-of-a-state is needed which would bring in non-Iran accepting Arab Sunni; and

b. that this new formulation would never see the light without the continued presence in Iraq of the troops of the idiots-reluctant.

The bombings were meant -

- - as a warning (and an attempt) to re-ignite the Sunni-Shia civil war, at a higher pitch than currently;

- - BUT, MOST IMPORTANTLY: as an attempt, using the threat of intensified civil strife, to influence Mr. Obama’s decision-making - - to keep the idiots-reluctant from withdrawing the troops; and

- - as a threat that the Sahwas would rejoin al-Qaeda which has been known for dispatching suicide bombers against Shia civilians - - to return to a solid Sunni block as good in its resistance as it once haad been, before it had trusted Saudi and Jordanian intelligence and the Diaspora Nationalists.

THE SAHWAS/THE OLD BAATH-TIED-TO-JORDANIAN-INTELLIGENCE

Although car bombings against Shia civilians had been taking place all along, they bumped upward following the arrest by Maliki’s troops of a Sahwa commander in Baghdad. Which tells the following story:

(1) that likely it was the Sahwas aka Old Baath-tied-to-Jordanian-intelligence - - and not the Islamists (al-Qaeda) - - who were behind the bombings. This interpretation rings especially true when one considers that Islamists have suicide-bombings as part of their arsenal, which the Sahwas and the Old Baath mostly don’t.

i. The fear: that if the troops withdraw - - which they’re not, they’re only being thinned out and they’ll be in Kuwait and Qatar, waiting - - then the Sahwas/Old Baath-tied-to-Jordanian-intelligence would have to eat it - - to become accommodating towards the Shia State. That would mean shedding the dream of making a come-back with the help of the idiots-reluctant. The Sahawas/Old Baath-tied-to-Jordanian intelligence had marketed their enmity towards Iran (and their skill at fighting it) to the harmful idiots and to Saudi intelligence . This just seems not to work with the idiots-reluctant (as opposed to the harmful idiots.) But they’re still trying, anyway. (Objectively, again: that ship had sailed; but hope does spring eternal, especially that the harmful idiots, Jordanian intelligence, and Saudi intelligence had stoked that false hope.)

THE RESPONSE

Responding to the attempt by the Sahwas/Old Baath-tied-to-Jordanian-intelligence to stoke the flames of the sectarian civil war, Muqtadha as-Sadr called for a demonstration joining tens of thousands in the heart of Baghadad. That demonstration called on the idiots-reluctant to get the hell out of the country. That was quite a risk as-Sadr had taken, what with car bombs exploding right-and-left. What was he up to?

If I were to take a guess, I think as-Sadr had likely assessed that the chief goal behind the explosions-against-the-Shia-civilians weren’t in their essence to intensify an otherwise low-intensity civil war . The explosion were meant chiefly to scare the idiots-reluctant enough (mostly about a future full of civil wars) for these to abort their plans to withdraw.

As-Sadr needed to send a message to balance that sent by the Sahwas/Old Baath-tied-to-Jordanian intelligence. (As opposed to Old Baath-tied-to-Syrian inelligence.) As-Sadr’s message:

We're aware that Jordanian intelligence is tied to the Sahwas/Old Baath, and that both of these work closely together. Too, we're aware that, at a minimum, the CIA keeps up with Jordanian intelligence, if not work closely with it. Accordingly, the three (Jordanian intelligence, Sahwas/Old Baath, and the CIA) can be said to be involved at different levels of activity and/or knowledge in the bombings-against-the-Shia-civilians. So here's our message: you continue on with this - - that is, your CIA doesn't rein in its Jordanians and these their Sahwas/Old Baath-tied-to-Jordanian intelligence - - and we shall unleash the waiting-to-happen (with Iran's blessing, if need be) populist movement to get you out-of-the-country with your tail between your legs. In other words, you're playing with fire. It'll be a political movement; but you kill more Shia civilians and it'll be armed, with the connivance of much of the security agencies of the Shia State - - the very ones you helped build. We should be able to turn the very Iraqi Shia State security struture you created against you.



