THE POLITICIAN AS CON ARTIST: CHARLES DE GAULLE, FRANCE-IN- ALGERIA, AND THE ISRAEL-ANCHORED IDIOTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

draft

(I owe the title- - “The Politician as Con-Artist”- - to a very close friend.)

I neither have the time nor the in-depth knowledge to draw comprehensive analogies between France’s predicament in Algeria in the 1950s and America’s current predicament, especially as Israel-Anchored, in the Muslim World. Things likely cut both ways: The experiences are analogous here, not so-analogous there.

But it has seemed to me as I was reading Charles Williams’ book (see below) that France’s experience in Algeria does sound the alarm on a number of fronts. One of these grabbed my attention more than others: The military’s narrow views on the Algeria conflict and the support that the Military enjoyed in a sector of the population that benefited from these views - - the European settlers in Algeria. In the 1950s, French politicians wouldn’t dare speak of withdrawing from the costly entanglement in Algeria. It didn’t matter that military victories would prove vacuous in their political non-results. If anything, these victories, in Algeria, would prove counter-productive when it came to winning any hearts or minds among the Algerian people, the real Algerians, the Muslims - - not the settlers.

Draft

Hence the statesmanship of Charles de Gaulle; only he knew how to do it- - to extricate France from the bottomless pit that was Algeria. To follow his progress and learn how the Master did it, you may want to go to Charles Williams, The Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General de Gaulle. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993.

Draft

In that book, you may want to cut to the chase and proceed to the following pages: 363 to 407. That would be Part Seven, titled “Head of State.” In Part Seven, you would need to focus on chapter 1 (The General’s Resurrection,) chapter 2 (I Have Understood You’,) and chapter 3 (Algeria Is Not French.)

WHEN THE MILITARY HAS A POLITICAL LIFE OF ITS OWN

De Gaulle, to Charles Williams, was endowed with so much courage. How else explain his stubbornness if one considers that he was the subject of thirty-or-so assassination attempts, mostly because of his policy about Algeria? Though I didn’t delve into who the schemers were, it was quite obvious that the “Ultras” had sprouted most of them. There has seemed to be an association between these and the French Military in Algeria. The French military establishment there had a political life of its own: “the army wanted no surrender in Algeria;” (p. 369) and neither did the Ultras. The military establishment cared little about the economic woes of the nation and the cost of the Algeria enterprise. That military establishment was focused in the way a mule would be.

Draft

That establishment even dared scheme for a coup d’etat in the mainland should its wishes be ignored. It had a name for its planned coup: Operation Resurrection. (372-373.) Even de Gaulle, the former General, seemed accepting of that fate (376), and not reluctantly. (377-378.) France could very well sink into a civil war with the coup or without. The Algeria-based French military had so taken over political decision-making that one cabinet minister had noted that the Minister for Algeria could not go to Algeria. (375.)

On June 3, 1958, the Assembly granted General de Gaulle (as Prime Minister) the special powers he needed to deal with Algiers. Remember: the army there at one time had thought he was on their side since, for one, he had given them a nod for Operation Resurrection:

“De Gaulle’s next task was to assert his Government’s authority in Algiers. It was certainly not going to be easy. The generals there were firmly of the view that it was they who had brought de Gaulle to power in France; and that they had done so specifically in order that Algeria might be incorporated into France and the rebellion ruthlessly put down. De Gaulle had done nothing to dispel that view . . .; indeed, he had not hesitated to invoke the threat of Operation Resurrection, and that threat had been a powerful card in his hand.” (381)

In other words, the General conned the military establishment in Algeria. He would later, at the time of his choosing, turn on them.

Draft

On June 4, de Gaulle visited Algiers to a roaring welcome. The settlers were sure he was on their side, but that feeling would prove fleeting. They could tell. (There were one million of them to nine million Algerians.) The General had nursed along the impression of his sympathy to their cause when in his speech to them he had said, “I have understood you.” (382) But he had confided to some that “we cannot keep Algeria.” (383) This confidence must’ve slipped out and spread among the settlers fast enough for the General’s poster portraits, put up only a week or two earlier, to be soon torn down.

A FAIRE TOUT POUR LE MOMENT-DE-L’ALGERIE

De Gaulle’s agenda was to extricate France from North Africa. For that, he needed the support of the armed forces. So he “was out to secure the firm support of the army as servants of the republic.” (385) He, too, had come to realize that to survive in the new world and thrive, France needed to be governed differently - - it needed a new constitution. So he launched on his double mission. But have no doubt: As I wrote in my notes, using my French, “Il [General de Gaulle] a tout travaille pour le moment de l’algerie.” (“He had worked everything for the Algeria Moment.”)


Draft


“The final brick in the edifice of the Fifth Republic,” wrote Willliams, “Was the election of a President.” (391) No sooner would Mr. de Gaulle move into that spot, that “[t]axes would be increased, social security payments cut, farm subsidies reduced.” (392) De Gaulle had conned the very French people who had elected him; they had not voted him to the Presidency to do that. Here’s Williams: “It must be rare, in any democratic system, for an election to have been fought and won on an economic prospectus that was so misleading.” (392)

Moving on to Algeria: “It was messy, nasty and dangerous. It had all the characteristics that politicians most fear: there was no obviously political solution; the passions aroused were intense; violence had become commonplace; and positions were so entrenched that there was no identifiable room to maneuver.” (399)

Draft

The General’s first move was to change personnel in Algeria—to purge those officers in the army in Algeria who he considered unreliable. Not only were high-ranking officers let go, but a further 1500 officers of lower rank were inconspicuously transferred or retired. (399) A major purge.

ILLUSIONS DO PERSIST EVEN AMONG POLITICALLY-SAVVY PEOPLE

But the general wasn’t without his illusions. He nursed ideas about defeating the Algerian nationalists if only to force them to negotiate on his terms. In December 1958, under the leadership of one commander-in-chief of de Gaulle’s choice, the French army conducted a ruthless campaign against the Algerian Army of National Liberation. Part of that campaign required the uprooting of one million Algerians. “It was appalling, but militarily it was successful. Politically, on the other hand, it did not work. The Algerian troops refused to give up.” (400)

Draft

“As he paced around the garden at Colombey, [de Gaulle] came to two conclusions. First, the cost of the war was politically and economically too great and in the end would pull down France herself. Second, the only solution that made any sense was Algerian independence.” (400)

These conclusions must’ve horrified the generals. One of them gave an interview to a German journalist which was published in January 1960. That general said the army perhaps had made a mistake in bringing de Gaulle back to power and, “as far as he and the majority of officers in positions of command were concerned, [he] would ‘not execute unconditionally the orders of the head of state’.” (401) De Gaulle reacted by sacking the general - -in spite of advice to him that the sacking would lead to bloodshed in Algiers. (Which it did.) “De Gaulle would have none of it. A soldier had broken the first rule of his profession: unquestioning allegiance to the civil power. That was all there was to be said.” (401) De Gaulle-the-flexible had forgotten that he himself had once given a nod to the military for a coup d’etat. But times have now changed. He was President and he was intent on carrying through with his plans to extricate France from Algeria.

Draft

The rebellion by the senior officers began a course of outright collision between the General/President and the French army in Algeria. The General would involve the French public to neutralize those of Algeria. In the end, the settlers read the sign on the wall: they began a mass exodus from Algeria. In May 1962 alone, 300,000 left their North African homes. (405-406)

Williams: “As it turned out, de Gaulle’s extrication of France from Algeria was the making of his reputation as a statesman.” (399)