Another part of the mssage: we’re men enough to divert the attention of our public away from armed retaliation against the Sunni by directing their attention to the occupation by the troops of the idiots-reluctant. Surprisingly, as-Sadr’s men and women behaved themselves.

OF FEAR AND DESPERATION

The fear of the Sahwas/Old Baath-tied-to-Jordanian-intelligence (and likely of Jordanian intelligence itself) is that political forces are behaving in accordance with the conclusion that the troops of the idiots-reluctant are departing, wholesale. That the only way to stem the tide of Arab-politics- that-cater-to-Iran’s-concerns is to wage an actual war on Iran - - by U.S. troops. A trip-wire, though elephant-size, wouldn’t do.

Why? Because not only did the harmful diots lose the Iraq war, the Arab regimes which had colluded with them (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Egypt) had lost the war, too - -the non-conventional one, that is. Which is really the one that matters. With the idiots-reluctant clearly not wanting a war with Iran at a time of national bankruptcy, and with the short-sighted Arab regimes not being able to win the non-conventional war (their tool had been and still is to deepen the Sunni-Shia divide to damn Iranian influence - - note Egypt's crackdown on Hezbollah-in-Egypt, alleging that it was planning attacks on Egyptian targets). Arab politics are bound to become more friendly to Tehran. The Saudi ruling elite, as a consequence, would have to strengthen the home front politically - - to enact reforms - - which it dreads.


You can see the repercussions of both failures - - that of the harmful idiots and that of the Arab regimes which had colluded with them in the invasion and occupation of Arab Iraq, to the point of allying themselves with Israel and its diaspora nationalists - - you can see the repercussions of those failures in the Syrian Muslim Brothers, who Saudi Arabia and the harmful idiots likely had funded , quitting the front that once had joined them to Saudi Arabia’s Syrian Sunni dwarf, Abdel-Halim Khaddam. Desperation by the Saudi and Egyptian elite had led them to beg Israel to finish Hamas; Israel couldn’t. But the beastliness and savageness of Israel’s war on Gaza’s population couldn’t but have affected the Syrian Muslim Brothers - - as it had everyone else. Now, another repercussion: even Hamas is refusing to join a government headed by either Abbas or Fayyad - - two harmful idiots’ “assets,” almost certainly, who had colluded with Israel in the savage attack on Gaza.

In short: the Sahwas/Old Baath-tied-to-Jordanian-intelligence is reading the political map in the region and is getting desperate as a result. The Saudis and Jordanians had tricked them into quitting their once-stellar armed resistance to seek an alliance with the harmful idiots. They helped them market their anti-Iran stance to the harmful idiots. The Sahwas/Old Baath-tied-to-Jordanian intelligence believed them: that the United States would carry through with a full-scale war on Iran and will put to use their expertise in the subject. It didn’t work. The political map, post-withdrawal, even with an elephant of a trip-wire remaining, looks bad for the Old Baath-tied-to-Jordanian-intelligence.

The Arab Sunni made the mistake of trusting Saudi Arabia and Jordan - - and a U..S. policy forever influenced heavily by Diaspora Nationalists - - be it a Republican or a Democratic Administration. When they quit their well-organized and alert resistance and instead put their trust in the very people who had stabbed them in the back - - the Saudi ruling elite - - the Arab Sunni of Iraq had committed political suicide. With that they put an end to Arab Iraq.


MOSUL

But what about the murder on Friday of five U.S. troops in Mosul? Was it a message, too? And who was sending it? Was it a message from the anti-U.S. Sunni (friendly with Syria) to the Sahwas/Old Baath-tied-to-Jordanian-intelligence (itself tied to the CIA) to cease-and-desist from trying to delay the departure of the occupying troops of the idiots-reluctant? If so, would Mr. Obama need to rein in those? Or was it a tool used by nervous Gulf countries’ intelligence services, with financial sway over the Islamists of Iraq - - their al-Qaeda which kills Arab Shia to fail the Shia State that is friendly with Iran - - to delay that very departure?

U.S. General Odierno, in the aftermath of the killing of the five troops, reacted by saying that like-operations would only delay the departure of U.S. troops from places like Mosul and Baaqouba. Has he fallen into the trap? Would Mr. Obama need to remind him not to bring Mr. Obama himself into that trap, too?

OUT-OF-IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN - - NOT AND NOT

second-and-a-half draft - - rough. But a diamond, really.

SUMMARY:

Quantitative Easing, and money from the surplus Saudi Arabia and the other Arabian Peninsula oil countries had amassed in the past few years, a part of which they’re passing on to the idiots-reluctant, have given new life to the idiots-reluctant’s military tenure in Iraq and Afghanistan. Too, it’s unlikely the Obama Administration would’ve increased the number of troops in Afghanistan but for a new understanding - - even possible partnership - - reached with Russia, which partnership in part seems to be directed at Iran.

Withdrawal of the troops from the two countries is dependent on a number of factors: (1) the return of fiscal conservatism to American politics; (2) American casualties in both Iraq and Afghanistan; (3) the ups-and-downs of the understanding/partnership with Russia - - e.g., on the use of Turkey in Afghanistan; (4) the level of exhaustion of the oil-money surplus of the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, and whether oil prices would spike or fall; and (5) the ability of the U.S. and U.K. mercenary contractors to create new and cheaper armies-of-mercenaries from Third World countries to replace the very expensive Western and South African mercenaries.

The promise to withdraw the troops is looking more-and-more like an act. So is the nervousness of the Saudi ruling elite about Iran. The Saudi ruling elite wants nothing less than the total defeat of the Islamic Republic in which it sees a catalyst for vibrant political opposition at home. Saudi Arabia’s tool: U.S. troops, paid for with the oil money surplus of the last few years. For now, Iran is more isolated than ever before.

[NOTE: Here are the figures I ran into in the Arab press on or about November 23, 2008, about "loans" given the U.S. by oil countries of the Arabian Peninsula:

Saudi Arabia: $120 billion.
U.A.E.: $ 70 billion.
Qatar: $60 billion.
Kuwait: $40 billion.

Later Note: Be mindful that the above figures came from a Syrian e-newspaper, quoting a Kuwaiti newspaper. Still: I lean heavily towards trusting the figures and as heavily into assessing that yet more "loans" will be provided the U.S. to assure its stay in Iraq, inside and right outside the border.)

THE SHIA STATE IN IRAQ AND ITS CUNNING USE OF THE IDIOTS-RELUCTANT

00 Are we gonna get out of Iraq?

- - The idiots-reluctant don’t want to. The superficial reason would be that they don’t want to deliver Iraq to Iran. They don’t trust that Turkey can balance Iran inside of Iraq, mainly because of Turkey’s Kurdish national assertiveness. (Note that the recent municipal elections in Turkey showed the Kurds vote mostly Kurdish. In other words: they’re fairly secessionist.) The long-term reason, however, is that they want to subdue the Islamic Republic. In essence, the idiots-reluctant still are on the same course as their predecessors: to establish bases across the globe and assert control over oil and natural gas routes and sources. To that end, subduing the Islamic Republic is necessary, especially that not only Iraqi oil is at stake – but the oil and its pipelines in the Caspian Sea Basin. In that vein, control of Iraq allows for tighter economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic since Iraq - - and not Dubai nor Lebanon - - would be that Republic’s best outlet to break through these sanctions.

The current government structure is Shia-to-the-bone. A tad strange since Iraq, when governed by Baathists, many Sunni, never had been so sectarian. The Shia were part-and-parcel of the “Sunni”-led government. But not-so-strange if one considers that colonialism always had relied on divide-and-conquer; and that terrifically Jewish Diaspora nationalists (not secular people by any stretch) had spearheaded the New Colonialism. Iraq got what the Diaspora Nationalists, sectarian-to-the-bone, had prayed for - - a sectarian and divided Iraq.

While the Shia government minds Iran’s concerns and is careful not to alienate it – note Muwaffaq al-Rabi’i’s creative attempts to try to rid Iraq of the Mujaheedeen Khalq – it nonetheless wants an association with the United States. It sees benefits in both relationships. In a word, the soul-and-the-pocket of nearly each-and-every-visible-and significant-Shia-leader of today’s Iraq is bereft with double-agency, with divided but not contradictory allegiance - - half-of-each-soul-and-pocket to the idiots-reluctant and half-of-the-same to the Islamic Republic.

00 What about the recent operation in al-Fadhl neighborhood against the Sahwas?

- - That’s the beauty of an alliance with the idiots-reluctant. But for the presence of U.S. troops, the Shia State would have to go it alone: fight a civil war with the Sunni. That would alienate the hell out of the Arab Sunni states. Even the Syrian government could feel threatened by a like-war. Instead: partner up with the idiots-reluctant to suppress the Iraqi Sunni - - and these same Arab Sunni states would have to shut up. Our intelligence services, I strongly suspect, have the elite of those states by the balls. They don’t dare do anything. They spin-and-twirl in their own weakness. The most they can do is pass money on to the Sunni leaders. But that gets them nowhere. That money reaches the Sunni Islamists who kill other Sunni (e.g., Sunni police recruits of the Shia State.) Their money ends up funding an intra-Sunni civil war in Iraq. The Islamists, true, kill Shia too; but they kill Sunni as well. Result: intra-Sunni civil war along with a low-intensity Sunni-Shia civil war.

00 So everyone is putting us to use?

- - You bet. We’re now beyond idiocy, way beyond. Texas Oil and the Diaspora Nationalists have put us in the most awkward of situations. We’re pulling at both ends. Totally uncalled for. And now Mr. Obama is running scared of his own Defense Secretary. (ADDED: I take this back. Mr. Obama is using Mr. Gates to effect needed cuts and save the federal govrernment. Better that these cuts be made by man trusted by the military-industrial establishment/complex than by anyone else.) Not to mention that the Diaspora Nationalists – the liberals, this time - - obviously have influence over him. And their Israel wants us there. The Saudis, too. (A renewed alliance between the two in Washington, D.C., where Saudi Arabia kicks in money to the Israel lobby?) Mr. Obama-the-President has shed Mr. Obama-the-candidate.

So: no, Mr. Obama doesn’t want to leave Iraq. The promise to withdraw the troops from Iraq is, practically speaking, an act. The planned stay of 50,000 combat troops can easily be supplemented any time the need arises with U.S. troops stationed close-by at al-Adid in Qatar and across the border in Kuwait. If anything, you can withdraw the troops via Turkey, only to re-route them (or others) back to Qatar and Kuwait , without the media ever getting a hint of it.

OUT-OF-IRAQ: THE SAUDI RULING ELITE

00 What are the Saudis afraid of?

- - Their own people.

00 It’s not Iran?

- - Hardly. Theirs is an act, too. Saudi Arabia lives under the defense umbrella of the United States. So Iran couldn’t be a military threat. But a strong Iran will mean a more daring Saudi Shia community which could demand (and is) more political participation and a stake in the wealth of its country. But things don’t stop here. With oil revenues diminishing, and the surplus decreasing (at a rate very much related in part to the scale of payments the Saudis are making for the American military tenure in Iraq and Afghanistan) political opposition within the Saudi public, non-Shia, should eventually begin to re-assert itself. The timing depends on the scale of oil revenues and the level of the accumulated surplus. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, when the Saudi state had been in debt, the Saudi opposition had been vibrant. (Some even claim that the Saudi oppostion had been so threatening that the Saudi royals developed an intense interest in Lebanon. That country was to become an alternative heaven to run-to should they lose power in Saudi Arabia. That one senior Saudi prince could buy up all of Lebanon’s real estate; and that in fact they were doing that through the late Rafiq al-Hariri.) There’s always a concern in countries in the Arab nation that other Arab states (and Iran and others) may fund their political opposition.

Iran or no Iran, the Saudi Shia in no way can be a threat to the royal-extended-family- government. But the Saudi ruling elite doesn’t trust its own self to co-opt that minority into the political system. The reason lies in the fact that the Saudi royal elite has been victim of a mix of three phenomena: (1) its servility to the Cronies of the Oil Republic of Texas (e.g., Crusader); (2) its own incompetence (e.g., having allowed Osama bin-Laden to gather huge popularity within the government structure of Saudi Arabia, and failing to infiltrate his Organization, or even feeling the need to do that, even though the Saudi government should’ve been the prime candidate - - not us - - to achieve the infiltration of the organization founded by a Saudi-politician-in-exile.) and (3) its shedding of any pretense to Arabism. That force - - Arabism - - would’ve had (and had) a neutralizing effect on Shia nationalism within the Kingdom, or any divisive nationalism-based-on-sect within the Arab nation.

The Saudi ruling elite lost any claim or pretense to Arabism when it had colluded with Israel-via-the-Diaspora-Nationalists and with Texas Oil/the Republic of Texas (Crusader and Bald Samson) to finish the only competent large army left in the Arab World – Arab Iraq’s. And as that elite continued to collude against three other , albeit less powerful, armies – Syria’s, Hamas’, and Hezbollah’s. . What that elite was left with was a Sunni identity, with nothing added - - and hardly trusted at that very identity! Why the want of trust? Corruption and jealousy about the birth-right privileges (e.g., salaries for-no-work) given to thousands-upon-thousands of princes (and princesses) eat away at that Sunni legitimacy. Imprisoned in that mold, that elite couldn’t trust its own self to bring the Saudi Shia into the fold – because it cannot see even the need for such, having so de-Arabized by selling out to Israel’s people in the United States and to these people’s ally - - the Evangelist Armies of the Oil Republic of Texas.

Thus: the war the Saudi ruling elite is fighting - - the very war it wants us to fight for them - - isn’t really a war on Iran. They’re already protected on that front by our presence in the Gulf - - in Qatar, in the U.A.E., in Kuwait, and in Iraq. Their concern is that Iran’s sway over Iraq, even when the Kingdom itself isn’t in any military danger, would translate into a more vibrant political opposition within the Kingdom - - both Sunni and Shia - - to the extended-family-form of government. Again: it wouldn’t take that much to co-opt the Shia community. The real fear: political opposition among the Sunni. Which, too, wouldn’t be that big a deal had the royal structure of governance not been so unwieldy. (See prior posts.)

(Watch as the idiots-reluctant become confused at the reappearance of the Saudi opposition should oil prices slide any further and should the Saudi surplus continue to be spent on footing the bill for U.S. armies in Iraq and Afghanistan and on salaries for thousands-upon-thousands of princes and princesses. If Arab nationalism makes a come-back, it’ll speed up the rise of the Saudi opposition. The Saudi ruling elite may try to direct that nationalism against Iran. But it may not succeed. That nationalism may revolve around “our money” and “our resources” and the “squandering” of these on “Crusader” troops who are the military backbone of Israel. Should Arab nationalism make a come-back, Iran will have to decide whether to fear it or to encourage it. But for as long as the Saudi oil money surplus is healthy, not much of significance will happen. Discuss. )

OUT-OF-IRAQ-AND-AFGHANISTAN: THE DOMESTIC SCENARIO

00 So we’re not gonna get out.

- - The scenario for seeing-us-out relates more to the economic crisis we’re living than anything else. International trouble-making is softening. Russia seems to be once again bargaining away its alliance with Iran for an understanding with the United States. Note the recent meeting between Medvedev and Obama, the earlier talk by U.S. officials about pushing the “reset” button with Russia, and the statement issued by both countries in part calling on Iran to stop enriching uranium and to open its facilities to inspection. All of this, of course, would be to naught if Russia doesn’t see returns.

00 And where do you think the domestic scenario is heading.

- - The glut of the U.S. dollar-as-international-currency will mean that rivals will have money to counter U.S. plans to spread bases across the globe to, in part, control oil routes and the oil itself. Let us do some assessment. Let’s consider the theory that says that this urge to control oil-and-its-pipelines has to do with three perceived needs:

(1) the perceived need for us to have cheap energy. Here, you control Iraqi oil, for instance, and you’re able to control the world market, not only OPEC, and keep energy prices low by pumping Iraqi oil at your pleasure.

(2) The perceived need by the mandarins to control events in the world. By controlling oil you can choke off China, for instance. And

(3) The perceived need of the Oil Cronies, who are a center-of-power-onto-themselves in the United States, based in the Oil Republic of Texas, and equaled only by Wall Street, to make more money for their cronies-for-their-cronies-for-their-cronies.

But two out of the three goals are failing.

The dollar glut is such that, in the absence of higher interest rates by the Fed and in the absence of taxation by the federal government - - both of which would eat away at the glut - - that glut will continue to be a crucial factor in determining success or failure in foreign policy , to wit: imperial control of resources. Accumulated capital will seek out oil-and-other-minerals at any moment the economy starts reviving because, in essence, accumulated capital has been robbed of acceptably-profitable-harbors such as a decent interest rate from Treasury bonds, or similar issues overseas.

As accumulated capital runs over to oil to partake in the revival of the world economy, it’ll create a bubble around that staple and around other mineral resources. (Note China’s hoarding of copper!) Unless you can take Iraq from around 2 - 2.5 million bpd production level to 7-8 million production level, oil prices are bound to shoot through the roof – as they did only too recently. Besides, it would be foolish to ignore resource nationalism based on the representations by this-or-that-traitor-to-his-country. Resource nationalism in Iraq should be a force to reckon with, sooner or later, and that nationalism would be unlikely to allow the American tax-base to transfer Iraq’s wealth to the United States, anyway.

Accordingly: bases overseas and oil grabs a la Iraq don’t work in achieving the first goal - - to secure lower prices for oil. The dollar glut translates into money in the pockets of rivals, and that into good (and inexpensive) use of nationalism against the idiots-reluctant's plans. Add to that resource nationalism which should emerge sooner-or-later after an invasion and seeming successful control of oil and oil-routes. In the end: the dollar glut nixes that goal and that strategy.

The second goal - - to choke off rivals such as China. Here again, the dollar glut nixes that, too. China accumulates a surplus of nearly 2 trillion dollars. It can now buy a lot of oil-rights (e.g., Russia) and mineral-rights (e.g., Australia) and wait for the revival of the U.S. and world economies. It’s a chicken game at which we lose even as we win. Meaning: we want to wait-out China until it spends its two-trillion in foreign reserves to deny it the use of the 2 trillion to gain superpower status. So we wait for political turmoil in China to force it to spend-and-spend. We’re sure we won’t have turmoil here, only people devastated by financial insecurity and loss of livelihood who, without a union to represent them, go postal. Going postal beats political turmoil any day. Right? But China IS spending the two-trillion. The two-trillion is such a huge sum for China and for the world that China can spend on a stimulus while buying up the seeds (so-to-speak - - oil rights and mineral rights) for an industrial/export re-birth, as soon as we take-off economically. Who’s waiting out who? Are we then going to go protectionist all-the-way to deny China the superpower status? The domestic forces lined up against protectionism are gargantuan. Some protectionism: yes. Protectionism of the kind that would deny China superpower status - - unlikely.

00 Still: doesn’t answer the question.

- - For reasons of their own, the idiots-reluctant are printing money (“quantitative easing.”) They have no choice but. Accumulated capital just doesn’t want to buy Treasury bonds at this time. So you have the Federal reserve buy these. That’s printing money. The Texas Republic Oil Cronies had succeeded at bankrupting the federal government - - a not-so-secret goal of theirs. When you bankrupt the federal government, you force it to increase taxes and pay higher interest rates. But you can only do that (increase taxes . . .) to survive – to float. To enact programs-for-the-dreaded-masses - - such as a national health plan - - you’d need a surplus. Mr. Obama retaliated against being forced into the corner of increasing taxes-increasing-interest-rates by seeking out the alternative to that: “quantitative easing.” Yes it’s inflationary, but we’ll deal with that when the time comes. Or the Republicans (a new administration) will have to deal with that when the time comes - - and therefore become supremely unpopular.

The hope of the Obama people is that the “quantitative easing” would save his administration from failing, a failure which the Republic of Texas Oil Cronies had planned for him (or even for McCain had he made it.) (The Texas Republic Oil Cronies has never liked McCain, anyway.)

Just as the Texas Republic of Oil Cronies had wanted to placate the Democrats by bankrupting the federal government (in part by paying-off the military-industrial-complex over which the Cronies hold sway), Mr. Obama is returning the favor through quantitative easing. Will come a time where no one can gain control of the White House (Republican or Democrat) unless they react to inflation by increasing taxes and raising interest rates. Which would mean that within the Republican Party, there should be a re-formulation of priorities away from profligate spending on made-up so-called-wars that would take the federal government to the cleaner's -- and towards fiscal conservatism. That - - fiscal conservatism - - should pull the country out of expensive entanglements in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. For now, though, quantitative easing, along with oil surplus money from Saudi Arabia and the other Arabian Peninsula oil countries, should fund the two tenures in Iraq and Afghanistan. ( In one post a while ago, I outlined what the Arab press had said about how much money these countries had paid to the U.S. allegedly to help it with its financial meltdown - - but truly to pay for our tenure in Iraq. See summary above.)

00 So, you’re saying, that unless Saudi money replaces the American, we eventually will have to leave Iraq and Afghanistan?

- - Saudi money (and other Arabian Peninsula oil money) already has. Those who want the troops back home will have to wait for that well to dry up. When it does, should fiscal conservatism be in vogue in the country, then the troops will be on their way back home and the idiots-reluctant would shed the illusion that our strength comes from our military deployments and not from the economic strength of the home front - - and the appropriate taxation to go along with that strength. Even then, fiscal conservatism couldn’t do it alone. It’ll need (1) casualties - - no one leaves unless they’re stung over-and-over; (2) relatively low oil prices to disallow the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the Emiratis and other oil-rich Arabian ruling elites from funding the troops’ tenure ; (3) an Arab - - preferably Saudi and Kuwaiti . . . - - political opposition to cease on that; and (4) ineffectiveness by new and cheap mercenaries from such places as the Philippines, trained by U.S. and U.K. mercenary corporations to keep the Arabs of Iraq and the Afghans in check. .

00 But who’s going to finance a war on us that would create casualties?

- - Logically: Iran. But I don’t think they’re up-to-it. Unless we make some serious concessions towards the Russians - - then the Russians. (The Chinese are praying we recuperate fast, even if they lose value on their one-trillion-or-so in the Treasury notes they hold.)

Oddly (and logically), Iran’s horse in Iraq isn’t the Shia state. They have that one. Iran’s horse is the Sunni. In Afghanistan: it’d be the Pashtun - - the Taliban, that is. But this is only theoretical for, again, Iran cannot do it alone. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently (before the G-20 meeting) had called on the Taliban to shed their weapons and accept the Afghan Constitution. He had been paving the way for the reconciliation that took place later in London between Obama and Medvedev. In other words, Russia isn’t on board for increasing U.S. casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan to force their departure once fiscal conservatism makes a come-back to the mainland United States. So, for now, Iran has to stick to the Shia State in Iraq and, in Afghanistan, away-from-the-Taliban - - at least no relationship with any gusto - - with the hope that the Shia State would protect it from the idiots-reluctant.

00 So, no withdrawal soon?

- - No. Mr. Obama wouldn’t have increased the number of troops in Afghanistan had he not known that Russia would cooperate. So he’s cooking up something with the Russians - - maybe some long-term partnership. Or maybe a promise that once the situation in Afghanistan is somewhat stabilized, and face-saving becomes possible for U.S. troops and others (e.g., NATO and likely increased numbers of Turkish troops), then the U.S. would withdraw in full. You’d have to be a fool to want to go through what the Russians had experienced in Afghanistan. In Iraq - - the Gulfies, especially the Saudis, should continue to kick money into our tenure there. Until the surplus from the recent years of high oil prices - -until that dries up. That Arabian Peninsula surplus money likely is being applied to Afghanistan and Pakistan, too.

CONCLUSION

Quantitative easing and Arab oil surplus money translate into extended tenures in both Iraq and in Afghanistan. Too, they translate into increased isolation for Iran. The Islamic Republic has been there before. But it never had as many U.S. (and possibly Turkish) troops so tighten the noose around its neck.